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"No matter how evolved humans think they are, we still have the same flight-or-
fight instincts of our caveman ancestors."
— Ernessa T. Carter, 32 Candles
Flight to Safety, Flight to Quality and Flight to Liquidity, have been searched
in Google for over 14,000 times since 2004. The economic literature uses these
terms loosely and interchangeably as the ‘short-run and sudden’ perverse move-
ment of capital from risky to safe assets in search of safety, quality and liquidity.
On uncertain, volatile and illiquid market trading days, patterns of multi-asset
correlations known as ‘risk off’ and ‘risk on’ emerge. In risk off, investors favour
safer assets like bonds, gold and safe-haven currencies, while simultaneously most
risky assets as equities, commodities and emerging market currencies run out
of favour. In risk on, the reverse phenomenon occurs as investors become more
willing to indulge in risky ventures. These episodes of correlated flight of invest-
ment capital from risk to safety or in the reverse direction have been frequently
occurring since the global financial crisis. They have been more frequent than
could be defended by the central tenet of neoclassical macroeconomics, the inter
temporal substitution of consumption which posits capital revaluation arises from
a desire to consume more today vs tomorrow. The long-run covariance in daily
returns of US 10-year treasury bonds and S&P 500 has been negative since 2005.
Incidentally, in this period, the US has witnessed a severe crisis and prolonged
recovery. The two seem related. It seems there is causality running from asset-
prices to business cycles and not in the other way where macroeconomics generally
searches for it.
The evidence is clear, risk on, risk off, capital flight and other asset prices
phenomenon reflect our desire to change portfolio risk over time. Despite the
extensive evidence linking risk aversion and precautionary behaviour to asset
price adjustments and volatile fluctuations, the literature has mainly focused only
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on the passphrase ‘short and sudden’ of the Flight to Safety phenomenon. By
exploring the capital flight phenomena only from an asset pricing and market
imperfections perspective, it has mostly overlooked their implications for long term
macroeconomic dynamics and policymaking. Evidence also suggests that these
phenomena are rich in information about the way we form economic expectations,
and therefore, it is the objective of this thesis to evaluate their long term impact
on the macroeconomy.
The thesis contains three main chapters that investigate the Flight to Safety
phenomenon and its impact on the macroeconomy from an empirical and theoret-
ical perspective. In doing so, it advocates for a more significant role of investors’
time-varying, state-varying and cyclical risk aversion in macroeconomic models
and policy analysis. The first chapter establishes that Flight to Safety, a sudden
and short term asset market phenomenon is worth the attention, as the identified
Flight to Safety shocks have long-run adverse impact on US business cycles. The
investigation then takes the direction to theoretically formalize the role of Flight
to Safety in micro-founded DSGE models. The second chapter establishes that
similar to the asymmetric impact of flight of capital (to safety or risk) on asset
markets, the optimal policy for investors with cyclical risk-aversion should also
be asymmetric in costly recessions. The third chapter brings the analysis back to
Flight to Safety by demonstrating it as an optimal response in costly recessions
when risk-averse investors have a low risk-bearing capacity. Abstract from each
of the chapters follows.
Chapter 1 examines the dynamic effects and empirical significance of Flight to
Safety (FTS) shocks in the context of US business cycles. FTS represents a sud-
den preference for safe over risky investments and contains important information
on agents’ time varying risk-aversion and their expectations for future economic
activity. This analysis presents an identification for FTS shocks using vector au-
toregressions (VAR). Sign restrictions are applied, while controlling for monetary
policy and productivity shocks, on the price differential series between stocks and
bonds in the US. Identified positive disturbances to this differential series are
characterised as FTS shocks. The business cycle impact of FTS is calculated by
applying the structural VAR model to the US economic data from 1954 to 2019.
A sudden increase in risk aversion, which is displayed through the FTS shocks in
the identified VAR model, has played a significant role in keeping investments low
in the US. FTS shocks explain more than sixty percent of the variation in US in-
vestments and they explain a higher proportion of macroeconomic fluctuations in
periods around the Global financial crisis. This is a significant linkage when com-
pared against results of DSGE models enriched with time-varying risk-premium
and investment technology. FTS also comes up ahead of news shocks in providing
early signals of shifts in total factor productivity. This analysis is consistent with
other comparable high-frequency, kernel-based measures of identifying FTS. The
results also reveal the asymmetric impact on the business cycle of Flight to Safety
and its complement Flight to Risk phenomenon. This asymmetry lends support
to pursuing a cyclical risk-aversion driven view of business cycles.
Chapter 2 explores the economic theoretical DSGE model based evidence that
can explain the asymmetric result of the previous chapter. Standard analyses
using the New-Keynesian (NK) model find that the policymaker cares far more
about inflation stabilisation than any other policy objective. Empirical evidence,
however, suggests that stabilisation of output, especially during recessions, is a
more significant concern for policymakers than what the benchmark NK model
implies. Evidence also suggests that the pre-Global financial crisis the Federal
Reserve followed an asymmetric monetary policy. It involved slow reaction to
increasing rates in expansionary phases but swift response to cutting rates during
the recessionary periods. This chapter, therefore, solves for the globally optimal
policy using Chebyshev’s collocation method in an NK model which features
costly recessions. The device used to generate costly recessions is taken from
the literature on the equity risk premium which can generate such premia by
assuming that household consumption habits make any loss of consumption in
a bad state (or economic contraction) particularly harmful for households. The
optimal discretionary policy result is non-linear and asymmetric during good and
bad states of the economy. During bad states, it is geared towards addressing the
output gap ahead of the inflationary gap. The asymmetry of the optimal policy is
motivated to correct for the inherent asymmetries in the way households’ precau-
tionary behaviour is affected by the various states of the macroeconomy. Ignoring
the households’ precautionary motives could lead to costly policy mistakes.
Chapter 3 continues with the economic theoretical DSGE model based inves-
tigation into generating Flight to Safety mechanism as an optimal response to
cyclical changes in individual risk aversion. The Flight to Safety phenomenon
has been portrayed in literature as an aberrant reaction to some form of market
externalities, valuation constraints or Knightian uncertainty. This consideration
of Flight to Safety as a short-term and an asset market phenomenon has also
resulted in it being overlooked for the purposes of macroeconomic theory and
policymaking. Whereas, recent empirical evidence suggests that the Flight to
Safety that exists even in low-frequency data, has significant information about
future productivity and business cycle performance. Therefore this chapter pro-
duces a new micro-founded general equilibrium approach to model Flight to Safety
phenomenon observed during recessions or bad states of the economy. It show-
cases Flight to Safety as an optimal policy response by individuals in an NK
model which features costly recessions and an option to switch between risky and
safer production technology. Due to the presence of consumption habits, there
is a non-linear increase in marginal utility once consumption gets closer to the
subsistence level of habits, this makes recessions costly. The households find it
more hurtful losing a unit of consumption in bad states than losing a unit in
boom times. However, making a precautionary switch towards a safer asset allo-
cation safeguards the investors against any loss of future income. Global solution
methods demonstrate that ex-ante Flight to Safety is the optimal response for
individuals that are consuming closer to their subsistence, and that calls for a
remedial policy response. These findings substantiate the macro-finance based
explanations of recessions by demonstrating that Flight to Safety stems inher-
ently from individual’s risk aversion even in the absence of intermediate credit
constraints or information asymmetry.
The thesis makes multiple contributions of which the three major ones are as
follows. Firstly, its central conviction is to identify the role of Flight to Safety
as the critical driver of business cycle fluctuations. By means of structural VAR
model it shows that Flight to Safety shocks predate any regress in total factor
productivity by several years, and account for more than 50% of fluctuations
in macroeconomic variables at business cycle frequency. The finding that FTS
can generate a long and sustained decline in investment-related macroeconomic
variables asks several questions from the established tenets of business cycle dy-
namics. It proposes an alternative view that shocks to investors’ risk aversion
lead to booms and busts in business cycles. Secondly, the thesis shows that pre-
cautionary savings behaviour matters, and it changes non-linearly in the amount
of information and control agents have over their future consumption. Therefore,
optimal discretionary policy need to actively and asymmetrically manage this
precautionary behaviour. A policymaker without an ability to observe output
gap can also replicate the optimal strategy by restoring the equity premium to
its steady-state level. Lastly, the thesis demonstrates that households near the
upper or lower ends of their risk-bearing capacity, demonstrate sudden changes
in their risk allocation that echo with the ‘risk on’ and ‘risk off’ phenomena. It
also challenges the standing approach in literature to consider Flight to Safety
phenomenon only as an aberrant reaction to some form of market externalities,
constraints or uncertainty and thereby overlooking it for monetary policy.
Through identification and theoretical evidence posted in this thesis, we have
learnt that the surge in FTS episodes over the last two decades is a crucial variable
of significance in understanding business cycles. The explanatory power of FTS
is promising and stands in contrast to the ineffectiveness of standard measures
of productivity, sentiment, and expectations in explaining the slow recovery post-
global financial crisis. There has been another surge in risk aversion during the
Covid-19 phase, and therefore improved understanding of the Flight to Safety
mechanism would be useful in making effective policies for recovery. In particular,
what would be interesting to look out for in future research is an estimated
micro-founded DSGE model with the causes and effects of the Flight to Safety
phenomenon.
The thesis shows that the path forward to include asset pricing, time-varying
risk aversion, non-linear solution methods, costly recessions and productive tech-
nology with heterogeneity in shock processes into economic modelling looks promis-
ing. It would go a long way in devising a risk aversion-based view of business
cycles. It is a challenge worth surmounting to establish recessions and behaviours,
as being driven from individual risk aversion, risk-bearing capacity and desire to
shift risk allocation over time. There is conviction in that thought since in good
times we show exuberance, and in bad times have an innate reaction to shed risk
indiscriminately. Our risk-aversion and our risk-bearing capacity are situational;
they determine whether we fight-or-flight and they can also reveal our future.
Hopefully! Ms Carter would agree.
Jayant Yadav
Thursday 28th January, 2021
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1. Flight to Safety in Business Cycles
FTS in Business cycles examines the dynamic effects and empirical signifi-
cance of Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks in the context of US business cycles. FTS
represents a sudden preference for safe over risky investments and contains im-
portant information on agents’ time varying risk-aversion and their expectations
for future economic activity. This analysis presents an identification for FTS
shocks using vector autoregressions (VAR). Sign restrictions are applied, while
controlling for monetary policy and productivity shocks, on the price differential
series between stocks and bonds in the US. Identified positive disturbances to
this differential series are characterised as FTS shocks. The business cycle impact
of FTS is calculated by applying the structural VAR model to the US economic
data from 1954 to 2019. A sudden increase in risk aversion, which is displayed
through the FTS shocks in the identified VAR model, has played a significant
role in keeping investments low in the US. FTS shocks explain more than sixty
percent of the variation in US investments and they explain a higher proportion of
macroeconomic fluctuations in periods around the Global financial crisis. This is a
significant linkage when compared against results of DSGE models enriched with
time-varying risk-premium and investment technology. FTS also comes up ahead
of news shocks in providing early signals of shifts in total factor productivity.
This analysis is consistent with other comparable high-frequency, kernel-based
measures of identifying FTS. The results also reveal the asymmetric impact on the
business cycle of Flight to Safety and its complement Flight to Risk phenomenon.
This asymmetry lends support to pursuing a cyclical risk-aversion driven view of
business cycles.
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1.1 Introduction
How can we identify Flight to Safety shocks? Do they have any significant effect
on the economy and the business cycles? Does the Flight to Safety phenomenon
warrant much attention if the shift of investments from risky to safe assets over
one week reverses in the next week? These are some important questions of
interest to both investors and policymakers alike. This chapter proposes answers
to these and similar questions using sign-based restrictions in identifying the
Flight to Safety shocks through vector autoregressions. Doing so also opens up
new avenues to improve our understanding of macroeconomic shocks and their
propagation mechanisms in business cycles.
The Flight to Safety shocks in this chapter represent unexpected positive inno-
vations to households’ risk aversion, or these are the shocks that lower investor’s
risk appetite. There are many instances in the financial markets, e.g. the Lehman
crisis period and the Covid-19 period, when an increase in risk aversion and un-
certainty has led to bursts of flight of investment capital from risky to safe assets.
Such instances are commonly referred to as Flight to Safety (FTS). Similarly, any
unexpected reduction in risk aversion, which then motivates a flight of investment
capital in the reverse direction, i.e., from safe to risky assets, is known as Flight to
Risk (FTR). This chapter investigates the impact and transmission of innovations
to investors’ risk aversion on financial markets, macroeconomic aggregates, and
business cycles through the medium of Flight to Safety shocks.
The method for identifying Flight to Safety shocks in this chapter builds on
Uhlig’s (2005) agnostic identification strategy of imposing sign restrictions on
the impulse response functions. This method identifies Flight to Safety shocks
in a five variable structural vector autoregressions (S-VAR) model by imposing
sign restrictions on impulse responses in four out of five macroeconomic series of
the S-VAR, viz. TFP, price of risk, real rates, and surplus ratio. The TFP is
adjusted for factor-utilization (Fernald, 2012). The price of risk series is obtained
by differencing the S&P 500 index price from the price of long-term US treasury
bonds. Any upside shift in this price of risk series will result from US Treasury
bonds becoming expensive vis-à-vis US equities, which represents Flight to Safety.
Real policy rates are obtained by adjusting effective federal funds rates for the
rate of inflation. The surplus ratio is defined for this chapter1 as one minus ratio
1The later chapters, which feature an NK model with internal habits, define surplus ratio
differently as one minus ratio of subsistence habits to consumption. Table 2.1 on page 118
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of the sum of non-durable goods and services consumption to total consumption.
FTS shocks are identified by imposing orthogonality (or zero) restrictions between
Flight to Safety and generic business cycle disturbances. The latter are shocks
to the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series and are ordered first
in the five variable S-VAR. The fifth series that is ordered last in the S-VAR is
a business cycle variable of interest (such as output, hours or investment, etc.).
No restrictions are imposed on its impulse responses to any shocks in the model.
In this manner, the identification method remains agnostic to the key variable of
interest. Different sign restrictions, from the ones imposed to identify the FTS
shocks, are included to single out the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity
(TFP) shocks, and monetary policy (MP) shocks. These two disturbances are
also restricted as orthogonal to each other.
The identification strategy is designed to overcome many challenges that are
expected to arise in identifying the Flight to Safety shocks in vector autoregres-
sions. At first, there is confusion over what one means by Flight to Safety shocks.
There is no standard definition of the Flight to Safety phenomenon, and there is
no actual price of risk series from which we can extract Flight to Safety shocks.
The second concern is about the validity of the entire econometric procedure,
which relates to whether the shocks in the price of risk series are purely led from
a Flight to Safety (or Risk) motive or automatic movements resulting from other
demand, business cycle, or monetary policy shocks. The next concern is avoiding
the possibility that external shock impacts all variables in the model. Several
shocks come to mind, which could have effects similar to those of a business cycle
shock or a Flight to Safety shock. However, they result from sources exogenous
to the model, e.g., a labour supply shock in another sector, an oil price shock, a
fiscal policy shock. The fourth concern pertains to the choice of sign restrictions
imposed and the credibility of identifying assumptions employed in this study.
There may be agreement about some sign restrictions strategies, e.g., that positive
monetary policy shocks raise interest rates in the short run. However, competing
ideas come to mind when considering the impact of Flight to Safety on various
macroeconomic time series. Finally, one also needs to consider that this study’s
results represent the impact of the intended Flight to Safety shocks and are not
resulting from any other form of expectations, policy uncertainty, or sentiment
shocks in disguise.
The first concern can be addressed by arguing that Flight to Safety is a
phenomenon of forward looking expectations and that households prefer bonds
provides the definitions for use in later chapters.
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or safer assets to equities or riskier assets, to safeguard their portfolio against
expected loss of future income and wealth. By following this approach, we can
obtain a price of risk series from the difference between the price of safe securities,
which for this chapter is calculated by inverting the yield on 10-year US Treasury
bonds and the price of risky securities (or the S&P 500 index). This price of risk
series increases (or moves up) when investors favour safer investments (bonds)
more than riskier investments (equities).
Developing a price of risk series in this manner has a clear advantage over
other recent attempts in the literature to identify the incidence of Flight to Safety
using likelihood and kernel-based methods. For e.g. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht,
and Wei (2013 and 2019). The approach to developing the price of risk series
followed in this chapter provides a smooth trend stationary series suitable for
vector autoregressions. It can be replicated without relying on the researcher’s
inputs of the bandwidth and threshold criteria, as required in likelihood and
kernel-based methods. The Sensitivity analysis section compares the Flight to
Safety shocks obtained using methods of Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei
(2019) with the Flight to Safety shocks obtained through S-VAR. These two
procedures’ key results are comparable, but working out a Flight to Safety series
through VAR offers ease of replication and universal appeal.
For addressing the second concern, the orthogonality restriction imposed be-
tween total factor productivity shocks and Flight to Safety shocks filters out the
possibility of automatic spillovers from business cycle surprises to Flight to Safety
shocks. Orthogonality restriction between total factor productivity shocks and
monetary policy shocks is also vital to keeping monetary shocks unrelated to
generic movements in business cycles.
The third concern is addressed by repeating this exercise for other macro
variables. The benchmark configuration’s key variable of interest in subsequent
experiments is replaced with other business cycle variables (such as hours, foreign
portfolio flows, consumer prices, etc.). The purpose of such an examination is
to seek common plausible explanations for changes in impulse responses between
the replacement model and the benchmark S-VAR model and to avoid missing
out on any explanatory contribution from common external factors.
The fourth concern is resolved by choosing policy-relevant and theoretically
robust signs and zero restrictions. The identifying assumptions are based on
the results of Smets and Wouters (2007). They consider a medium scale NK or
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NNS (New Neoclassical synthesis) model that is consistent with the balanced
steady-state growth path and is estimated using Bayesian methods. Their model
has 7 structural shocks in: total factor productivity, risk premium, investment
technology, wage, price markup, exogenous spending, and monetary policy. Sev-
eral features of their model such as labour augmenting technological progress,
investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and real rigidity in
intermediate goods and labour market, make it a standard workhorse model of
monetary policy analysis and also make it relevant for obtaining economic the-
ory backed sign restrictions for total factor productivity, Flight to Safety and
monetary policy shocks for the analysis made in this chapter.
Some of the critical results from Smets and Wouters (2007) that are useful in
driving sign restrictions for this chapter are as follows. Technology shocks lead to
an increase in output and consumption but a small decrease in nominal and real
interest rates. On the initial impact, the fall in real rates is insufficient to prevent
a decline in inflation and opening up of the output gap. Flight to Safety shocks
restrictions in this chapter follow from risk premium shocks of Smets and Wouters
(2007) where these innovations result in a fall in output, hours, and an increase
in the real interest rate. One could argue that the risk premium shocks are not
the same as a Flight to Safety shocks. Nevertheless, suppose the increase in risk
premium is not uniform across investments of different risk profiles. In that case,
for this chapter and to generate comparable results with standard DSGE models,
it is within reason to characterize an increase in risk premium as a motivating
factor for investors’ preference for safety. The monetary policy shocks in that
model (Smets and Wouters, 2007) on impact lead to an increase in nominal and
real interest rates but a decrease in output, inflation, and hours. The monetary
policy shocks in S-VAR model of this chapter include similar restrictions.
The fifth and final concern is addressed in the robustness section, where results
from the economic policy uncertainty series [from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)
and Bloom (2014)], corporate bonds spread, liquidity spread, investment-specific
technological productivity, and the relative price of the investment in terms of
consumption are included in the analysis. Their results depict a reasonable likeness
between the share of investment growth explained through Flight to Safety shocks
and other series that capture the phenomenon of Flight to Safety. The Granger
causality running from the price of risk series to these alternate series reaffirms
the notion that Flight to Safety plays a significant role in business cycles.
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The analysis contributes by motivating us to rethink about the role
played by Flight to Safety in the most severe US recession since the Great depres-
sion. This chapter’s empirical exercise extends research on Flight to Safety into
new directions in the following manner. Firstly, it explores the long and short-
run impact of Flight to Safety shocks on key macroeconomic variables through
a structural vector autoregression study where Flight to Safety and monetary
policy shocks are orthogonal to any business cycle shocks. The structural VAR
makes minimal assumptions about the existence of any prior ordering of structural
shocks. Secondly, it evaluates the strength of results by comparing them with the
business cycle phenomenon in other sectors such as labour market and investments
and in different periods such as the Great moderation period running up to the
global financial crisis and the pre-Great moderation period. Thirdly, it evaluates
the empirical exercise and identification strategy by obtaining comparable results
from series that, in principle, have similar impact phenomena as the Flight to
Safety. Some of the other asset market phenomena that coincide with episodes of
FTS are: an increase in policy uncertainty, a widening of yield spreads between
Baa and Aaa corporate bonds yields, an increase in liquidity spread between the
yields on long-term and short-term treasury bonds, and an increase in the ratio of
the price of investment goods to the price of consumption goods. The Robustness
section makes a comparison between each series’ business cycle impacts with the
results obtained from the FTS series. Fourthly, the analysis brings to light the
asymmetric economic impact of Flight to Safety and the capital flight in the
reverse direction, Flight to Risk. Lastly, it develops a Flight to Safety shock series
for the US economy that is intuitive and simple.
The contribution of results comes from providing a sound justification
and closure to the main objective of undertaking this study to estimate the
business cycle impact of FTS. Flight to Safety shocks significantly affect the
long-term dynamics of the business cycle and economic activity. The impact of
Flight to Safety shocks on the economy has increased in the post-Global financial
crisis period. Hours, output, consumption, and investments all display negative
responses to identified Flight to Safety shocks.
A one standard deviation Flight to Safety shock can account for a statistically
significant 3% decline in private investments and a 4% decline in residential in-
vestments over a couple of years. Identified FTS shocks also lead to an imminent
fall in total factor productivity by 8-10 quarters. Thus, they dispel the notion
that FTS shocks are a neutral TFP or investment related TFP shock in disguise.
FTS shocks also account for over sixty percent variation in relevant macroeco-
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Figure 1.1: Contribution of FTS to Investment growth
Notes: Y-axis: Year on year growth rate (%) of US Investments and the benchmark
model fitted with only Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks identified using Sign and Zero
restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. X-axis label is Years (in YY format). Investment
- is the US investment data series (PInv). FTS shocks only - is the Investment series
in the benchmark model fitted with FTS shocks only.
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nomic variables (hours, output, consumption, and investments) at business cycle
frequencies, indicating that such shocks are an essential part of business cycles.
The identified Flight to Safety shocks in the benchmark VAR configuration
can explain majority of the historical decomposition of Investments in the US.
See Figure 1.1 on page 7, which plots the year on year growth in the investment
data (dashed line) and the one that can be explained by only the Flight to Safety
shocks in the benchmark VAR model (solid line). The co-movement between the
two series is striking. In particular, during economic downturns such as previous
recessions of the 80s, 90s, the Dotcom bust, and the Global financial crisis, the
Flight to Safety shocks seem to be running the investment growth lower.
Besides FTS shocks, the benchmark model whose identification restrictions
we will discuss in later sections, has shocks in total factor productivity, monetary
policy, and consumer demand. Despite the presence of these other three keys
shocks such a significant contribution of the Flight to Safety shocks, signifying
that perceived risk aversion and precautionary motives manifested in Flight to
Safety have a more prominent role in developing our understanding of business
cycles. The significant contribution of FTS shocks to business cycles can be further
corroborated from the k-period ahead forecast error variance decomposition (from
Figure 1.2 on page 9) of crucial macro variables from identified Flight to Safety
shocks. The figure shows that FTS explains more the sixty percent of forecast
error variance in investment and a significant portion of it in other key macro
variables such as output, hours, CPI, and consumption at business cycle frequency
(8-32 quarters).
A breakdown of historical decomposition (Figure 1.3 on page 10) of the In-
vestment series shows that FTS shocks were a significant driver of the increase
in private investments in the years 1994-2007 running up to the global financial
crisis. The significance of FTS shocks has been at its maximum during the period
following the global financial crisis. Post-2009, there is a sluggish response of
Investment series in the US due to negative FTS shocks hitting the economy. The
recovery period had a reduced incidence of FTS shocks, but only after 2015 did
we see any positive deviation from the Investment series trend.
An underlying expectation hypothesis that this vector autoregression
analysis could influence is that there are possibly two channels through which
Flight to Safety may be relevant to study investments and business cycles. Firstly,
Expectations channel, which explains Flight to Safety shocks as being caused
1.1. INTRODUCTION 9
Figure 1.2: FEVD (%) explained by FTS shocks



















Notes: The k-step ahead Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD %) explained
by FTS shocks, in the 5-variable VAR, which is identified using Sign and Zero restric-
tions Identification Strategy 1. The 5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP,
Price of risk (Bond minus Equity price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investments.
In other iterations of the 5-variable model, ‘Investment’ is replaced with other macro
variables of interest. The result of ‘Investment’ and only those variables that replace
‘Investment’ in the benchmark VAR are reported.
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Figure 1.3: Historical Decomposition of Investments











Notes : Historical Decomposition of Investment in VAR model Yt = [tfpt, Bond-
Equityt, real ratet, Surplus ratiot, Investmentt]′, which is identified using Sign and
Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. X-axis label: years.
1.1. INTRODUCTION 11
by a build-up of expectations of an impending deterioration in the economy
or an expected downturn in the business cycle. Flight to Safety is thus only
an indication of a negative total factor productivity shock expected to hit the
economy. Therefore, rational, forward-looking households respond in the short
run by moving investments from risky equities to safer bonds to safeguard their
portfolio against future expected loss of income and wealth.
A similar approach is followed in news shocks driven business cycle literature
[see Nam and Wang (2019), Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011), Beaudry and
Portier (2006) and (2014)] which postulates that cyclical fluctuations emerge when
economic agents update their expectations from news about future productivity.
Secondly, the Speculative channel, according to which investors and businesses
that have an understanding of the economy, pre-empt others by taking speculative
positions. A Flight to Safety shock then is an over-correction by speculators to
disappointing economic news. If enough speculators, investors, customers, and
entrepreneurs over-correct, they can engineer a crisis of its own. Put, as per the
expectations channel, Flight to Safety shock is a response to the expected future
state of the economy, whereas in line with the speculative channel, a Flight to
Safety shock results from an optimistic bet on the economy that turned-sour in
the current state. The technology used in the analysis in this chapter is neither
sufficient to identify the role of expectations, nor is it the central objective of this
study to identify such channels. Still, by looking at the VAR study’s evidence,
there is some inclination to favour the Expectations channel. Aligning the results
with estimation from a theoretical DSGE model could enhance our understanding
of these channels.
This chapter contributes to growing macro-finance literature by
developing facts about the Flight to Safety mechanism and linking it with time-
varying risk aversion and precautionary savings motive of agents/investors and
financial intermediaries. The linkages between FTS mechanism and behavioural
features related to investments have not been included even in the following liter-
ature, which is considered seminal on Flight of Safety. Vayanos (2004) provides
a theoretical introduction to the FTS phenomenon in asset pricing literature.
Cochrane (2016, 2017) presents a macro-finance model that links changes in
investor excess consumption to Flight to Safety. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht,
and Wei (2019) and Baur and Lucey (2009) document the incidence of Flight to
Safety across major countries. And Boudry, Connolly, and Steiner (2019) pro-
vides impact of Flight to Safety on liquidity returns, revenues and valuation of
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the commercial real estate industry. The previous literature has also explored
the Flight to Safety mechanism in a limited way. Two common themes stand out.
First of all, it is to consider FTS as being generated through market imperfections
or externalities. These have been explored in the form of liquidity constraints [He
and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)], Knightian uncer-
tainty (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008), margin requirements of speculators
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008), and intermediary balance sheets (Adrian,
Boyarchenko, and Shachar, 2017). The second perspective is to consider FTS as
a short term asset market phenomenon. The kernel-based approach discussed in
Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) exemplies this perspective. It mea-
sures the likelihood of observing an FTS event. Either through a threshold-based
method that calculates how each trading day compares to the distribution of
return differential between bond minus equity returns. Alternatively, measuring
it by an ordinal index-based method ranks each trading day on how it complies
with the weak and strong symptoms attributed to an FTS day. This chapter relies
on a quarterly time series of equity index and government bond yields to identify
Flight to Safety shocks. It stays away from extreme but for short duration only
movements in volatility, asset prices, and other high-frequency variables. Work-
ing with high-frequency data (like Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013))
would not have answered one of the primary purposes of this study, which is to
evaluate the long-term impact of FTS. If an extreme flight of investment from
stocks to bonds over one week reverses in another week, that would leave the
aggregate investment allocation for the quarter as unchanged and, therefore, less
relevant for our macroeconomic analysis. The Flight to Safety shocks identified in
this chapter are robust to similar results from kernel-based methods of identifying
such shocks. However, compared to other approaches, the vector autoregressions
approach followed here has higher universal applicability.
This chapter pursues a novel approach to develop stylised facts about Flight
to Safety. I use agnostic identification which follows from Uhlig (2005) and Arias,
Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner (2018). The sign restrictions based identification,
building on the work of Canova and Nicoló (2002), Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005)
restricts the signs of specific impulse responses in the structural VAR, and without
undercutting scientific inquiry, it keeps them in line with tenable priors accepted
in theory. This strategy contributes to the literature by imposing minimal sign-
based restrictions on the structural VAR and not using the orthogonal ordering
approach. The latter assumes some macro variables as sluggish to react to shocks.
The identification in this chapter imposes no restrictions on the key business cycle
variable of interest.
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The success of an identification strategy depends on the plausibility of impulse
responses it generates. This chapter’s reasonable sign restrictions do not contra-
dict with established results from DSGE models (Smets and Wouters, 2007). This
impulse response-based identification strategy generates bounds on key variables
of interest responses to structural shocks in the VAR. The identification strategy
does not impose any sign restrictions on the key variables of interest, such as
Output, Investment, Consumption, Hours, Unemployment, Labour productiv-
ity, Residential Investment, Non-Residential Investment, Capital Expenditure,
R&D Expenditure, Consumer Prices, Government consumption and Expenditure,
Prices of Investment goods in terms of Consumption goods, Consumer Sentiment,
Capacity Utilisation, Vacancy rate, Participation rate, Foreign flows, and Wages.
So in words of Uhlig (2005), the business cycle variable of interest remains agnostic
to the identification. On the one hand, identifying FTS through S-VAR and sign
restrictions differs from the existing approach to address this topic. On the other
hand, this approach to study this phenomenon through vector autoregressions
has a universal appeal.
The primary motivation for looking at the FTS phenomenon and obtain-
ing its long term impact on the US macroeconomy comes from the unprecedented
nature of the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and its long-lasting impact on
consumption and investment data series. Compared to previous post-war reces-
sions, the US’s recovery following the global financial crisis has been muted and
unprecedented for many quarters. Investment per capita in the US (as shown
in Figure 1.4 on page 14), fell sharply after the Global financial crisis of 2008.
Similarly, Consumption of Non-durable goods and services2 was most distinctly
impacted by the global financial crisis than any previous post-war recession. These
series have been sluggish to return to its pre-crisis levels, as shown in the Fig-
ure 1.4 on page 14. During the global financial crisis, the performance was the
worst performance of Investment, Consumption of non-durable and services, and
many other macroeconomic aggregates in comparison to any post-war recession.
The global financial crisis also dampened business sentiment (as shown in Fig-
ure 1.5 on page 15), but intriguingly, the impact was not so severely different
from other previous recessions. Therefore sentiment alone cannot account for
the significant decline in macroeconomic aggregate variables (esp. Investments)
during the global financial crisis, and we have to look for alternate causes. This
search for alternative explanations for the GFC was one of the chief motivations
behind undertaking this study.
2For this chapter only, we can characterize this series as Consumption habits.
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Figure 1.4: Global financial crisis and US recessions
(a) Private Investment per capita
(b) Habits (Services and Non-Durables Consumption) per capita
Notes : Value at the peak of the each recession is indexed at 100, and corresponds
to 0 on the X-axis, which denotes the time period in quarters pre and post the peak
of a recession. The legend denotes peak to trough duration of a recession, for.eg.
07.IV-09.II is the peak to trough period 2007Q4-2009Q2 of the 2007-09 recession.
Source: US FRED, NBER
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Notes: The figure shows Flight to Safety shocks (identified with restriction strategy 1)
to a 5-variable benchmark VAR model, for Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3. The correlation
between the two series is -52%. Two quarter average of identified FTS shocks (dashed,
right inverted axis), and 4 quarter average of the Philadelphia Fed Manufacturing
Business outlook survey (solid, left axis) are plotted.
This unprecedented impact of the global financial crisis on the macroeconomic
aggregates befits looking at explanations/mechanisms that could have been more
relevant in the recent crisis than in any previous ones. Therefore, the search
is for variables that had a somewhat more noticeable impact on the business
cycle during the global financial crisis than the impact they had on the macroe-
conomic aggregate variables in any other post-war recession. Figure 1.6 on page
17 and results of Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) methods from
Appendix A.2 show that the incidence of Flight to Safety has increased in the last
two decades, which makes it a phenomenon of significance in recent events and a
likely differential that could explain the impact of the global financial crisis.
Let us look at some anecdotal evidence that the identified FTS shocks from
the empirical study performed in this chapter, a 5-variable VAR with the sign
and zero restrictions, capture the changes in US Business conditions expectations.
The identified FTS shock series, as seen in Figure 1.5 on page 15, has a negative
52% correlation to US Philadelphia Fed Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey
(MBOS). The latter is an index tracking the direction of change in overall business
activity. This figure plots a cumulative sum of two-quarters of FTS shock on an
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inverted scale, i.e., the dips on the chart refer to Flight to Safety, and the peaks
are a shock in the reverse direction or a Flight to Risk. The two series closely track
each other; they slowly increase through the Dotcom period of the 90s, ending
with a bust in 2001. The housing sector bubble build-up in the 2000s, and the
recession of 2007-08 are also visible. Most importantly, the inverted cumulative
FTS shock has a peak to trough drop of near eight percentage points during 2007.
It marks the worst peak to trough for identified series in the tested period (1983
to 2019). However, the worst peak to trough drop of Business confidence series
during 2007 was similar to the one in the late 80s crisis. Monetary easing in the
1990s and 2000s was able to restore business confidence. However, we notice that
despite the unprecedented monetary policy response following the Lehman crisis,
there is a lack of recovery in business confidence, and it did not return to its
peak for nearly a decade. Therefore, reasons/factors that were not prevalent in
the 1980s were the main reason behind the dip in consumer sentiment during the
GFC. This supports our faith in the original expectation that the identified FTS
shocks from our VAR exercise, which have been unprecedented in times preceding
the GFC, capture the GFC’s driving mechanism, which was an unprecedented
post-war economic downturn.
This chapter takes a small step forward in emphasizing the Flight to Safety
and changes in investors’ risk aversion as variables of significance in the business
cycle. It would be interesting to see, in future research, if the findings of this
chapter are consistent with results from an estimated DSGE model or whether
there is a need to impose any additional restrictions based on general equilibrium
modeling to bolster this chapter’s findings further.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section 1.2 makes a
brief discussion of related literature. Section 1.3 describes the data. It is followed
by a description of the benchmark 5 variable model’s identifying assumptions in
section 1.4. This section also discusses the theoretical and numerical algorithm
for sign and zero restriction identification employed in this chapter. Section 1.5
discusses the results from empirical analysis, their impact on business cycle vari-
ables, the forecast-error variance, and brings to light the asymmetry between
Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk shocks. Section 1.6 performs sensitivity ex-
ercise on the results. It also discusses the alternative identifications of Flight
to Safety shocks and their significance in various periods. Section 1.7 discusses
the identified FTS shocks with methods propounded in literature in explaining
business cycle fluctuations while section 1.8 concludes.
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Figure 1.6: Frequency and Likelihood of Flight to Safety days.
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Notes: Heatmap for frequency (freq) and aggregate likelihood (prob) of Flight to Safety (FTS)
days in each quarter from 1963 to 2019. FTS days are calculated by Ordinal index approach
(see Appendix A.2.3), for k = 1.25. Aggregated likelihood or strength of FTS, for each quarter
in the studied period is calculated by adding the likelihood for each FTS day during that
period.
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1.2 Literature review
This section discusses both theoretical and empirical research related to Flight
to Safety. In the wake of the global financial crisis, uncertainties about the
growth and economic outlook have led to many pronounced episodes of negative
correlation between returns on government bonds and stock returns. The returns
on government bonds (safe assets) were positive, while the stock returns (risky
asset) were negative. During such instances, there was also deterioration in
market liquidity and an increase in volatility (See Figure 1.7 on page 19). It
is such episodes that are commonly referred to as Flight to Safety (or FTS).
However, the economic literature also uses FTS as an inclusive term for two
other phenomena, viz. Flight to Quality (FTQ) and Flight to Liquidity (FTL),
where the key difference between these two terms results from the underlying
preference (whether for liquidity or quality) of investors that has motivated them
to re-balance their portfolio from risky to safe assets.
Precautionary motives and risk aversion
A typical FTS episode is signified by a sudden increase in appetite for safe
assets with respect to risky assets. The idea that during times of uncertainty,
economic agents change their behaviour, by exhibiting caution towards excessive
consumption and increase their savings, is quite old and one of the defining reasons
for the study of macroeconomics. Agents that are uncertain about their future in-
come and employment, exhibit precautionary behaviour to increase savings today
to smooth out their consumption path and ameliorate the impact of realisation of
a bad state in future. Modern understanding of the precautionary motives often
refers to discussion in Keynes (1936), however there is an even earlier precedent
in Marshall (1890), "The thriftlessness of early times was in great measure due to
the want of security that those who made provision for the future would enjoy it".
Theoretical macro-finance literature [pioneered by Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1996), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997)], demonstrates the impact of small shocks on the macro economy. Persistent
effects from these shocks can permanently damage agents’ net worth through a
drop in prices of assets they hold. Moreover, it feeds into a feedback loop where
the fall in prices amplifies the initial mechanism and reduces agents’ net worth
even further.
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Figure 1.7: Conditional volatility in financial markets
Notes: Long run and Short run (right axis, in all charts) conditional volatility, cor-
relation and covariance for daily returns (%) of S&P 500 and US 10-year Treasury
bonds. The long run variances are calculated by using a backward looking kernel of
250 days, whereas short run variances are calculated by backward looking kernel of 5
days. See Appendix A.2.1 for a detailed methodology.
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A rise in precautionary motives and increased risk aversion reduces investment
demand and fuels deflationary pressure, which can be self-fulfilling. As per Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov (2014) when prices drop in a crisis due to higher expected
returns, agents hold on to cash for buying assets later at fire-sale prices, which
elongates periods of low growth and asset misallocation.
The theoretical asset pricing literature on investor related Flight to Safety is pi-
oneered by Vayanos (2004). In his model, fund managers face a funding constraint
in the form of the likelihood of withdrawal of managed funds by individuals that
are investing in these funds. The fund managers’ funding constraint depends on
the fund (i.e., whether it outperforms a threshold set by investors). This funding
constraint also evolves endogenously on the level of market liquidity and volatility.
During volatile times, there is an increase in probability with which the fund’s
performance could fall short of investors’ threshold set. In volatile periods, this
feature increases fund managers’ risk aversion and leads to a preference for more
liquid (FTL) and safer (FTS) assets.
Financial constraints based models in He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), show that the amplification from small shocks
grows for these financially constrained agents when their wealth is at a distance
from the steady-state. When the endogenous risk is driven by financial constraints
instead of being driven by fundamentals, it increases agents’ precautionary savings
motive. Precautionary demand and savings are shown to play an essential role
in other industries as well. Empirically Kilian (2009) decomposes oil prices and
addresses that from 1975-2007 precautionary demand shocks, which is uncertainty
about future supplies, had an immediate and persistent impact on oil prices.
Whereas during that period, the contribution to oil prices from disruptions due to
supply shocks had been often short lived, and contribution from global demand
shocks had been persistent but somewhat delayed.
Wealth preservation and liquidity preference are other two commonly studied
motives for FTS. Boucher and Tokpavi (2019) study whether (high or low) bond
yield environment affects the strength of these motivations. In their quantile
regression model, an environment of low bond yields, expansionary monetary
policy, and low inflation jeopardize the well-known diversification benefits of
holding US treasury bonds. There is a decrease in the traditional Flight to
Safety channel’s strength, i.e., switching investments from equity to bond. It gets
substituted by a pick up in the strength of Flight to Safety from equity to other
safe-haven assets viz. Gold, Japanese Yen (JPY) and Swiss Franc (CHF).
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The CAPM literature establishes FTS as the joint occurrence of higher eco-
nomic uncertainty, low cash flows, high risk premium, high precautionary savings
motive and low real rates. FTS episode in asset pricing literature results from
the precautionary response of investors to changes in economic conditions. When
uncertainty (quantity of risk) or stock market volatility increases, then the agents,
investment managers, speculators in asset pricing models become more risk-averse
and prefer safe and high-quality assets.
Liquidity, volatility and market externalities
There is a macro, asset pricing, and CAPM literature pattern that the Flight
to Safety mechanism is linked with precautionary behaviour and changes in risk
aversion of household/investor. But other theoretical studies have explored FTS
in relation to speculation, liquidity, and market volatility. Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) study the relation between liquidity shocks and adverse economic and
financial episodes. Illiquid securities in their results have a higher sensitivity to
market liquidity and market returns. Stocks with higher liquidity risk on average
command an additional 1.1% risk premium.
Previously observed episodes of Flight to Quality, including Penn central trans-
portation company default of 1970, Crash of 1987, Russian default, the Asian crisis,
Bailout of LTCM, and events following attacks of 9/11 were not just instances of
capital/liquidity shortages. These episodes also witnessed disengagement by in-
vestors from risky activities. In the words of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008),
these were instances of Knightian uncertainty or immeasurable risk. Their model
demonstrates that agents and intermediaries faced with an increase in Knightian
uncertainty or liquidity shortages give more consideration to the worst possible
outcomes. Such agents become self-protective and conservative in the allocation
of risk capital, thus rendering capital markets inflexible. A resolution to this
situation exists in the form of a massive policy involvement from the government
acting as lender of last resort and transferring some of its collateral, trust, and
liquidity to the distressed capital market (Caballero and Kurlat, 2009).
Speculators during FTS suffer from the destabilizing effect of margin require-
ments (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). When speculators’ funding liquidity
is tight and has higher margin requirements, they provide more liquidity for
assets with low margin requirements (and are safer). This generates FTS and
co-movement of risk premiums in capital markets. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2008), high market volatility creates a differential between the liquidity of safe
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and risky stocks. In other related studies, there is a deterioration of aggregate
liquidity due to either lower net worth of intermediaries (Adrian and Shin, 2010),
or effect of regulation on intermediary balance sheets (Adrian, Boyarchenko, and
Shachar, 2017), or dynamic adverse selection (Guerrieri and Shimer, 2014). When
combined with uncertainty averse behaviour of agents, any of these could lead to
portfolio reallocation from risky to safe assets, or FTS.
The empirical literature mainly studies the FTS as a high-frequency event
and focuses on its impact on returns, liquidity and volatility of the asset markets
(Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2016). The distinction between
liquidity profile of corporate bonds impacts the way different bonds react to FTS
(Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath, 2013). There is a notable reduction in illiquid
or stress regimes’ asset prices, particularly for less liquid assets. The prices for
investment-grade US corporate bonds are less affected than those of speculative
(junk) grade bonds. A similar effect is visible in stocks with low book-to-market
value ratio.
Baur and Lucey (2009) find that FTS episodes are a regular occurrence in crisis
periods and show contagion for eight developed countries that they study. FTS
demonstrates the resilience and diversification benefits of financial markets for
investors, as it shows that there is an asset class that can absorb excess capital in
times of crisis. Markets lacking an FTS absorbing asset class suffer more significant
losses and are less resilient in a crisis period. Using daily data for 23 countries,
Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) further provide some stylized impact
of FTS. FTS phenomenon coincides with an increase in the Volatility Index (VIX),
a decrease in consumer sentiment, a higher preference for holding safe-haven assets
(Gold) and currencies (Japanese Yen JPY, and Swiss Franc CHF), and a rise in
the TED spread, which is the difference between the 3-month Treasury bill and
the 3-month US dollar LIBOR. Boudry, Connolly, and Steiner (2019) provide
the impact of FTS on high-frequency responses such as short-term liquidity and
returns, and the low-frequency response variables such as long term revenues and
valuation, of the commercial real estate industry. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
demonstrate that individual investors do not depict any portfolio reallocation
towards more risky assets as their wealth increases; instead, they re-balance slowly
following capital gains/losses. The regression of daily returns of Gold prices on
stock and bond returns of UK, US, and German markets, in Baur and Lucey
(2010) demonstrates that Gold has short-lived safe haven (safer asset) properties
during extreme stock market events. Whereas in normal times, Gold is a hedge
(uncorrelated) to stock markets.
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Sign restrictions and expectations dynamics
Cochrane (2017) finds that changes in economic fundamentals lead to FTS,
and it has a long-run impact on the asset valuations and macroeconomic variables.
Despite that, there is no empirical study explaining the impact of FTS on short
and long-term fundamentals of the economy. One possible reason for this could
be the difficulty in separating the endogeneity of business cycles to FTS. Boucher
and Tokpavi (2019), is a notable exception, as they find that the strength of FTS
from stocks to bonds weakens as the interest rate on government bond maturities
fall towards ZLB. They highlight the endogenous mechanism, which translates
the state of the business cycle and the level of interest rates to the strength and
likelihood of the FTS. In their analysis, during a low yield environment, the FTS
from stock to bond is substituted by the FTS from stock to other safe-haven assets
such as Gold and Swiss Franc. In comparison, this chapter aims to understand
both the long and short-term impact of FTS on the macroeconomy, especially the
short and long-term impact of FTS episodes on depressing private investments,
including residential and non-residential investments, in the US economy.
The sign restrictions based identification used in this paper also complements
with significant empirical work done using sign restrictions in identifying the
impact of macroeconomic shocks in explaining the business cycles. Previous
research has used sign restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks (Uhlig,
2005), government spending shocks (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009), financial shocks
[Hristov, Hülsewig, and Wollmershäuser (2012), Gambetti and Musso (2017)],
oil price shocks [Baumeister and Peersman (2013), Kilian and Murphy (2012)],
technology shocks [Dedola and Neri (2007) and Peersman and Straub (2009)],
uncertainty shocks (Bloom, 2014), changes in the volatility from monetary policy
shocks (Theodoridis and Mumtaz, 2015), financial and uncertainty shocks (Cal-
dara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakrajšek, 2016), news shocks [Beaudry and
Portier (2006), Barsky and E. R. Sims (2011), Beaudry and Portier (2014)], and
mood swings [Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011), Nam and Wang (2019)].
Sign based identifying restrictions command an active space in empirical re-
search and has kept pace with new techniques, such as using agnostic priors (Arias,
Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner, 2018) and in combination with Bayesian FAVARs
(Ahmadi and Uhlig, 2015). Sign restrictions have been useful in enhancing our
understanding of macroeconomic shocks and their propagation, and this paper
contributes to its growing arsenal.
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A related view of this chapter’s risk-driven business cycle hypothesis is the
news-driven business cycle hypothesis (Beaudry and Portier, 2006), which posits
that booms and bust cycles can arise from better or worse expectations about
future fundamentals. According to the news-driven business cycles hypothesis,
favourable news about future factor productivity can ignite a boom today via
creating an incentive to accumulate and install new capital for future demand. In
contrast, a less than expected realization of total factor productivity today could
lead to bust even without any actual fall in total factor productivity or changes
in fundamentals.
The empirical evidence supported in VAR based identification schemes in
[Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Beaudry, Dupaigne, and Portier (2011)] backs
this claim, and noise shocks, i.e., misinformation about future total factor produc-
tivity, are related to positive co-movement in macroeconomic aggregates observed
in data. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) provides an alternate viewpoint that pos-
itive news may reduce the incentive to accumulate capital and instead favour
an increase in utilization of capital. Increased capacity utilization in itself leads
to a boom. However, the news-driven hypothesis is questioned under a differ-
ent identification scheme (Barsky and E. R. Sims, 2011). The impact of noise
shocks is similar to that of a standard DSGE model. A better than expected
total factor productivity leads to an increase in consumption but a decline in
output, hours, and investment. The VAR-based evidence of news based literature
is criticized (Arias, Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner, 2018) for its non-fundamental,
non-invertibility, the sensitivity of cointegration assumptions, and choice of vari-
ables in the system. If stock prices are not included in the system, the results do
not confirm news shock driven business cycles.
This chapter proposes another view to this debate that it is not noise shocks
to news about future total factor productivity. Instead, investor risk aversion
shocks lead to booms and busts in the business cycles. The Flight to Safety shocks
identified in this analysis lead expectation formation and TFP changes by much
longer periods than postulated by either news shocks or uncertainty shocks. The
macroeconomic theory-based identification employed in the benchmark analysis
is robust to alterations in sign restrictions. The fact that other time series can
account for the Flight to Safety phenomenon can also produce results comparable
to the benchmark analysis, reassuring our faith in this analysis’s results. The
significant results are not entirely dependent on the inclusion of the singular price
of risk series. In this manner, we avoid some criticism levied on the replicability
of news shocks results with other series. Moreover, it appeals to the universality
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of the cyclical risk aversion phenomenon captured in Flight to Safety.
As global financial markets have grown increasingly more interconnected, the
last couple of decades have seen FTS episodes (See figures A.4 and A.5 in Appendix
A.2.3) occurring more frequently and commonly around the world. Baele, Bekaert,
Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) report 2.7% FTS days in the US, and similar
instances of FTS in 23 other countries.
Economic literature witnessed an increase of interest in the phenomenon of
Flight to Safety. However, it is still fledgling, and its stylized facts are being
developed. More importantly, there is a lack of understanding about how Flight
to Safety shocks would work in the context of standard business cycle models.
This chapter embarks on a step in this direction by attempting to identify Flight
to Safety shocks and their business cycle impact.
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Table 1.1: Data series used in VAR models
Series Source Code Definition
Output GDP Gross domestic product
Disp. Income DPIC Disposable Personal Income
Consumption PCEC Personal Consumption Expenditures
Durable PCDG PCEC: Durable Goods
Non-Durable PCND PCEC: Non durable Goods
Services PCESV PCEC: Services
Investment GPDI Gross Private Domestic Investment
Res Investment PRFI Private Res. Fixed investment
Non-Res Investment PNFI Private Non-Res. Fixed investment
Gov CI GCE Govt. Consumption Exp. & Gross In-
vestment
Policy rate FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate
CPI CUSR0000SA0 Consumer prices - Urban
Participation CIVPART Labour force participation ratio
Vacancy rate composite HWI Help-Wanted Index∗
Unemployment rate UNEMP Unemployment rate
Wages per hour A576RC1TOTLQ
Compensation
Hours from Non-farm payrolls
Hours NFBUS PNFS (excl. nonprofit): Hours
Employees NFBUS PNFS (excl. nonprofit): Employees
TFP dtfp_util Utilisation-adj TFP#
TFP(EqDur) dtfp_I _util Utilisation-adj TFP Equipment and
Durables#
Rel. px Cons to Equ relativePrice Rel. price Consumption to Equipment
Disp Inc / capita A229RC0Q0-
52SBEA
Disposable Income per capita
Capex BOGZ1FA38-
5050005Q
Capex Domestic non-fin. sectors
Capacity Util TCU Capacity Utilisation: Total industry
R&D expenditure Y694RC1Q0-
27SBEA
GDP: Research and Development
Foreign portfol. flows Equity & Debt Cumulative flows (+ inflow, - outflow)
Uncertainty EPU Economic policy Uncertainty§
Inv share invShare Equipment and Cons Dur share of out-
put
Cons.Sentiment UMCSENT Consumer sentiment index
Term spread DGS10, DGS1 10 year and 1 year Treasury bond
Corp bond spread DBAA_AAA Baa minus Aaa yield
Equity ĜSPC S&P 500 Index
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Table 1.1 – continued from previous page
Series Source Code Definition
Deflator DPCERD3Q0-
86SBEA













∗ Barnichon (2010) # Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) § Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016)
Sources: US FRED, BEA, BLS, IMF, Univ of Michigan, Datastream, FRBSF, Yahoo!
Finance
1.3 Data
The source, purpose and definition of US data series that are considered in this
empirical exercise are described in Table 1.1 on page 26, while Figure A.6 on page
262 hosts the logarithmic time series plots of those data series.
This empirical study investigates the role of Flight to Safety or Flight to
Risk shocks on the business cycle in the US from 1983 Q1 to 2019 Q3. The
selected period includes the Great moderation period 1983-2007, which in the
macroeconomic history witnessed a reduction in business cycle fluctuations in
the developed world, esp. the US. The selection of the beginning date (the year
1983) for the data is made to ignore the impact of Oil shocks in the 1970s and
the subsequent change in the Fed’s monetary policy stance and communication
strategy. The data also accounts for the global financial crisis period and the
subsequent recovery period from 2009 to 2019.
The macro time series are obtained from US FRED database of the Federal
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Reserve bank of St. Louis. Long-run macroeconomic data studied in this chapter
(as produced in Table 1.1 on page 26) are the fundamental series that represent
the long term macro-economic health of the US economy at any point in time.
These are relevant to our research question of decoding the short and long-run
impact of Flight to Safety shocks and Flight to Risk shocks on business cycles.
The empirical analysis is conducted through five variable vector autoregres-
sions, of which the first four key variables are: Total factor productivity, Price
of risk (bond minus stock prices), Real rates and Surplus ratio, and the fifth
variable is the variable of interest. In the benchmark configuration the variable
of interest is Investments. The variable of interest in subsequent iterations of the
VAR model is changed to one of the following variables of interest: Hours (total),
Output, Disposable Income, Term spread (or difference between 1-year and 10-
year T-bill rate), Consumer prices Consumption (Total) and Consumption (only
of Non-Durable goods and Services) which for this chapter only is also defined as
Consumption Habits.
The series on total factor productivity (tfp) is adjusted for factor-utilisation
using Fernald (2012), which follows Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) and its
updated version in (Basu, Fernald, Fisher, and Kimball, 2013) with the pur-
pose to create quarterly growth-accounting database for the US business sectors3
Utilization adjusted tfp series is a better approximation of true technological
progress and has been previously used to identify the impact of news and expec-
tations shocks (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009). This source also provides for the
relative share of investment to output (invshare), the relative price of Consump-
tion to equipment (pxceq), and the utilization adjusted tfp series for equipment
and durables (TFP(EqDur)). All of which are considered in the sensitivity and
discussion sections of this chapter.
The difference between log of bond prices and the log of equity prices is
considered for series on Price of risk. An increase over time in the price of bond
minus the price of equity signifies consumers’ preference for safer asset vis-a-vis
risky asset. Therefore identified positive shocks to this series are characterized as
Flight to Safety shocks while identified adverse shocks to this series are Flight to
Risk shocks.
There are two ways in which we can get the price of equity, or the risky asset,
3See Fernald’s website, US Fred pages for data and comparable series of total factor pro-
ductivity (Fernald 2012).
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first, by merely using S&P 500 Composite Index. The data on the adjusted closing
price of S&P 500 Composite Index is sourced from Yahoo! finance (series ĜSPC).
An alternate way to construct relative price for risk is to consider the 10-year
P/E (price to earnings) ratio of S&P 500, which is available on Robert Schiller’s
webpage4, and use it to deduce a ten years earnings yield for S&P 500. Consider
this earning yield of S&P 500 as a yield to maturity of a 10-year S&P 500 index
and use it to reverse engineer the price for Risky asset (S&P). US 10-year Treasury
bond is considered a safe asset, and the data for 10-year nominal bond yield to
maturity is sourced from US FRED database (series DGS10). The price for safe
asset (10-year T-Bond) is reverse calculated from its yield to maturity.
By taking the difference of log series of nominal bond prices and the log of S&P
prices (either through the index value or through 10-year price to earnings yield),
a series for Price of risk can be generated. The former approach is considered
in the benchmark VAR, and the sensitivity of results to the latter approach is
discussed in later sections.
The ex-post real rate of return is given by the Federal funds (nominal) rate
minus the US all Urban consumers (indexed 2012 = 100) inflation rate. The
term spread is calculated by taking the difference between US 1-year and US
10-year yield, while corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa) is sourced from Moody’s.
The surplus ratio is a series developed by considering One minus the ratio of
Non-durable and Services consumption to total Consumption.
Surplus Ratio = ConsumptionTotal − ConsumptionNonDurables+Services
ConsumptionTotal
(1.1)
Non-Durable and Services consumption has been considered by many as a measure
of consumption habits and as a measure of permanent consumption [See for e.g.
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and
Cochrane (2017)]. Consumption habits series is developed by adding up personal
consumption expenditure on non-durables (PCND) and personal consumption
expenditure on services (PCESV) series from the BEA. The ratio of consumption
habits to total consumption is a proportion of total consumption that satiates
the household’s habits or permanent level of consumption. One minus this ratio
describes the proportion of consumption in excess of the habits or permanent
consumption level. The literature on cyclical risk aversion considers the Surplus
ratio as the key component of the household’s utility (De Paoli and Zabczyk,
2013). The household feels a tighter pinch, or marginal utility of consumption
4http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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increases when the excess consumption gets closer to its long-term sustainable part
[Cochrane (2017), De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)]. The results of benchmark 5 VAR
model are not sensitive to replacing the Surplus Ratio with Total Consumption.
The other series which replace the key variable of interest in the benchmark
VAR are also taken from the US FRED database. The nominal series on Con-
sumption is the real personal consumption expenditure (PCEC) from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Durables consumption represents the personal con-
sumption expenditure on Durable goods (PCDG) series of the BEA. Nominal
output is measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the BEA.
To further investigate the behaviour of the investments sector, this chapter
also considers the following variables of interest: Durable goods consumption,
Residential investment, Non-residential investment, Research and Development
expenditure, Capital Expenditure, Price of Investment in terms of Price of Con-
sumption and the Price of Investment and Consumption of Durable goods in terms
of Price of Consumption habits (i.e., non-Durables consumption and services).
The nominal series on Investments is given by Gross private domestic invest-
ment (GPDI), the non-residential investment is represented by Private Nonres-
idential Fixed Investment (PNFI), and the series on Residential investment is
Private Residential Fixed Investment (PRFI). The GDP Research and Develop-
ment expenditure by BEA (Y694RC1Q027SBEA) is used for the R&D series.
The above described nominal data series are converted into real data series by
deflating using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) based implicit price
deflator (DPCERD, indexed 2012=100). All the above variables are divided by
population, which is reverse calculated from the Disposable income (DPI) and
Disposable income per capita series (A229RC0Q052SBEA) of the BEA, to get
respective real per-capita series that are used in the empirical analysis of this
chapter. The relative price ratio of investment to consumption is calculated by
using respective implicit price deflators (indexed 2012=100). Similarly, the ratio
of the sum of deflators for investment and durables consumption to the sum of
deflators for non-durables consumption and services gives the relative price of
investment and durables.
The business cycle analysis also considers the insights of labour market vari-
ables: Hours (per worker), Output per labour (labour productivity), Labour force
participation rate, Unemployment rate, Vacancy rate, and Vacancy to Unem-
ployment ratio. Some other variables considered for robustness are consumer
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sentiment, capacity utilization, and Foreign portfolio flows.
Labour market indicators of Hours (total) and Hours per employee are taken
from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). Total hours are measured by the hours
of all non-farm businesses in the BLS data. Hours per employee are calculated by
dividing total hours by the total non-farm business Sector employees. Real wages
per hour are generated by deflating the Total Compensation of Employees (Wage
and Salary Disbursements) personal income and outlays data (A576RC1) of BEA
with the PCE deflator and dividing it by the total number of hours of employees on
from non-farm payrolls, from BLS. Labour productivity is calculated by dividing
real GDP with total hours. Labour force participation rate (CIVPART) and
Unemployment rate series are from the BLS. The Government expenditure is
Government consumption expenditure and gross investment (GCE1) data from
the BEA and is deflated using the PCE implicit price deflator and divided by
population to derive the Government expenditure per capita series of the empirical
analysis. Quarterly data on Vacancy rate is from monthly Help-Wanted Index5
(Barnichon, 2010).
Some other important sub-index series are considered in the empirical analysis.
This includes the Total Industry Percent of Capacity Utilisation (TCU) series from
the BEA, which is used for the Capacity Utilisation series. Capital expenditures
for Domestic non-financial sectors from BEA (BOGZ1FA385050005Q) are used to
develop the Capital Expenditure series. The economic policy uncertainty series
constructed in (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016) is used as a measure of policy
uncertainty. Consumer surveys about consumer sentiment available for a long
history from the University of Michigan are included in the analysis.
1.3.1 Downward trend
The Price of risk series as shown in Figure A.6 on page 262 has a downward
trend, which shows that the relative price of safe asset to risky asset has been
falling. It was higher in the 70s and 80s than it was during the global financial
crisis. For the Price of risk series we can say that there are many other factors,
besides inflation that manifest in the price of bond and equities responsible for the
downward trend. Investors adjust the bond yields6 to account for various forms
5Constructed in ‘Building a composite Help-Wanted Index’ (Barnichon 2010).
6 Price of a bond is an inversion of its yield. The analysis that is performed on yields can
be translated into prices. In this chapter the nominal price of bond is measured by inverting
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of embedded risks and in case of the long-dated bond, the term-premium7. Bond
yields, therefore, adjust for the changes in safety premium, interest rate premium,
reinvestment premium, duration premium, default premium, inflation premium,
liquidity premium and event premium. The yields of long-dated (10 years) bond
also adjust for the term-premium. All of which would impact the long-term bond
yield8 and the Price of risk series that we have included in this analysis.
Similarly the equity price is impacted by the underlying factors of dividend pay-
ments, mergers and acquisitions, reinvestment of capital, productivity increases,
market power (domestic and global) and management changes. Besides factors
that result in the time-varying nature of investor risk aversions such as increased
globalisation and savings glut, they also contribute in uncertain ways to the Price
of Risk series. A net effect of these over the years has been that the price of
buying a real long term bond has been relatively falling to the real price of a unit
the 10 year bond yield, but I haven’t come across any empirical work that works with bond
prices by inverting bond yields. Shiller (2015) is an influential study on bond and equity return
dynamics but it also uses yields (not prices) to develop a total return index for the long and
short term bonds.
7 Term premium is the amount by which the yield on a long bond is greater than the yield
on a shorter dated bond. It is the premium that investors demand for holding a long term
bond versus rolling over shorter term bonds for the same holding period. Ever since Fama and
Bliss (1987) and Campbell and Shiller (1991), among others, found little evidence to support
the Expectations Hypothesis which stated that the forward yield is market’s expectation of
short term rates in the future, it has become a widespread practise to decompose yields on
long term bonds into two components: (i) expectations of future path of short-term interest
rates and (ii) the term-premium. Term premium is deemed as a key ingredient in the optimal
maturity structure of government debt (Greenwood et al. 2015) and an instrument through
which monetary policy can influence long-term yields (Crump et al. 2016). Term-premia [See
Kim and Wright (2005), Diebold et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2018)] are also the main driver
of cross-sectional variation in yields, and contributed to co-movements between the US and the
Euro area yields. The general equilibrium models of term-premium [Cox et al. (1985), or Lee
(1995)], imply that the term-premium is a function of investors’ attitudes toward risk. The
term structure of interest rates varies according to market expectations and are very sensitive
to the expected future path of growth, inflation, and monetary policy (Kliem at el. 2017), so a
macroeconomic approach to understand it is warranted (Koop and Williams 2018).
8Common risk factors with respect to bond and bond fund investments, (as
per FINRA https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/types-investments/
bonds/understanding-bond-risk) are as follows. Interest rate risk (or market risk, or holding
-period risk) which is the possibility of an increase in interest rates during the holding period
that would increase yields and lower the final selling price of the bond. Call risk (or reinvestment
risk) which is the risk from an early repayment by the bond issuer. As interest rates fall, the
bond issuer has an incentive to reissue at the prevailing low rates and repay the previously issued
high interest bonds. Thus leaving the bond investor with no suitable reinvestment opportunities.
Duration risk results from the sensitivity of bond prices to interest rate fluctuations. It is a
non-linear function of bond’s time to maturity. A shorter term bond has lower duration risk
than longer dated bonds. Credit risk (or default risk) accounts for the possibility of default by
the borrower. Inflation risk also impacts the price of the bond as rising inflation reduces the
purchasing power of the returns on bond investments. Liquidity risk is the risk of not being able
to find a buyer easily when required. Event risk from significant events such as war, trade-wars,
mergers and acquisitions etc. is also a factor for valuing long term bonds.
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of US equity index.
The benchmark 10 year treasury bond, whose price is used in the Price of risk
series, is updated every year and so only the most liquid and relevant bonds are
used. This avoids the changes in duration risk of the bond but it stays exposed to
changes in interest rate risk, inflation risk and term premium. The equity index
which is a market capitalisation based index is also regularly updated and that
leads to a survivorship bias which means only the successful and large companies
remain, while the failed ones are weeded out. The regular upkeep of the benchmark
bond and equity series, keeps them relevant but exposes them to other biases. An
ideal experiment would be to decompose each of the individual price effects of
bond and equity prices and only compare them on the basis of safety premium.
However in absence of such a natural data decomposition, the Price of risk series
that we have considered in this chapter is a respectable alternative. The series
could deviate from trend for the reasons that are peculiar to either bond or equity
prices, but it would also deviate due to Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk. By
way of the identification strategy employed in this chapter I present evidence that
changes in individual risk aversion are a major source of such deviations.
1.3.2 Non-stationarity and Structural VAR
The variables considered in the VAR except unemployment rate, cpi and yield
spreads, display a trend and are integrated of order one (see results in Table 1.2).
The macro variables can be detrended by removing a deterministic trend or by
first differencing before conducting OLS, otherwise one runs into the problems
of spurious regressions, where the econometric procedure indicates relationship
between two variables when none may exist. In that case single or joint hypothesis
tests to examine the statistical significance of the coefficients and their standard
errors are biased and the residuals violate the Gauss-Markov assumptions of no
heteroscedastic and no auto-correlation. Therefore it is recommended especially
while conducting unrestricted VAR and when working to devise point forecasts and
causality that all of the components in the VAR have at least weak stationarity,
that is they don’t have time-varying first and second moments. But the spurious
regression problem does not apply if variables are cointegrated9 with one another.
9Two variables are said to be cointegrated if they are each unit root processes, but if a linear
combination of them is stationary.
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In such a case first differencing is not appropriate10. C. A. Sims (1980b), J.
Stock, C. A. Sims, and Watson (1990) and Luetkepohl (2011) and others11 have
suggested that a way to avoid the problems of spurious regressions without first
differencing is to obtain the structural VAR with higher number of lags, and
that the forecast errors, historical decomposition, impulses responses and Granger
causality based results are valid even for integrated representations. Therefore
the structural analysis employed in this chapter avoids spurious regression by
using 4-lags, imposing sign based restrictions and developing robust standard
errors. Alternatively if the variables are co-integrated the Vector-error correction
mechanism as presented in EC-VAR of Bansal et al. (2007, 2011) could be followed.
They demonstrate that as cash-flow and consumption series are cointegrated, an
error correction VAR describes a completely different optimal portfolio allocation,
in particular for long term horizon, than a commonly used VAR approach. The
return betas from their EC-VAR account for cross-sectional variation in equity
returns, which is not the case if cointegration is ignored.
The next challenge is to devise an identification scheme to overcome the
endogeneity in macroeconomic variables and other shocks that generate FTS
behaviour. We answer these questions by isolating the business cycle and monetary
policy shocks and only considering the FTS shocks that are orthogonal.
10Chris Brooks in his (2019) textbook Introductory Econometrics for Finance says, ".....many
proponents of the VAR approach recommend that differencing to induce stationarity should
not be done. They would argue that the purpose of VAR estimation is purely to examine the
relationships between the variables, and that differencing will throw information on any long-run
relationships between the series away" .
11Eric Sims proposes, "Differencing often feels like the right thing to do, but can result in
serious mis-specifications if variables are cointegrated. Estimating in levels (provided there are
lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side, which takes care of the spurious regression
problem) is always safer" . Source: Eric sims’ lecture notes https://www3.nd.edu/~esims1/
time_series_notes_sp13.pdf.
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Table 1.2: Unit root test results of various series
Critical values
Test Statistic p-value #Lags #Obs 1% 5% 10%
Util-Adj TFP -0.801 0.819 0 146 -3.476 -2.882 -2.577
Price of risk -1.204 0.672 3 143 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Real rate(%) -2.086 0.25 11 135 -3.48 -2.883 -2.578
Consumption -1.261 0.647 6 140 -3.478 -2.882 -2.578
Hours -1.251 0.651 5 141 -3.478 -2.882 -2.578
Output -1.22 0.665 2 144 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Investment -1.967 0.301 2 144 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Cons (NDur+Svc) -1.119 0.708 3 143 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Hrs per emp -1.417 0.574 4 142 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Outp per Emp -0.493 0.893 2 144 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
CPI -4.209 0.001∗ 0 146 -3.476 -2.882 -2.577
Surplus ratio -0.877 0.795 3 143 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Participation rate(%) -1.515 0.526 10 136 -3.479 -2.883 -2.578
Unemployment rate(%) -2.762 0.064∗ 9 137 -3.479 -2.883 -2.578
Disp Income -1.557 0.505 2 144 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Inv + Durables Cons -1.472 0.547 3 143 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Rel.Px Inv -3.711 0.004∗ 0 146 -3.476 -2.882 -2.577
Rel.Px Inv+DurC -1.233 0.659 1 145 -3.476 -2.882 -2.578
Res Investment -2.855 0.051∗ 5 141 -3.478 -2.882 -2.578
Non-Res Investment -1.75 0.406 2 144 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Gov. Expenditure -1.727 0.417 4 142 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
R & D -0.672 0.854 2 144 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Capex -1.168 0.687 4 142 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
1y-10y spread(%) -3.58 0.006∗ 3 143 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Corp bond spread(%) -4.744 0∗ 1 145 -3.476 -2.882 -2.578
Util-Adj TFP(Eq.Dur) 0.025 0.961 4 142 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
Equity px -1.632 0.467 1 145 -3.476 -2.882 -2.578
Bonds px -3.006 0.034 10 136 -3.479 -2.883 -2.578
TR 10y-earn px -3.352 0.013∗ 7 139 -3.478 -2.883 -2.578
10y-Cape px -3.489 0.008∗ 3 143 -3.477 -2.882 -2.578
CAPE -2.72 0.071∗ 1 145 -3.476 -2.882 -2.578
LT 10y-earn px# -1.527 0.520 1 114 -3.489 -2.887 -2.580
Notes: ADF unit root test results for data series used in S-VAR. The null hypothesis of the test is,
H0 : The series has Unit root.∗ indicates results that are significant at 90%. # series is available
for period 1983-2011, all other results are for 1983-2019. Maximum 12 lags are considered for each
series. #Lags describes the lag order which gives the best result to reject the Null hypothesis.
#Obs is the number of observations left after accounting for lags.
36 1. FTS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
1.4 Empirical analysis
This section describes the sign restrictions methodology that is adopted in this
chapter to identify Flight to Safety shocks in the US. Sign and zero restrictions are
derived from Uhlig’s agnostic identification (Uhlig, 2005) and the methodology
below is also supported by additional derivations presented in Appendix A.1.
After describing the identification methodology, the section also presents the
identifying assumptions and the theoretical rationale behind choosing them.
1.4.1 Methodology for identifying Flight to Safety shocks
The reduced form VAR and Uhlig’s agnostic identification: Consider a VAR model
in reduced form as in Uhlig (2005)
Yt = ct +
p∑
k=1
B(k)Yt−k + ut (1.2)
where Yt is an m x 1 vector of endogenous variables, at date t = 1, ......T , B(k) are
reduced-form square coefficient matrices of size m x m and ut is m x 1 one-step
prediction error with m x m variance-covariance matrix Σu. This reduced form
VAR has a moving-average representation,




where Φ(0) = Im. For simplification we can ignore the ct term which comprises
of intercept and/or time trend. This is mostly an agreeable representation of
the reduced form VAR. The challenge in identification lies on how we decompose
the forecast error ut. If we assume that there are m fundamental, mutually
independent innovations, i.e. one shock for each endogenous variable, which are
normalised to be of variance 1. They can be represented by a m x 1 vector v such
that
E[vv′] = Σv = Im. (1.4)
The identification problem is then restricted to finding a linear mapping between
reduced form innovations ut and structural shocks vt. The mapping is represented
by an unknown matrix A such that
ut = Avt (1.5)
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The jth column of A represents the impact on all variables of VAR of the jth fun-
damental innovation. However identifying such an A matrix is not straightforward
as the variance-covariance matrix of ut which now can be written as
Σu = E[uu′] = AE[vv′]A′ = AA′ (1.6)
also holds true for Ã which is any arbitrary orthogonalisation of Σv . For instance
consider a Cholesky decomposition of Σv = ÃÃ′ and some orthonormal matrix
P such that
A = ÃP (1.7)
AA′ = ÃPP ′Ã′ = ÃÃ′ (1.8)
Therefore the identification of the structural shocks vt requires us to pin down
the orthonormal matrix P , which means there are another m(m − 1)/2 restric-
tions required to achieve this identification. Commonly used procedures in this
identification are recursive ordering of variables (C. A. Sims, 1986), breakup of
components into transitory or permanent (Blanchard and Quah, 1989), struc-
tural relations between fundamental innovations and prediction errors (Bernanke
and Mihov, 1998), and sign restrictions [Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig
(2009)]. I use Uhlig (2005) sign-restriction based agnostic identification method
to find the effects of FTS on the economy. A clear advantage of the approach is
that sign-restriction limits identification exercise to only k shocks of interest, and
the other m− k fundamental innovations can be ignored. By not imposing any
sign restrictions on the response of variables of interest, the procedure remains
‘agnostic’ (in the manner of Uhlig, 2005) with regards to these variables and can
be used in finding the effect of shocks on such variables. Following from the
equations (1.3) to (1.8) we can deduce the structural VAR in moving average
form as




where Ψ(h) = B(h)P , B(h) = Φ(h)Ã and vt−h are the structural shocks. The
impulse response of jth shock at horizon h ∈ h−, ..., h+ is given by the jth column
Ψj(h) of matrix Ψ(h):
Ψj(h) = B(h)p
j (1.10)
where pj is the jth column of P . The response of the ith element of the system
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Bi,(h) is the ith row of B(h) and pj is the jth column of P . Thus sign and zero
restrictions can be applied to response Ψi,j(h) for some horizons h to identify any
jth structural shock. It follows from Uhlig (2005) that the problem comes down
to identifying the unit vector pj which comes closest to meeting the sign and zero
restrictions (See Appendix A.1).
The identification can be achieved by either selecting from Markov chain Monte
carlo (MCMC) simulation a certain number of impulse responses that meet our
pre-determined sign restrictions or by choosing a Penalty (or criterion) function
Θ(p) which increases in the size of violation by impulse response to the selected
sign and zero restrictions. For ease of notation I am dropping the j superscript
in the equations that follow from here on. As discussed in Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), in the Penalty function approach, selecting between sign restrictions then
becomes a minimisation problem that solves,
p∗ = argmin
p
Θ(p) s.t. p′p = 1, (1.12)

















where i+ is the set of variables whose impulse responses Bi,(h)pj are set to be
positive and i− is the set of variables whose impulse responses are set to be
negative for the horizon h ∈ h−, ..., h+. Any zero restrictions on impact of the
variable ordered zth in the VAR system, can be included in the minimisation
problem by adding an additional constraint on the unit vector p as:
p∗ = argmin
p
Θ(p) s.t. p′p = 1 and Rzerop = 0 (1.14)
where Rzero is zth row of B(0), i.e. Rzero = Bz,(0). The minimisation is solved in
Matlab using Simplex and inbuilt methods, and the estimation is conducted using
Bayesian procedures as in Uhlig (2005).
The algorithm for both MCMC and Penalty based methods is thus given by:
1. Draw from Normal-Wishart prior.
2.a. For a given draw either solve (1.14) to get a candidate solution for p∗ , or
2.b. Apply the stereographic inversion on the candidate solution to solve other
constraints, i.e. unit length and meeting Zero restrictions.
3. Obtain statistical inference on the basis of draws that solve step 2.
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Table 1.3: Identification restrictions in S-VAR
variables TFP Price of Real rate Surplus Variable of
shocks Risk ratio interest
Strategy 1
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to safety 0 + + − .
Monetary policy 0 . + − .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Strategy 2
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to safety 0 + + 0 .
Monetary policy 0 . + 0 .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Strategy 3
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to safety 0 + . 0 .
Monetary policy 0 . + 0 .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Notes: The benchmark VAR has 5 variables: TFP, Price of risk (which is
Bond price minus Equity price), Real rate, Surplus ratio (which is One minus
the ratio of Consumption of services and Non-durables to Total consump-
tion), and a variable of interest which in the benchmark case is Investments
but is replaced in different iterations by other business cycle variables for e.g.
Output, Consumption, Hours, CPI etc. On impact of the respective shock,
+ means the variable is restricted to be positive and − means that the vari-
able is restricted to be negative for the impact horizon. The impact horizon
is shock period plus one more period. Symbol 0 signifies a zero restriction
when the response variable is restricted to not respond to the shock contem-
poraneously, and Dots . signify that the impact response of that variable is
left unrestricted.
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1.4.2 Sign and Zero restrictions based identification
The benchmark 5-variable VAR model consists of: Utilisation-adjusted Total
factor productivity, Price of risk, Real rate, Surplus ratio and the variable of
interest which in the benchmark configuration is Investments. In other iterations
of the model the variable of interest is replaced by: Hours, Output, Consumption,
Disposable income, Term spread between 1-year and 10-year T-Bill rate, CPI and
Habits. Residential investments, Non-residential Investments, Disposable income,
Wages (per hour), consumption of non-durables and services, Foreign portfolio
flows, Government expenditure, Labour productivity. The structural model is
given by:





















Three different identification strategies are adopted (See Table 1.3 on page 39)
for considering impact, impulse response restrictions from FTS shock on the first
3 or 4 variables of the benchmark 5 variable VAR. The impulse responses from
the 5th variable or the variable of interest in all strategies are left unrestricted.
In this manner, the impact analysis is agnostic to the effect on the variable of
interest. The identification strategies (in Table 1.3) are a set of sign and zero
restrictions that are supported by theoretical models of the business cycles and
by observations from data.
A prominent model that has been used in deriving sign restrictions in this
chapter is the NK (New Keynesian) or NNS (New Neoclassical synthesis) Smets
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and Wouters (2007) model that is consistent with the balanced steady state
growth path and is estimated by them using Bayesian methods. Their model has
7 orthogonal structural shocks in: total factor productivity, risk premium shocks,
investment technology shocks, wage shocks, price markup shocks, exogenous
spending (policy) shocks, and monetary policy shocks. It also incorporates many
relevant policy analysis features, such as labour augmented technological progress,
investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and real rigidity in
intermediate goods and labor markets.
Several other interesting features of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model
are as follows. Household chooses over consumption and labour effort. Labour is
differentiated by a union, which gives monopoly power over determination of wages,
which are Calvo-style sticky. Consumption habits are exogenous. Households
make decisions to rent and accumulate capital based on the rental rate and
capital adjustment costs. Firms decide on producing differentiated products and
set prices based on present and expected marginal costs (wages and rental rate
of capital), and past and expected inflation. Wages depend on past wages and
future inflation. The medium-scale of this model, its micro-theoretic foundations
and relevance of the variables it considers with the business cycle phenomenon,
all together make it a standard workhorse model of monetary policy analysis and
a reliable resource to base the identifying restrictions of the empirical study of
this chapter.
The results of Smets and Wouters (2007) are consistent with the great modera-
tion period 1984 to 2004 and demonstrate a fall in the volatility of shocks (related
to total factor productivity, monetary policy, and price markup), the volatility of
output growth and inflation, and the sensitivity of response of output variables to
monetary policy shocks. They also show that during the great moderation, the
monetary policy response to output changes has slowed. The reaction of policy to
inflation has slightly increased, but the output gap’s reaction has reduced by half.
The sensitivity of their results to investment adjustment costs and consumption
habits is high. Investment shocks result in the hump-shaped responses in output,
hours, inflation, and interest rates.
The sign restrictions in this paper are based on the key results of Smets and
Wouters (2007). In particular that technology shocks lead to a fall in nominal and
real interest rates. However, for the monetary policy reaction function that they
estimate, this fall is not sufficient to prevent a drop in inflation and an opening
of the output gap. Risk premium shocks result in a fall in output, hours, and an
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increase in the real interest rate. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks lead to
an increase in interest rate, real interest rate but decrease output, inflation, and
hours. The sign restrictions are applied for a horizon of shock period and the next
period, while the zero restrictions are applied for the shock period itself. These
restrictions are represented in the B(0) and B(1) matrices, which are discussed
next for the three different identification strategies.
1.4.2.1 Identification strategy 1
Identification strategy 1 (See Table 1.3 on page 39), applies zero impact restriction
on TFP from monetary policy shock and Flight to Safety shock. Recall, that
the ordering of the 5 variable VAR in benchmark configuration is: TFP, Price
of risk, Real rate, Surplus ratio and Investment. Therefore on applying the zero
restrictions the impact matrix B(0) becomes
B(0) =

. 0 0 . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .

(1.18)
where dots (.) symbolise entries that remain unrestricted. On including sign
restrictions given in Identification strategy 1 (see Table 1.3 on page 39) the B(0)
and B(1) matrix are modified to
B(0) =

+ 0 0 . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ − − . .




+ . . . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ − − . .
. . . . .

(1.19)
The sign restrictions in 5 variable VAR are implemented for a maximum horizon
of one period after the shock, i.e. the restrictions are valid for the shock period
and one period after. Any zero restrictions are imposed only on the impact period.
Identification strategy 1: restrictions to TFP shock In the 5 variable
benchmark VAR model, Identification strategy 1 imposes negative sign restrictions
from TFP shock (the first shock in VAR) on Real rates (the third variable in VAR)
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and imposes a positive restriction on Surplus ratio (the fourth variable in VAR).
In models of business cycle, an increase in technological progress is expected
to increase the household’s desire for consumption and leisure. If we assume
that consumption habits are slow to change, then it follows that an increase in
household’s discretionary consumption would raise the surplus consumption and
the surplus ratio. However, the impact of real rates from a TFP shock is not that
unambiguous. A positive TFP shock leads to decrease in real interest rate. This
is consistent with the logic of standard Euler equation, where the current period
real interest rates is inversely related to current consumption. For the policy
maker with a dual mandate of price and output stability, in standard forward
looking 3-equation New Keynesian (NK) model12, it is optimal to consistently set
interest rates equal to natural rate of interest. Therefore a TFP shock in models
of price-rigidity warrants a cut in real rates to keep the output gap closed.
The literature based evidence points to a fall in natural rate of interest with
increases in total factor productivity (Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis,
and Villegas-Sanchez, 2017). But this causality is believed to run both ways, and
low real rate through its effect on resource allocation affects TFP growth that
drives natural rate lower (Cette, Fernald, and Mojon, 2016). Following from the
work of Smets and Wouters (2007), in the identification strategy 1 I choose to
keep the response of Real rates as negative on impact from the positive TFP
shock. Results from Smets and Wouters (2007) demonstrate that both nominal
interest rates and real rates fall on impact from a TFP shock, but by not enough
to avoid a fall in prices.
Identification strategy 1: restrictions to FTS shock The impact from
FTS shock is considered as orthogonal to the TFP shock and is included in
the VAR through a zero restriction of the TFP (first variable in VAR) to FTS
shock (second shock in VAR). If we cannot control for the state of business cycle
(TFP shocks), then there could be confusion whether the increase in price of
the safe asset is due to FTS or from a TFP linked economic downturn. The
news shocks literature [Barsky and E. R. Sims (2009) and (2011), Beaudry and
Portier (2005) and (2006)] also chooses some form of zero restriction on TFP from
news/sentiment shocks.
12The forward looking 3-equation NK model (Galí, 2015) is given by:
the IS relation: yt = Et[yt+1]− 1θ
(
it − Et[πt+1] + uISt
)
, θ > 0
the Philips curve: πt = βEt[πt+1] + κ (yt − ynt ) , 0 < β < 1
and the policy rule: it = rnt + φππt + φy ỹt , κ > 0
where uISt is an AR(1) shock process, yn is the flexible price level output, rn is the natural rate
that prevails flexible prices, and ỹ = y − yn.
44 1. FTS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
Flight to Safety by definition is a phenomenon when capital moves away from
risky assets to safer assets. Therefore on impact from a positive FTS shock the
Price of risk (the second variable of the benchmark VAR), which is difference
between Bond price and Equity price, is restricted with a positive sign restriction.
Favourable (or positive) news shocks, in some TFP related news shock literature
(Gambetti and Musso, 2017) are also linked to a fall in nominal rates after the
1980s. If we assume that FTS episodes are linked with pessimistic news about
future TFP, then similar restrictions that are advocated on Real rates from a
negative TFP news shock can be placed for identifying FTS shocks. Real rates
responses are therefore restricted to be positive on impact from FTS shock. On
impact of a Flight to Safety shock agents look to save for precautionary reasons
and therefore their surplus consumption would reduce. This provides us with the
third restriction which is a negative response of surplus ratio (the fourth variable
in benchmark VAR) on impact of a positive FTS shock. This is also consistent
with the results from Smets and Wouters (2007). That model has shocks to risk
premium such that an increase in the premia leads to fall in variables of business
cycle activity, such as hours and output and leads to an increase in the real interest
rates. An increase in risk-premia does not translate one-to-one into preference
for safety that is a hallmark of FTS. However, a risk premium shock leads to
increase in expected rate of return from risky assets and a fall in their prices. As
long as the shift in risk premium after the shock, is not uniform across the whole
spectrum of investments (of range least to highest risk), it can be safely argued
that the price gap between most risky and least risky investment widens after
the risk premium shock and use of the results from Smets and Wouters (2007) is
justified.
Identification strategy 1: restrictions to Policy shock To distinguish
monetary policy (MP) shock from TFP shock, a zero restriction is placed on the
response of TFP series (first variable in VAR) to monetary policy shock (third
shock in VAR). This is a commonly used restriction in identifying structural
monetary shocks in TFP and news shock literature (Beaudry, Nam, and Wang,
2011). No restrictions from the policy shock are placed on the Price of risk (second
series in VAR). A positive monetary policy surprise will lead to an increase in
nominal rates and fall in inflation expectations, therefore the Real rate responses
(third variable in VAR) are sign restricted to be positive. In Smets and Wouters
(2007) monetary policy shock leads to increase in interest rate, real interest rate,
and decrease in inflation. Structural model based evidence, including Smets
and Wouters (2007) supports the view that positive monetary policy surprises
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negatively impact consumption and surplus consumption and other business cycle
variables including hours and output, and so the response of surplus ratio (fourth
series in VAR) to positive monetary policy shock is sign restricted to be negative.
The shock to fourth variable (surplus ratio) which is a Demand shock is not
strictly identified in either of the identification strategies 1, 2, and 3. Therefore
no restrictions are imposed on the response of any variables in the VAR from
demand shocks that impact the Surplus ratio. There may be a case to include an
additional restriction that positive demand shocks lead to increase in Surplus ratio.
However I resist from doing so, for the main reason that the impact of demand
shocks on Surplus ratio in not straightforward as any changes in demand need to
be further decomposed into durables, non-durables or services to get their impact
on the Surplus ratio. Besides keeping the number of identifying restrictions small
has some philosophical backing based on the principle of Occam’s razor. It’s the
notion of ‘nominalism or reductionism’ (attributed to William of Occam) that
in explaining something no more than necessary assumptions should be made.
The identification strategy remains agnostic to the response of the 5th variable
in VAR or the variable of interest. No restrictions are imposed on this variable
from shocks to the remaining 4 variables in the VAR. In the benchmark model
the 5th variable, or the variable of interest, is Investments. The response of the
variable of interest stays agnostic in terms of Uhlig (2005) representation. Table
1.3 describes the identification restrictions for various variables in benchmark 5
variable VAR.
1.4.2.2 Identification strategy 2
The Identification strategy 2 differs from Identification strategy 1 in the following
manner. The negative sign restrictions on the surplus ratio (the fourth variable
in the VAR) on impact of FTS and Policy shock are removed. They are replaced
by zero restrictions for both FTS shock and Monetary policy shock. So the
Surplus ratio which is a ratio of the difference between total consumption and
non-durable and services consumption (habits) to total consumption, does not
react contemporaneously to Flight to Safety shock and Monetary policy shocks.
This is done to acknowledge an alternative empirical literature which argues for a
lack of contemporaneous effect of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomic
variables such as investment, output and consumption, as their data is only
available with a lag. On including sign restrictions given in Identification strategy
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2 (see Table 1.3 on page 39) the B(0) and B(1) matrix are modified to
B(0) =

+ 0 0 . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ 0 0 . .




+ . . . .
. + . . .
− + + . .
+ . . . .
. . . . .

(1.20)
1.4.2.3 Identification strategy 3
Identification strategy 3 has one less restriction from the previous two Identifica-
tion strategies 1 & 2. In this strategy the positive impact restriction of Flight to
Safety shocks on Real rates, the third variable of the VAR, is removed. So Real
rates is only positively restricted to Monetary policy shocks and is left unrestricted
for FTS shocks. In both Identification strategies 1 & 2, the response of Real rates
had same restriction (to be positive on impact) to both FTS and Monetary policy
shocks. That assumption was open to the possibility that some latent shock, which
could meet the imposed restrictions of both FTS and Monetary policy shock to
real rates, could be responsible for the results of the model. Identification strategy
3, breaks that link by restricting the impulse responses to Real rates from Policy
and FTS shocks differently and therefore avoids the possibility of responses being
driven form any common external shock. By analysing the differences between
the impulse response from two different Identification strategies (1 and 3, or 2
and 3), we can get further convincing evidence of whether the shocks that this
empirical exercise identifies are in fact FTS shocks.
On including sign restrictions given in Identification strategy 3 (see Table 1.3
on page 39) the B(0) and B(1) matrix are modified to
B(0) =

+ 0 0 . .
. + . . .
− . + . .
+ 0 0 . .




+ . . . .
. + . . .
− . + . .
+ . . . .
. . . . .

(1.21)
A reason for choosing different identification strategies 1, 2 and 3 in this study,
is the inherent assumptions in those strategies about the key drivers and prop-
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agation channel behind the model. By assuming a direct and contemporaneous
link between the shock variable and macroeconomic variables, we are assuming
that forward looking rational households can anticipate the shocks and respond
immediately, on the other hand by excluding such contemporaneous relationship
we are testing if the shock variable is a primary driver of any change in the
macroeconomic series.
Recall that the sign restrictions in 5 variable VAR are implemented for a
maximum horizon of one period after the shock, i.e. the restrictions are valid for
the shock period and one period after. Whereas, zero restrictions are imposed
only on the impact period. The maximum lag length considered on the basis
of information criteria is 4 quarters. The results of all models are tested for
robustness have been tested over various horizons and other lags.
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1.5 Structural VAR Results
This section describes the benchmark structural VAR results to show that Flight
to Safety shocks inflict a long and lasting impact on the business cycle variables.
The results from some investment-related variables compare well with the observed
lack of investment growth in periods following the global financial crisis when
economic pessimism or Flight to Safety was at higher levels. The section also
shows how effective are various identification strategies in picking up innovations
in Flight to Safety. It discusses the impact this identification has on beliefs about
economic channels that guide investor behaviour during business cycles.
Let us first look at the identified structural shocks from benchmark VAR,
which are plotted in Figure 1.8 on page 49, where the shaded areas represent the
peak to trough dates of NBER recessions. The identified shocks correspond well
with recessionary periods. The scale and size of shocks in the 1990-91 recession
is smaller than in the other two recessions of 2000-01 and 2007-09. Most inter-
estingly, only the Flight to Safety shock displays the most significant jump of its
entire history during the 2007-09 recession. This brings us back to the original
purpose of identifying data series and events related to the unprecedented global
financial crisis more than they do so with any other post-war recession. The
initial assessment portrays FTS shock as a likely candidate.
We can further assess the usefulness of the vector autoregressions in the
benchmark configuration of the model by looking at identified structural shocks
that are quite orthogonal (see Figure 1.9 on page 50) and uncorrelated. Figure 1.9
shows the probability distribution of these shocks, the regression line of one shock
on another, and the correlation coefficients between the identified shocks. The
regression line and scatter plots display a lack of meaningful relationships between
the shocks. Correlation coefficients for most of them are not significant. There
is some linkage in identified TFP and FTS shocks as their correlation coefficient
has a small negative slope, which shows that positive FTS shocks appear to be
leading to adverse TFP shocks. We further explore this feature in the following
section through the results of impulse responses to FTS shocks.
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Figure 1.8: Identified structural shocks
Notes: Standardised median structural shocks from 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 and their
68% confidence bands. Shocks are identified through the benchmark 5-variable VAR,
using Sign and Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. The 5 variables in that model
are: TFP, Price of risk (Bond minus Equity price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and
Investments. The shaded areas represent peak to trough period of NBER recessions.
Respective shocks are: TFP, FTS, Monetary Policy, Demand and Residual.
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Notes: Regression (line) of one structural shock on another, and Probability distribution
of structural shocks identified in benchmark 5 variable VAR using Identification strategy
1. r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient. p is Two-tailed p-value of the correlation
coefficient. The 5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP, Price of risk (Bond
minus Equity price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investments. Respective shocks are:
TFP, FTS, Monetary Policy, Demand and Residual.
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1.5.1 Economic contractions from Flight to Safety
In this section, the results from identification strategy 1 (as discussed in Table 1.3
on page 39) for the 5 variable VAR with variables: Total factor productivity, Price
of risk, Real rate, Surplus ratio, and Investments are discussed. Investments are
a key variable of interest, and in later studies, it is replaced with other variables
such as Output, Consumption, Hours, and CPI.
Figure 1.10 on page 52 plots the impulse responses from identified Flight to
Safety shocks on all variables of the benchmark 5-variable VAR with Investments
as the key variable that is unrestricted and considered agnostic in the identification
strategy. Additionally, the figure also reports ‘Hours’ when replacing the variable
‘Investment’ in the benchmark model. Similarly, in Figure 1.11 on page 54 results
of other variables of interests as they replace the fifth variable of the benchmark
VAR are reported. The impulse response results for the first 4 variables in these
alternate models are similar to those of the benchmark model where ‘Investment’
is the variable of interest. So, preserving space and time, they are only reported
once, i.e., for the benchmark model.
The results (in Figure 1.10) show that the pessimism and risk aversion resulting
from Flight to Safety shocks has a long term impact on the business cycle. The
Bond minus Equity price (Price of risk) series jumps upon impact from FTS
shocks. As described earlier, an unexpected increase in the price of a safe asset
(10-year T-bond) vis-á-vis the price of a risky asset (S&P 500) symbolizes an
increase in investors’ preference for safety over risky investments, or Flight to
Safety. So as expected from sign and zero restrictions set out in Identification
strategy 1, we witness an immediate jump in this series of 4-5%. An impact of
this size cannot be fully generated from an increase in the safe asset price alone.
The yields on safe asset (bonds) are meager, and a 4-5% increase in prices (or a
drop in yields of this magnitude) cannot be obtained without violating the Zero
lower bound on bond yields. Therefore a steeper fall in S&P 500 index on impact
from FTS shock is the primary driver of this sudden jump in the Price of risk
series. Once the FTS shock has hit, it takes near 28 quarters for the series to
return to its pre-shock levels. The identified FTS shock thus demonstrates a long
term impact on the investors’ preference for safer assets.
Identification strategy 1 (discussed in table Table 1.3 on page 39) restricts the
response of Real rate to FTS shocks to be positive and Surplus ratio to be negative
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Figure 1.10: Impulse responses of Benchmark VAR to FTS shocks
































Notes: Median impulse response and 68% and 95% confidence bands of variables in
benchmark VAR model to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. which are identified
with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3. In all charts,
Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters) horizon after
the shock. Benchmark VAR has five variables: Total factor productivity, Price of
risk (which generates the FTS shocks), Real rate, Surplus ratio is one minus ratio of
consumption (non-durable goods and services) to total consumption and ‘Investment’.
In another iteration of the 5 variable VAR model ‘Investment’ is replaced with ‘Hours’.
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for the shock period and one period following the shock. Both these variables
behave as expected. The Real rate rises, and the Surplus ratio falls on impact.
The median impulse response of Real rates increases by 0.3 percent, whereas the
fall in the median Surplus ratio response is about -0.1 percent. The latter is a
significant fall for two reasons, the first of which is that there is not much scope
for the Surplus ratio to fall. This ratio in Data in the long run averages around
12 percent, as habits (i.e., consumption of services and non-durable goods) form a
significant (∼90%) portion of total consumption. Furthermore, the second reason
is that the consumption-based models [Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Cochrane
(2017), De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)] which consider surplus ratio in the utility
function, demonstrate that even for a small decline in this ratio there is relatively
big spike in consumers’ marginal utility.
The identification strategy 1 also puts a zero restriction on the response of
total factor productivity so that the identified Flight to Safety shock is orthogonal
to TFP. As a result, we see that the impulse response of TFP is muted on the
impact of the FTS shock. However, it begins to turn negative around 8-10 periods
after the shock and slides after that for another 12 quarters. For the length of
business cycle frequency (8-32 quarters) after the FTS shock, there is a persistent
decline in TFP.
Investment, which is the variable of interest in the benchmark 5-variable VAR,
is kept unrestricted as no sign or zero restrictions are imposed on it from any
shocks in the model. The impulse response in Investment is negative on the
initial impact of FTS shock. Investment decisions are made many periods in
advance, explaining the smaller immediate drop in Investments on the impact of
the Flight to Safety shocks. However, the response reaches a median quarterly
fall of around -3% in a short span of 2-3 periods after the shock. It sustains this
L-shaped response and stays below -2% for about 10-12 quarters. The impulse
responses also show that Investments are very slow to recover to their pre-shock
levels. What is probably more significant is that after the impulse response in
Investment reaches its lowest, i.e., 3-4 quarter after the impact of FTS shock, only
then the Total factor productivity (TFP) begins to decline.
To better understand the mechanism through which FTS impacts the business
cycle, ‘Investment’ in the benchmark configuration is replaced with other macroe-
conomic variables. They are ‘Hours’ whose impulse responses to FTS shocks
are presented in Figure 1.10 on page 52 itself and six other variables. Impulse
responses to FTS shock for these six variables are presented in Figure 1.11 on
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Figure 1.11: Impulse responses of Macro variables to FTS shocks





































Notes: Median impulse response (in %) and 68% and 95% confidence bands of Macro
variables of interest to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. in benchmark VAR
model identified with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
In all charts, Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters)
horizon after the shock. Only the responses of variable of interest in the VAR model
are reported. ‘Disp Income’ stands for Disposable Income. ‘1y-10y spread’ is the
difference between yields of 1 year and 10 year US Treasury bonds. ‘Cons (NDur +
Svc)’ is Consumption of Non-durable goods and Services.
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page 54. These additional variables include four business cycle variables: ‘Out-
put’, ‘Disposable income’, ‘Consumption (Non-Durables and Services)’ and total
‘Consumption’, a pricing variable ‘CPI’ and a liquidity variable ‘1y-10y spread’
which is the difference in the yields of 1-year and 10-year US treasury bonds.
The impulse responses to these variables represent a negative hump-shaped
response. ‘Hours’ exhibits a negative response that is slow to begin and decreases
gradually, which resembles a reverse hump shape. However, except for hours
neither of the other business cycle variables fully recover to their pre-shock levels.
The median response in hours is small and reaches a minimum of approximately
-0.9% around 10 periods after the shock. In contrast, the TFP for the first
8-10 quarters has been non-negative, which means the decline in hours is not
driven by technical regress. Similarly, the responses in other variables of interest
- Output, Disposable Income, Consumption (Non-Durables and Services), and
Consumption - cannot be linked to a fall in TFP. It can be argued that their fall
is more synchronous with Flight to Safety. Since after the Flight to Safety (FTS)
shock has hit, the impulse response in these variables keeps on reducing for 10
periods, whereas for the same period after the shock, the TFP is non-negative.
It also seems that the impact of Flight to Safety shocks on macro variables
must be playing out through a long-term decline in Investments. The impulse
response in Investments has a faster and a more significant decline, almost 3-4
times of the decline witnessed in Hours, Consumption, Output, Consumption
(of Non-durables and Services) and Disposable income. The negative impact on
these macro variables of interest continues for 8-10 quarters before reaching its
nadir and recovering after that. 8-10 quarters is also the time around when the
steep fall in Investments begins to ameliorate. Therefore we can safely say that
TFP shocks do not bring the economic gloom that is shown in ‘Investments’ and
other variables of interest. Instead, it is driven by the pessimism in the economy
brought out from a structural FTS shock.
This highlights the investment-oriented effects of FTS shocks, and provides
evidence to one of the hypotheses set out at the inception of this study. Flight to
Safety, which is a sudden change in preference for safer investments by investors
through resource re-allocation, leads to an eventual decline in overall TFP. As
when only safer (or less productive) economic investments are undertaken, the
entire economy’s production and productivity suffers.
One could also argue that the economic contraction is unrelated to TFP
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declines and is caused by FTS shocks. This contradicts other studies in the
literature that follow the (Barro and King, 1984) conjecture, which has argued
that investment re-allocation is not a major driving force of the business cycles.
Several empirical studies on the news [Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) Nam and
Wang (2019)] and expectations shocks identify that those shocks only lead a TFP
shock by 1-2 quarters. Therefore, the TFP shock appears to cause changes to
macro variables and business cycles in those studies. The long lead time between
FTS shock and TFP shock that we get in impulse responses of Identification
strategy 1 breaks that link and leads us in seeking an alternate driving mechanism.
Habits or Consumption (Non-durables and Services) are also slow to react
initially upon the impact of the FTS shock, but they end up mimicking the
decline in Consumption and after 30 periods end up about -0.5% lower that their
pre-shock levels. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it shows that the
precautionary motives exhibited during FTS generate a correction in even the
most hard-wired of consumption behaviour (habits). Secondly, for a consumer
looking for her utility maximization, a stabilization of the surplus ratio (i.e., one
minus the ratio of habits to total consumption) matters more than stabilization
of total Consumption or Habits. This is further explored in later chapters.
The median response of term spread, in Figure 1.11, which is measured as the
difference between the short-dated 1-year US Treasury bond and the long-dated
10-year US Treasury Bond yield, picks up slightly on the impact of the FTS shock.
However, the move is not significant, especially when compared to the rise in the
Price of risk. It demonstrates that the preference for safety that is a hallmark of
an FTS shock does not significantly translate into a preference for liquidity, i.e.
preference for the short term over long term safe bonds. This is not surprising
since most long-term investors such as pension funds would match the duration
of the risky assets that they are shedding from their portfolio with the duration
of the safe investments they are undertaking in response to the FTS shock.
The impact of FTS shock on consumer prices (CPI) supports our conviction
of imposing a positive restriction (in Strategy 1) on Real rates from the impact of
FTS shock. The rationale for such restriction was that a Flight to Safety shock
is dis-inflationary, and the evidence in the impulse response of CPI confirms it.
The median CPI falls around 0.2% per quarter, or we can say there is a deflation
of 0.2% quarterly deflation on the impact of FTS shock. The median CPI does
not recover for the tested horizon of 30 periods, which for the quarterly inflation
rate means that a few quarters after the Flight to Safety shock, the inflation
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rate consolidates around zero percent. This shows that FTS shock is deflationary
on impact and non-inflationary in the long run, a sign of economic pessimism.
Thus looking at the impulse responses of various macro variables, we can make
an assessment that a Flight to Safety shock leads to an overall economic gloom
in the economy.
The results highlight the fact that either one of the two possible channels
of speculation or expectations through which FTS can impact the economy is
at play. The speculation channel relies on FTS resulting from over-correction
by speculators from a realization of negative news or information shock about
the economy. If that were true, then the economic adjustment to FTS would
have been swift. Nevertheless, given the slow but significant response of key
Investment and activity-related variables to FTS shock and the long lead time
of 8-10 quarters in the decline of total factor productivity after the FTS shock
indicate that speculation may not be the primary mechanism driving this effect.
The expectations channel relies on the notion that Flight to Safety emerges from
expectations being formed about the deteriorating future state of the economy. It
posits that FTS shocks are based on rational expectations and present a warning
signal of an eventual decline in economic activity. If this were true, then FTS
is an even earlier warning signal than news and sentiment shocks, where the
lead time is usually 3-4 quarters. This seems plausible, as FTS represents an
increase in risk-aversion, so providing a warning of impending deterioration in
the economy motivates risk-averse rational agents to reallocate investment capital
from risky to less risky (and also less productive) sectors. This re-allocation of
risk over time feeds into a decline in economic activity and a decline in total fac-
tor productivity. This paper’s empirical approach is not sufficient to distinguish
between the two, but some clarity can emerge from looking at various impulse re-
sponses from different identification schemes. Through evidence posted by various
macroeconomic variables, there is some inclination towards favouring the latter
expectations driven explanation that FTS shock predates an economic downturn.
We can further strengthen this conviction from the results of Investment and
Labour related business cycle variables.
1.5.2 Cyclicality of Labour and Investment sector
To provide further evidence that identified FTS shocks consistently explain the
properties of US business cycles, this section compares the impulses responses in
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Figure 1.12: Impulse responses of Labour variables to FTS shocks
















































Notes: Median impulse response and 68% and 95% confidence bands of Labour related
variables of interest to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. in benchmark VAR
model identified with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
In all charts, Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters)
horizon after the shock. Only the responses of variable of interest in the VAR model
are reported. ‘Hrs per Emp’ is Hours worked per employee. ‘Vac Unemp’ is ratio of
Vacancy rate to Unemployment rate.
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Identification strategy 1 (see Table 1.3), of a 5-variable VAR model where either a
labour market variable (Figure 1.12) or an investment sector variable (Figure 1.13)
is the variable of interest. Recall that in this identification the impact of TFP
shock is restricted to be positive on the utility-adjusted TFP and Surplus ratio,
and is restricted to negative on Real rates. The impact response of FTS shock
is positive on the Price of risk (Bond-Equity price), positive on Real rates, and
negative on Surplus ratio. The Monetary policy shock impact is restricted to
positive on Real rate and negative on the Surplus ratio. Both FTS and Monetary
policy shock are orthogonal to TFP shock.
The identified FTS shocks substantially impact unemployment rate and labour
force participation rate (Figure 1.12 on page 58). Hours per worker decline slightly
on the FTS shock impact and recover fast; also, they are not the major driver
of total hours. These responses agree with Shimer (2005) empirical result that
the major driver of the decline in total hours is not hours per worker but the
unemployment rate. The intensive margin, given by hours per worker, is only
partially responsible for fluctuations in aggregate hours and other labor market
constituents.
The impulse responses to the Vacancy rate and the Unemployment rate are
opposite to each other, signifying the negative correlation between the two at
business cycle frequencies. Search based models of unemployment and business
cycles (of which Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is a key example) cannot generate
the high negative correlation between the unemployment and vacancy rate. Due
to the Nash bargaining mechanisms, the real wage determined in these models is
too flexible (Shimer, 2005).
The results from Flight to Safety shocks generate a vacancy to unemployment
ratio that is procyclical and a real wage rate that is highly sticky and in line
with the Beveridge curve that portrays a downward sloping relation between the
Vacancy rate and the Unemployment rate in the US data. The Labour force
participation rate in our results is also procyclical. The impulse responses (in
Figure 1.12) for labour productivity, which is the ratio of output to hours, exhibits
an increase on the impact of FTS shocks. Whereas Hours, Output, Consumption
reduce during the first 10 periods after the shock. This incongruity of response
of labour-related business cycle variables with the response of TFP and labour
productivity shows that the key driver behind this economic gloom is not the
decline in TFP but rather an increase in economic pessimism breeding the Flight
to Safety. This finding contradicts the economic models that ignore the role of
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Figure 1.13: Impulse responses of Investment variables to FTS shocks
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Notes: Median impulse response and 68% and 95% confidence bands of Investment
related variables of interest to Flight to Safety (FTS) shocks of 1 s.d. in benchmark
VAR model identified with Sign and Zero restrictions strategy 1. Data: 1983:Q1 to
2019:Q3. In all charts, Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time
(in quarters) horizon after the shock. Only the responses of variable of interest in
the VAR model are reported. ‘Res’ is Residential, ‘Non-Res’ is Non-Residential,
‘Inv + Durables Cons’ is sum of Investments and Durables Consumption, ‘Rel.Px of
Inv’ is the Relative price of Investment in terms of Consumption, ‘Gov.’ stands for
Government.
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expectations and cyclical risk-aversion in business cycles.
Further investigation into the constituent variables of investments, i.e., resi-
dential and non-residential investment (See Figure 1.13) shows that the residential
investments react slowly to the FTS shock. However, after around 10 periods, it
reaches a median reduction of -4% per quarter. Most housing-related investments
are planned for many periods in advance. Once the residential investment projects
are approved, they are slow to roll back, and once these plans are stalled or aban-
doned, they are even more challenging to get re-approved. On the other hand,
non-residential investments that are more agile in comparison react early on the
shock’s impact. They consolidate after about 5 quarters at a median response of
-2% per quarter and recover faster than residential investments. Capital expendi-
ture is held back by -2% and is faster to react than residential and non-residential
investments. The FTS shocks have a lesser impact on R&D expense which is a
more stable form of investments. Similarly the consumption of the Durable goods
of households, a part of Investment plus Durable series, is steadier than total
investments. It declines by a little over -2% upon the impact of an FTS shock.
The impact of FTS shocks on both Government expenditure, and Foreign flows
are felt only in the long run. More importantly, FTS shock on impact lowers the
relative price of investment good (in terms of consumption).
The variable ‘Relative price of investment’ in business cycle literature has
been used as a series to develop investment-specific technology shocks and the
marginal efficiency of investment shocks. The Flight to Safety shocks identified
in this study do not run against the investment shocks literature-based evidence.
A positive shock to investments lowers the relative price of investment in terms of
the consumption good in models of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)
and (2011), and J. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) among others.
The procyclical relative price of investments, which is a hallmark of investment-
specific technology shocks-based explanations of business cycles, is also visible
in this chapter’s impulse responses. The ratio of investment price to price of
consumer good falls on impact of the FTS shock, i.e. consumption becomes
relatively expensive.
An immediate application of the findings is to get decomposition of forecast
error-variance (See Table A.1 to A.5 in appendix pages 252 - 256) and to de-
termine what proportion (Figure 1.14 on page 62) of the k-step ahead forecast
variation, esp. at business cycle frequency (8-32 quarters) is explained by identified
innovations to FTS.
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The FTS shock explain a major share of Forecast error variance at business
cycle frequency for each of the key business cycle variables: Output (58%), Con-
sumption (50%), Investment (60%), Residential Investment (40%), Income (55%),
Hours (55%), TFP (20%), Surplus ratio (30%), Real rate (35%). The FEV
contribution for FTS shocks to key macro variable peaks before an increase in
contribution from TFP shocks. Suggesting that FTS shocks rather than TFP
shocks drive the highlighted business cycle features.
Figure 1.14: FEVD explained by TFP, FTS and MP shocks
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Notes: The k-step ahead Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD %) explained
by FTS (Solid), TFP (Dots) and Monetary Policy (Dash) shocks, in the 5-variable
VAR, which is identified using Sign and Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. The
5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP, Price of risk (Bond minus Equity
price), Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investment. In other iterations of the model,
‘Investment’ is replaced with other variables of interest. The result of benchmark VAR
and other variables of interest are reported.
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Table 1.4: Identification strategy for Flight to Risk shocks
variables TFP Value of Risk Real rate Surplus ratio Variable of interest
shocks
FTR Strategy 1
Productivity + . − + .
Flight to Risk 0 + − + .
Monetary policy 0 . + − .
Demand . . . . .
Residual . . . . .
Notes: The SVAR for identifying Flight to Risk shocks has 5 variables: TFP, Value of risk
(which is Equity price minus Bond price), Real rate, Surplus ratio (which is One minus the
ratio of Consumption of services and Non-durable to Total consumption), and a business cycle
variable of interest for e.g. Investments , Output, Consumption, Hours, CPI etc. On impact
of the respective shock, + means the variable is restricted to be positive and − means that
the variable is restricted to be negative for the impact horizon. The impact horizon is shock
period plus one more period. Symbol 0 signifies a zero restriction when the response variable is
restricted to not respond to the shock contemporaneously, and Dots . signify that the impact
response of that variable is left unrestricted.
1.5.3 Asymmetry in FTS and FTR
One of the peculiar and significant features of Flight to Safety (FTS) or a sudden
increase in preference for safer investments is that the market volatility and uncer-
tainty experienced in such episodes are not reciprocated during its complementary
market phenomenon of Flight to Risk (FTR). FTR is when investors prefer risky
investments to safer bets. Such differential behaviour is based on the human
psyche and behavioural biases that are out of this study’s scope. However, for the
purpose of our analysis, it is interesting to consider whether the impact of FTS
is reversed for shocks of opposite magnitude. An FTR shock series is developed
by choosing a complementary identification to the one imposed in the benchmark
study. Impulse response results from this series help uncover FTR shocks’ impact
and keep the analysis relevant and comparable to the benchmark FTS model
results.
The FTR shocks are identified by changing the sign of the Price of risk series,
i.e. by calculating it as the difference between the Price of S&P 500 and the
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Figure 1.15: Asymmetry between Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk





































































Notes: The figure shows impulse responses to Flight to Safety (solid) and Flight
to Risk (diamonds) shocks and their 68% confidence bands (shaded). FTS shocks
are identified with restriction strategy 1 in the benchmark VAR model. The FTR
shocks are identified by imposing restriction strategy discussed in the Results section
Table 1.4. Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
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10-year Treasury bond. This could be called a Value of Risk series or negative
Price of risk series. Therefore an increase in the Value of Risk or Equity minus
Bond price series occurs when Equities get more expensive compared to bonds,
and a positive shock to this series is studied as Flight to Risk. The identification
strategy imposed in identifying FTR shocks is also adjusted to account for the
complementary changes to benchmark strategy 1. A positive shock in the Value
of Risk series for the impact horizon is restricted to a fall in Real rates and an
increase in the Surplus ratio. Both these sign restrictions are opposite in signs to
the sign restrictions imposed on these variables in the benchmark strategy 1 for
identifying FTS shocks. Similar to FTS shocks the FTR shocks are also restricted
to be orthogonal to TFP and monetary policy shocks. Table 1.4 on page 63
presents the identification restrictions imposed in identifying FTR shocks. The
impulse responses to FTR shocks, as shown in Figure 1.15 on page 64, highlight
the asymmetry in the response of Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk shocks.
These impulse responses to FTR shocks are smaller in magnitude and short-lived
compared to the impulse responses to FTS shocks. The increase in Equity minus
Bond price (or a decrease in Bond minus Equity price) from an FTR shock leads to
very slow adjustments in investments, hours, output, non-residential investments,
inflation, and TFP and real rates when compared with their response to FTS
shocks. The lack of negative response in Real rates is because monetary policy
response is exogenous to the model. An increase in inflation after Flight to Risk
does not warrant policy cuts from the inflation-targeting central bank. Real rates
become negative when inflation stabilizes. The residential investment shows a lack
of response, which is not that puzzling when considering that residential purchases
are long-term decisions. These can be put away easily when faced with a Flight to
Safety phenomenon, but they are not immediately put on board after a Flight to
Risk. Housing is a long-term investment, and in the case of Flight to Risk shocks,
the immediate response should be felt in more volatile (risky) but liquid options.
The residential investment increases after 5 years of risk-taking. There is also
a counter-intuitive fall in surplus ratio after an FTR shock. However, it can be
explained by the slow response of output and consumption in comparison to the
more significant increase in consumption (of Non-Durables and Services) habits.
The increase in habits is also responsible for the relative price of investment goods
in terms of consumption good getting into the negative territory. The surplus
ratio slowly returns to its pre-shock levels. There is also feedback from FTR
shocks to TFP, which reacts positively 5-8 quarters after the shock. Interestingly
the response is delayed as it was in response to FTS shocks, highlighting the
expectations channel through which the capital flight can impact productivity in
an economy.
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1.6 Sensitivity and Robustness analysis
The benchmark results are identified with Strategy 1 and using 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3
period US data. This section analyses the sensitivity of those results to alternative
identification strategies viz. Strategy 2 and Strategy 3 (given in Table 1.3). And
to alternative data periods viz. pre-Great Moderation data (1954:Q3 to 1978:Q4)
and pre-financial crisis or Great Moderation period of 1983:Q1 to 2007:Q2. This
section also compares FTS results with estimation output from DSGE models
and explores the relationship of FTS shocks with other News and Uncertainty
shocks.
1.6.1 Alternative identification strategies
In Identification strategy 2 (refer Table 1.3 on page 39), the negative restriction
on the impact of FTS shock to surplus ratio, which was included in Identification
strategy 1, is removed. In place of that, a zero restriction is imposed on the
Surplus ratio on impact from the FTS shock. The impact of FTS shock on Real
rates is still kept, as it was in Identification strategy 1, at positive for the impact
horizon, i.e., the shock period and the next period. In addition, the response of
the Surplus ratio in the identification strategy 2 has a Zero restriction on impact
from Monetary policy shock as well.
Changes in identification strategy 2 can be summarised in the following way.
An increase in FTS is restricted to a positive impact on Price of risk and Real
rates, Monetary policy shock is restricted to have a positive impact on Real
rates, and both FTS and Monetary shock are orthogonal to the Surplus ratio.
Whereas, in this strategy, the impact restrictions for TFP shocks are unchanged
from Identification strategy 1 and are orthogonal to both FTS and Monetary
policy shock. The responses of the variable of interest, which is Investment or
any other macro variable, are kept agnostic.
The impulse responses to FTS shocks under Identification strategy 2, which are
plotted as dashes in Figure 1.16 on page 67, are not significantly different from the
responses to Identification strategy 1, which are represented by a solid line with its
68% confidence band is shaded in the same fig. 1.16. The decline in Investments
is severe and keeps around -2% for around 10 quarters. The impulse responses in
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Figure 1.16: Sensitivity of impulse responses to identification strategies




























































Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Notes: Sensitivity of impulse responses to FTS shocks under identification with
Benchmark Strategy 1 (Solid) with responses from Strategy 2 (Dash) and Strategy 3
(Triangles). Data: 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3. 68% confidence band of Benchmark strategy
is shaded in light green. Y-axis label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in
quarters) horizon after the shock. ‘Cons (NDur+Svc)’ is Consumption of Non-durable
goods and Services. ‘Res’ is residential, ‘Non-Res’ is non-residential, and ‘Rel.Price
of Inv’ is Relative price of investment good in terms of consumption good.
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key business cycle variables of interest such as hours, output, and consumption are
immediate (See Figure 1.16) and are shaped in an inverse hump. The reduction
in Consumption (non-durables and services) and the Surplus ratio is delayed by 2
periods, and the response is now less severe than it was in identification strategy
1. The response of the Surplus ratio stabilizes to pre-shock level as Habits fall
in line with Consumption. The median response reaches a minimum of only
-0.04%, which is due to the differences in identifying restrictions between Strategy
1 and Strategy 2. More importantly, the response of TFP is muted for around 10
periods and is nearly as severe as it was during the identification strategy 1. This
exercise in identification strategy 2 shows that the Surplus ratio restriction was
not driving the future decay in TFP. Instead, it further supports the argument
that the FTS shocks predate, by a significant period, an imminent fall in TFP.
Identification strategy 3 is different from identification strategy 2 and strategy 1
concerning restrictions based on FTS shocks. The restriction imposed (in strategy
1 and 2) on the real rate response to be less than zero on the FTS shock impact
is removed, and this variable is made unrestricted to the FTS shock. But the
zero restrictions to TFP and Surplus ratio variables are kept, as they were in
Identification strategy 2. Therefore Price of risk (Bond minus Equity prices) is the
only variable that is restricted to increase on the impact of a positive FTS shock.
The impact restrictions for TFP shocks are unchanged and are kept the same as
they were in identification strategy 1 and identification strategy 2. The monetary
shock has restrictions for only the Real rate to be positive for the impact period
(shock period and the next period) horizon and has zero restrictions on the impact
of the TFP series and the Surplus ratio. The impact response from the variable
of interest is unrestricted and kept agnostic.
Thus Identification strategy 3 is a way to distinguish between the responses
of FTS and Monetary Shocks. By removing the restriction on Real rate upon
the impact of FTS shocks, we would like to ascertain if the shocks that we have
identified are FTS shocks and are not driven by some exogenous shocks that
impact both FTS and Monetary policy shocks similarly.
The results from identification strategy 3 are represented by triangles in Fig-
ure 1.16 on page 67. They differ from our findings from the results of the first 2
identification strategies. Once we take out the impact restriction on Real rate to
be positive for an FTS shock, the real rates’ median response is only slightly pos-
itive +0.1% on impact, whereas the fall in CPI upon impact from the FTS shock
is -0.2%. This result should not be puzzling as it shows that the jump in Real
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rates from FTS shock is cut short by a simultaneous response of the Monetary
policy, or a cut in nominal rates. It signifies that FTS shocks are co-incidental
with cuts in policy rates, which further strengthens our initial hypothesis of the
FTS shock being a pre-cursor of worsening economic climate.
By removing the restriction on response of Real rates in Identification Strategy
3, we can also remove the constraints on contemporaneous changes in monetary
policy in response to FTS shocks. This leaves the interest rate policy some scope
to be pre-emptive. Therefore the cuts in real rates in this strategy occur earlier
compared to rate cuts in strategy 1 and 2. Through this, we witness that the
delay in the response of TFP to FTS shocks is also shortened. Evidently, the
TFP begins to decline after 5 periods, whereas it declines 8-10 periods after FTS
shocks in identification strategy 1. Hours, output, consumption, and investment
all exhibit a faster decline (or a shorter slump) and reach the minimum around
the same time, i.e., 5 periods after the shock, when total factor productivity
growth becomes less than zero. The main result from different identification
strategies reinforces the conviction of results of identification strategy 1, which
is that the innovations in Price of Risk (Bond minus Equity prices) predate a
general economic slump, which in around 8-10 quarters also leads to an eventual
decline in TFP.
Next, we look to address the possible criticism that the chosen data period in
our benchmark configuration period of 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 is heavily influenced
by the increase in the supply of safe assets around the world since the global
financial crisis and by the impact of the crisis itself. This criticism is addressed by
curtailing the analysis to the pre-crisis period of 1983:Q1 to 2007:Q2, which is also
the Great Moderation period. We also consider the sensitivity of the results to
the pre-Great Moderation period of 1954:Q3 to 1978:Q4, intending to understand
the influence of great moderation on the strength of Flight to Safety shocks.
1.6.2 Impact of Great moderation period
From the mid-80s to global financial crises, the Great moderation period represents
a period in the macroeconomic history of developed economies when the incidence
and volatility of business cycle fluctuations were significantly reduced from the
decades that preceded it, 1954 to 1978. Structural developments in public policy
and the Federal reserve’s policy commitment and communication strategy were
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influential in bringing out this change in business cycle incidence and volatility
during the Great Moderation period. It is argued that economic agents were
better able to form expectations about future economic and policy uncertainty
during great moderation than in the decades that preceded it.
The results of this empirical study show us that FTS shocks breed in pes-
simism about the general economic climate that predates an eventual decline in
future TFP. One of the reasons this is possible is if FTS shocks signal households
to expect future TFP and economic growth to be weaker. If these expectations
are well-formed, then in line with the Great moderation literature, they must
be significantly well-formed in the Great moderation era 1983-2007 than in the
volatile era 1954-1978. Figure 1.17 on page 71 shows the median impulse re-
sponses to FTS shocks for business cycles variables of macroeconomic variables
of interest for the pre-Great moderation period (1954-1978) in dashes, and the
Great Moderation period (1985-2007) in squared line. This figure also compares
these two periods with the benchmark period (1985-2019) median response given
in a solid line. The shaded area depicts 68% confidence bands for the benchmark
period responses.
It is clear from the results that the FTS shock has a limited impact during
the pre-Great moderation period (dashes in Figure 1.17). This suggests that
FTS shocks have been more critical in the Great moderation period. Due to the
available technology, structural policy changes and low inflation in this period, it
was easier to form expectations about the future TFP growth. Moreover, through
improved trading opportunities and increased participation from retail investors,
there has been an increase in availability and awareness about risky and safe
assets in the Great moderation period as compared to the earlier period. The
impact of the global financial crisis is also visible through the comparison of
Great Moderation (squares) and the benchmark period (solid) results in fig. 1.17.
The inclusion of post-Global financial crisis data accentuates the responses in
unemployment and residential investments. What stands out most from the
result is that during the Great Moderation, the response of investment, hours,
real rates, utilization-adjusted total factor productivity is similar in scale and
scope as predicted by the benchmark model. It reinstates our conviction in the
results that FTS shocks generate business cycle fluctuations.
Thus from the various identification strategies, periods, and business cycle
variables employed in this empirical study, we can confirm that the identified
FTS shocks of the Price of risk (Bond minus Equity price) series are linked to
1.6. SENSITIVITY AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 71
Figure 1.17: Sensitivity of impulse responses to different time periods





























































1983-19 (Benchmark) 1954-78 1983-07
Notes: Sensitivity of impulse responses to FTS shocks during Benchmark period
1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 (Solid) with responses from Pre-Great moderation period 1954:Q3
to 1978:Q4 (Dashes) and Great Moderation period 1983:Q1 to 2007:Q2 (Squares). 68%
confidence band of Benchmark period are shaded. Y-axis label is percentage points
and X-axis label is Time (in quarters) horizon after the shock. ‘Cons (NDur+Svc)’
is Consumption of Non-durable goods and Services. ‘Res’ is residential, ‘Non-Res’
is non-residential, and ‘Rel.Price of Inv’ is Relative price of investment in terms of
consumption.
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an increase in investors’ risk aversion. They enforce a chilling effect on economic
activity and predate a decline in total factor productivity. The results reinforce
our initial contention for undertaking this empirical study, which was that FTS
shocks have an immediate and long-term negative impact on economic activity esp.
Investments. The delayed response of TFP to FTS shocks brings to light the two
channels through which FTS impacts the business cycles. Either FTS shock is an
over-correction to a speculative bet gone wrong. Or FTS is grounded in rational
expectations and represents a risk-aversion shock that induces a re-allocation of
capital to safer assets, usually less productive. This increase in pessimism or fear
of risk in a sufficient number of agents leads to an imminent long-term decline in
economic activity. It is neither the objective nor the scope of this study to decide
which of the two expectations channel is more crucial. However, the large and
varied set of data included in this empirical exercise and the different assumptions
imposed through identification strategies incline us towards the latter.
1.6.3 Comparison with Shiller data
Comparable series to the Price of Risk series that could account for a part of
the term and inflation premium, also have the feature that relative price of safer
asset was higher in the 80s and that risk taking has been relatively cheaper in
the recent past. For this analysis I additionally consider Robert Shiller’s (2015)
series which includes:
(A) LT 10y-earn px: Long term real excess return (Bond minus Equity) series
that adjusts long term nominal yields for growth in CPI,
(B) TR 10y-earn px: Total return index (bond minus equity) which compares
the price difference between total return real bond index and total return
real equity index,
(C) 10y-Cape px: Excess real bond returns which subtracts the cyclically
adjusted price to earnings (CAPE) yield from real bond returns, and
(D) CAPE: a series on CAPE itself that has been a hallmark of long term price
to earnings ratio.
Additional adjustments13 are made into these four series to make them compatible
13The alternative series from Robert Shiller’s database are adjusted as: A. LT 10y-earn px:
Log Price difference between assets paying Long-term (LT) 10y yield and LT S&P Earnings
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Figure 1.18: News, Uncertainty and FTS shocks


































































Notes: Comparison of impulse responses to FTS shocks in benchmark model (Solid)
and their 68% Confidence band (shaded) with impulse responses to News shocks
(Cross) and Uncertainty shocks (Right arrow). The fourth variable in the benchmark
model is ‘Price of Risk’ and it is replaced with ‘Price of Equity’ and ‘Uncertainty’
series to obtain comparable results to the News and Uncertainty shocks. Y-axis
label is percentage points and X-axis label is Time (in quarters) horizon after the
shock. ‘Cons(NDur+Svc)’ is Consumption of Non-durable goods and Services. ‘Res’
is residential, ‘Non-Res’ is non-residential, and ‘Rel.Px of Inv’ is Relative price of
investment in terms of consumption.
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with this chapter’ analysis. Of these, the first series (LT 10y-earn px) is the total
return series showing a big spike around the global financial crisis (See Figure A.6
on page 262). These alternate series using the identification strategy 1 explain
around 15-40% of forecast-error variance decomposition which is much lower (See
Figure 1.19 on pages 75 - 76 for comparison) than the 50-60% FEVD decompo-
sition that is explained by the Price of Risk series of this chapter. Of all the 4
Shiller’s series that are considered the (LT 10y-earn px) Long term cpi-adjusted
bond yield minus long term cpi-adjusted earnings yield series (see fig. 1.19a) ex-
plains the maximum, around 40% of forecast error-variance in investments and
related variables. This series is similar in composition to the Price of risk that we
have considered in this chapter. Shiller adjusts the long term bond and earnings
yield for growth in cpi, like this chapter does it for the Price of risk series, but
Shiller’s series is only available till 2011, as it adjusts for the long-term future
earnings yield of the equity index.
1.6.4 News, Uncertainty and Risk premium shocks
In this section, we check for the robustness of the identification strategy. The
analysis starts by looking to answer the criticism that information present in
Flight to Safety shocks identified in this chapter is comparable to other News
and Uncertainty shocks. Therefore, pursuing the Flight to Safety line of inquiry
may not extend our understanding of the business cycle by much. Beaudry and
Portier (2006) and Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) uncover the effect of news
shocks on the business cycles by identifying news surprises as the shocks to an
equity index (S&P 500) series. One of the key results from that analysis is news
shocks predate fall in TFP by a couple of quarters. Following their classification
of choosing equity index to identify news shocks, we make a comparative analysis
in this chapter. The second variable in the benchmark model is replaced from
the ‘Price of risk’ series to S&P 500, and sign and zero restrictions set out in
Identification strategy 1 are used to identify ‘News’ shocks to the latter series.
Similarly, another comparison is made by replacing the ‘Price of risk’ series
in the benchmark model with Bloom (2009) Economic policy Uncertainty (EPU)
index, and sign and zero restrictions set out in Identification strategy 1 are used
yield, B. TR 10y-earn px: Log Price difference between Total return (TR) 10y bond index and
S&P index, C. 10y-Cape px: Log Price difference between assets paying 10y bond yield and
Cyclically adjusted S&P Price to Earnings (CAPE) yield, D. CAPE: Log Price of asset paying
Cyclically adjusted S&P Price to Earnings (CAPE) yield.
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Figure 1.19: FEVD (%) explained by shocks to alternative Price of Risk series
(a) LT 10y yield - Earnings px



















(b) TR 10y yield - Earnings px



















Notes: The k-step ahead Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD %) explained by FTS
shocks in series that can act as alternative to Price of Risk series. The alternative series
are developed form Robert Shiller’s database as: A. Price difference between assets paying
Long-term (LT) 10y yield and LT S&P Earnings yield, B. Price difference between Total return
(TR) 10y bond index and S&P index, ...continued on next page...
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(c) 10y yield - CAPE px




















Notes (continued):........ C. Price difference between assets paying 10y bond yield and Cyclically
adjusted S&P Price to Earnings (CAPE) yield, D. Price of asset paying Cyclically adjusted
S&P Price to Earnings (CAPE) yield. The 5 variables in the benchmark model are: TFP,
alternative Price of Risk series, Real rates, Surplus Ratio and Investments and it is identified
using Sign and Zero restrictions Identification Strategy 1. In other iterations of the 5-variable
model, ‘Investment’ is replaced with other macro variables of interest. The result of ‘Investment’
and only those variables that replace ‘Investment’ in the benchmark VAR are reported.
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to identify ‘Uncertainty’ shocks to the latter series.
The impulse response comparison of thus obtained news shocks and uncertainty
shocks with the Flight to Safety shocks is made in Figure 1.18 on page 73.
The careful reader may notice the slight difference in the impulse responses
for FTS in Figure 1.18 with respect to the ones presented in the Results section
earlier. This is because the impulse responses in Figure 1.18 are for the period
1985-2019, which is the entirety of the time period for which Bloom (2009) EPU
data is available.
Using only the information present in Equity prices (S&P500) for identifying
News shocks, we miss out on much information in the Price of risk series. An
impact of that loss of information is visible in impulse responses comparison of
News shocks with FTS shocks. The business cycle responses to News shocks
are less pronounced and short lived in comparison to the Flight to Safety and
Uncertainty shocks. One of the shortfalls of Uncertainty based explanations of
business cycle Bloom (2009) is that they have a short-lived impact. The response
of business cycle variables to Uncertainty shocks is similar in direction to their
response to FTS shocks, but it is significantly short lived and smaller in magnitude
for some of the key variables such as residential investments, hours, unemployment,
and surplus ratio. The explanatory power of news in Beaudry and Portier (2006)
and Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011) comes from news disturbances in leading
the eventual change in TFP by 2-4 quarters. Through the lens of the identification
strategy assumed in this chapter, we see that news shocks have minimal impact on
the TFP. As discussed earlier, the FTS shocks lead to decline in the TPF growth
rate by 8-10 quarters. From the impulse responses of TFP to uncertainty shocks
(in fig. 1.18), we can say that the median response of TFP to uncertainty shocks is
also delayed by 8-10 quarters. This could signify that the uncertainty shocks are
an even earlier warning system for TFP decline than FTS shocks. Alternatively,
since the magnitude of response of TFP to uncertainty shocks is smaller than its
response to FTS shocks, one could counter-argue that it is the latter (FTS) shock
that is leading TFP decline through an increase in uncertainty.
Before attributing a lot of the explanatory power to uncertainty shocks, we
must also consider that the Economic policy uncertainty index (EPU), which
measures uncertainty shocks, is back-calculated by counting policy uncertainty
related words in news articles (Bloom, 2009). The EPU index already accounts
for most of the speculation and expectation feeding into the TFP decline and
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Flight to Safety. There is a significant overlap between these, and the impulse
responses in Figure 1.18 may not be sufficient to resolve this confusion. So I use
the Granger-causality test [See Table 1.5 on page 78] for identifying the lead-lag
relation between FTS and Uncertainty shocks. The exercise shows that the Price
of risk series, responsible for FTS shocks, Granger causes Uncertainty series at lags
2-3 while the Uncertainty series does not Granger cause the Price of risk at those
lags. It demonstrates a lagged relationship between the two where the long-run
impact of the Uncertainty shocks on TFP is a derivative of lagged FTS shocks.
Table 1.5: Granger Causality results for FTS shocks
A. Does lagged ‘Price of Risk’ series Granger cause any of these variables
lags EPU S&P 500 1y-10y Baa-Aaa TFP TFP(EqDur) Inv Share
1 0.658 0.709 0.134 0.09 0.017∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.865
2 0.016∗ 0.82 0.05∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.002 ∗∗ 0.96
3 0.048∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.101 0.002∗∗ 0.048∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.94
4 0.091 0.0∗∗ 0.067 0.003∗∗ 0.056 0.009∗∗ 0.57
5 0.146 0.0∗∗ 0.063 0.007∗∗ 0.087 0.006 ∗∗ 0.657
6 0.063 0.0∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.154 0.011∗ 0.586
7 0.121 0.0∗∗ 0.126 0.004∗∗ 0.136 0.022∗ 0.69
8 0.121 0.0∗∗ 0.135 0.005∗∗ 0.121 0.031∗ 0.67
12 0.207 0.0 ∗∗ 0.18 0.009∗∗ 0.223 0.083 0.403
B. Does any of these lagged series Granger cause ‘Price of Risk’
lags EPU S&P 500 1y-10y Baa-Aaa TFP TFP(EqDur) Inv Share
1 0.334 0.713 0.28 0.236 0.579 0.478 0.695
2 0.081 0.432 0.159 0.323 0.277 0.131 0.718
3 0.062 0.494 0.281 0.263 0.063 0.007∗∗ 0.802
4 0.11 0.568 0.348 0.355 0.086 0.011∗ 0.831
5 0.202 0.571 0.034∗ 0.446 0.091 0.011∗ 0.864
6 0.166 0.631 0.07 0.546 0.014∗ 0.025∗ 0.605
7 0.151 0.795 0.046∗ 0.756 0.023∗ 0.033∗ 0.748
8 0.185 0.804 0.055 0.282 0.051 0.067 0.758
12 0.649 0.38 0.19 0.35 0.113 0.247 0.666
Notes: p-values are reported. ∗ signifies 95% confidence, ∗∗ signifies 99% confidence.
EPU: economic policy uncertainty index. 1y-10y: liquidity spread between 1 year and
10 year yields. Baa-Aaa: corporate bond spread. TFP(EqDur): TFP in Equipment
and Durables consumption. Inv Share: equipment and consumer durables share of total
output.
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Figure 1.19: Comparison with Smets & Wouters (2007)








































Notes: Comparison of median impulse responses to FTS shocks from Benchmark model
(Solid) with updated (to 2019:Q3) results from Smets and Wouters (2007) model. SW_TFP is
negative shock to TFP (Dash-dots), SW_RP is positive shock to Risk Premium, and SW_IST
is negative shock to Investment-Specific Technology. Y-axis label is percentage points and
X-axis label is Time (in quarters) horizon after the shock.
The Granger causality relationship of Price of Risk to News shocks, estimated
from the S&P 500 series, is even stronger in comparison and runs to 12 lags.
Table 1.5 on page 78 also reports Granger causality results from FTS to time-
series, which are similar to the Price of risk developed in this chapter in containing
information about Flight to Safety and which have been explored in literature
for capturing sentiments and uncertainty about investments. These are liquidity
spread between 1-year and 10-year yields (1y-10y), corporate bond spread (Baa-
Aaa), TFP total, TFP in Equipment, and Durables consumption [TFP(EqDur)]
and equipment and consumer durables share of total output (Inv Share). There
is significant Granger causality running from the Price of Risk series to these
alternate series. None of the series except for TFP in Equipment and Durables
consumption [TFP(EqDur)] series Granger causes the Price of risk, and even for
TFP(EqDur) series, the Granger causality is significant for lags greater than 3.
However, the Granger causality running from the Price of risk is significant even
for shorter lags.
In Figure 1.19, the findings of this chapter are compared with the established
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results from workhorse DSGE models equipped with investment technology and
risk premium shocks (Smets and Wouters, 2007). The impulse response impact
of adverse shocks to TFP, negative shocks to investment-specific technology, and
positive shock to risk premium in an updated 2019 model version of Smets and
Wouters (2007) are slow and less severe when compared with the impulse responses
to FTS shocks studied in this chapter. The impulse responses to Smets and
Wouters (2007) model also have the typical macroeconomic puzzles, such as a
negative correlation of output, consumption, and investment with hours, which
the results from the FTS shocks identified in this chapter seem to avoid.
The identified shocks from the benchmark configuration compare well against
the FTS and FTR obtained by alternate methods such as the Ordinal index
approach and the Threshold approach (Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei,
2013). Comparing the two methods with the identified shocks to the Price of risk
series of the benchmark VAR is made through scatter plots in Figure 1.20 on
page 81. It shows two interesting phenomena. Firstly, that during the (quarterly)
periods when the VAR identifies a positive shock to the Price of risk series, there is
also a higher likelihood of FTS days in those periods. And secondly, the likelihood
of Flight to Safety days is higher than Flight to Risk days’ likelihood. Obviously,
the measure of FTS and FTR likelihood, which are calculated using Threshold
(Appendix A.2.2) and Ordinal index (Appendix A.2.3) method are dependent on
the selected parameter (κ or k), and a higher choice of that parameter would limit
the likelihood of observing the extreme flight of capital in either direction (towards
risk or safety). For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to note that in
the Threshold method, the κ is chosen to be equal to 1, which results in 11% of
total days being classified as FTS, and in the Ordinal index method, a choice of k
is also equal to 1 gives 3.4% FTS days. Detailed methodology of finding the FTS
and the FTR days using the two methods is made in this chapter’s Appendix
A.2.1. A comparison of FTS and FTR days using the ordinal index method with
k of 1, as shown in Figure A.4 on page 260, also provide us more significant and
more frequent spikes during FTS days than during FTR days.
Lastly, we take a look at the correlation between the obtained shocks and
the data, which is presented in the correlogram [See Figure 1.21 on page 82].
This investigation shows that the benchmark model fitted with only FTS shocks
captures most of the correlation in data, which the model fitted with TFP shocks
only fails to do.
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Figure 1.20: FTS/FTR from Threshold and OI method






























































Notes: Scatter plot comparing the median structural shocks to price of risk series
from benchmark VAR for period 1983:Q1 to 2019:Q3 (X-axis) with Quarterly average
of FTS probability and negative (neg.) of FTR probability values (both on Y-axis).
The FTS and FTR are calculated using Threshold method with κ = 1 in top figure
and are calculated using Ordinal index method with k = 1 in bottom figure. The
calculations are discussed in detail in Appendix A.2.1. FTS are only reported for
quarters when identified shocks were positive, while negative (neg.) of FTR are only
reported for quarters when identified shocks were negative.
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Figure 1.21: Correlogram of Data and Model with FTS and TFP shocks
Notes: Y-axis: Cross-Correlation of the growth rate of Consumption (dC), Output
(dY), Hours (dH) and Investment (dI) in US Data and the benchmark model fitted
with only Flight to safety (FTS) shocks and TFP shocks identified using Sign and
Zero restrictions discussed in Strategy 1. X-axis: k lag lengths.
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1.7 Discussion
Our understanding of macroeconomic shocks and their propagation has come a
long way since the early days of C. A. Sims (1980a) and Kydland and Prescott
(1982). Most of the US business cycles’ features have been well established in the
Real business cycle literature. Ramey (2016) has a detailed discussion on this
topic. The key results are that consumption is less volatile than output, output
is less volatile than investment, but output is similarly volatile to hours. The
US macroeconomic data series also shows co-movement and pro-cyclicality (J. H.
Stock and Watson, 1999). However, not so well established in the RBC literature
is the role of asset prices and the causes of business cycles (Rebelo, 2005).
The standard neoclassical paradigm of real business cycle models cannot ratio-
nalize the high expected risk premium observed in the US equity market returns
or the low risk-free rate in US bond returns. It has resulted in puzzles [for e.g.
Mehra (2003) and Donaldson and Mehra (2007) evaluate attempts to resolve
the ‘Equity premium puzzle’ since it was first introduced in Mehra and Prescott
(1985)].
With regards to our understanding of the nature and cause of business cycle
fluctuations, much progress has been made through structural vector autoregres-
sions and DSGE based research, but the literature is still inconclusive. This
section discusses the developments of the last two decades in explaining business
cycle fluctuations from the perspective of technology shocks, investment-adjusted
technology shocks, the marginal efficiency of investment shocks, financial shocks,
news shocks, information shocks, risk shocks, and uncertainty shocks, and com-
pares them in light of the results from FTS shocks, as identified in this chapter.
1.7.1 Neutral Technology shocks
The usual explanations for the cause of business cycles for a long time were policy
(monetary and fiscal) shocks and cost shocks. Kydland and Prescott (1982) added
technology shocks to the list, and the literature that followed controversially
attributed the cause of recessions to a fall in total factor productivity. These
technology shocks raised productivity in all factors of production (labour and
capital), which is why they are also known as neutral technology shocks.
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Galí (1999) fuelled the opposition to this thought of understanding recessions
as periods of technological regress. By identifying technology shocks as the only
source for long-term labor productivity changes in his model, he could show that
‘hours’ at least in the short run fell in response to technology shocks. King and
Rebelo (1999) and Baxter and King (1999) defend the RBC models by showing
pro-cyclicality of hours to output. Francis and Ramey (2006) reconstruct the US
historical data from WWII to find that technology shocks in later periods only
raise productivity gradually, and this gradual rise provides an inventive to reduce
hours in short-run for the anticipation of increasing hours in response to higher
productivity in the long-run. Like Galí (1999), Francis and Ramey (2005), too,
assume that hours have a unit root, and they show that their results are robust
to over-identification tests.
Nevertheless, the assumption of considering a unit root in hours per capita is
criticized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003), and they find that
Gali’s results fail if hours are used in levels instead of first-differences. Chari,
Kehoe, and Mcgrattan (2000) dispel Gali’s findings as being driven by measure-
ment error. By bringing additional methods Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)
defended Gali’s results. They use hours per worker as a proxy for making uti-
lization adjustment to the Solow residual. This series is regularly updated and
made available online [see Fernald (2012)]. Shocks to this adjusted series lead
to a reduction in hours worked. In contrast, the vector autoregressions approach
by Alexopoulos (2011), using a new series based on books published in the field
of technology, finds that positive technology shocks lead to an increase in total
factor productivity, investment, and to an extent, hours. Unsettled, the debate
moves on to look for alternative explanations for business cycle fluctuations.
1.7.2 Investment-specific technology and MEI shocks
A prime alternative explanation to technology shocks is raised in investment-
specific technology shocks (IST). As the name suggests, the investment-specific
technological productivity shocks raise the productivity of only new capital (in-
vestment goods). The impact of a positive investment-specific technology shock
(IST) is visible in the price of additional investment, becoming lower in terms of
the price of consumption goods. It also increases the real rate of investment.
J. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and (2000) were the first to
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examine the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks and the investment-
specific technology (IST) shocks in calibrated DSGE models. They found them to
account for around 30% of the variation in output. Over the last decade, several
influential papers have argued that IST and MEI shocks are the key drivers of
business cycles. See Fisher (2006) for long run restrictions VAR, Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Lindé (2011) for structural VAR, Justiniano et al (2010, 2011)
for DSGE model and Araújo (2012) for emerging markets based evidence. Fisher
(2006) extends Galí (1999) by assuming that only IST shocks impact relative price
of investment and finds these shocks to explain more than 60% of variation in
output growth and hours. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) establish the
role of credit frictions in investment-specific technology shocks.
In models with an RBC core Barro and King (1984) conjecture (or curse) that
only technology shocks can account for the observed co-movement among out-
put, consumption, investment, and hours. They conjecture that after a positive
investment (IST or MEI) shock, there would be a tendency to raise investment
much higher than could be afforded by increasing labour effort. Therefore, any
difference between labour income and investment would have to be made up by
reducing consumption. This fall in consumption runs against the evidence of
pro-cyclicality of consumption with output in data. Therefore investment shocks
cannot be the primary driver of business cycles in models with inseparable pref-
erences and an RBC core. Justiniano et al (2010, 2011) overcome this curse by
including nominal and real rigidity in their model. Other researchers too, such as
Khan and Tsoukalas (2011), J. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000), Furlan-
etto and Seneca (2014) have extended their models with capital utilization cost,
non-separable preferences, habits persistence, adjustment costs in intermediate
inputs and investments adjustment costs. Such extensions introduce some form
of real rigidity in their models to generate an explanatory power for investment
shocks.
Medium scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007), on the one hand,
confirms that productivity shocks have a negative short-run impact on hours
worked. This is consistent even for a flexible price economy as argued by Galí
(1999). However, on the other hand, they also raise doubts about the significance
of investment-specific technology shocks. ‘Demand’ shocks, which in their model
are captured via risk premium shock, exogenous spending, and investment-specific
technology shocks, explain significant variation in macro data but only in the short-
term. Whereas, only technology shocks explain most of the long-term variation
in data.
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In contrast, results from DSGE models of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tam-
balotti (2010) and (2011) show that investment shocks are the primary driving
force in output fluctuations. Their source of discrepancy with Smets and Wouters
(2007) results from the different ways in which they measure investment and
consumption in their models. They include durable goods consumption and
inventories into Investments. Consumption of durables goods has also been com-
monly included in the definition of investments by other estimated DSGE models
[See, Cooley and Prescott (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003)
and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007)]. Whereas, the Smets
and Wouters (2007) model, unlike Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)
and (2011), does not include inventories in investments but includes purchases of
consumer durable goods in consumption. Both durable goods consumption and
inventories are the more cyclical components of GDP (J. H. Stock and Watson,
2016) and including durable goods consumption and inventories in investment
makes that investment series more volatile and procyclical.
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) argue that it is the first of the
two changes they make that is significant in driving their results. The first
change they make to Smets and Wouters (2007) is by excluding durables goods
from consumption and including them into investment. This change is majorly
responsible for the increase in the variance decomposition at the business cycle
frequency, which is explained by the investment-specific technology shock in their
paper compared to Smets and Wouters (2007). Whereas in the case of the second
change, when Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) exclude inventories
from investment and move their investment series closer to Smets and Wouters
(2007) definition of investment, it leads to two changes. First, the investment shock
parameter becomes large, dampening investment shocks’ impact on investment,
output, and consumption. Second, the preference shock has less impact as there
is a weaker response from both output and consumption.
The understanding from investment and the marginal efficiency of investment
based literature is that investment-specific technology shocks explain most of the
variance in output at business cycle frequency. However, the case for investment
shocks as a significant contributor to business cycles, as shown in the significant
result of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) and (2011), seems less
convincing if we include financial frictions in the model.
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1.7.3 Financial frictions and Risk shocks
The rate at which investment goods are converted into consumption goods is
identified as the main driver of business cycles, but this rate of change is controlled
by the investment adjustment cost parameter in investment-specific technological
shocks models, such as Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). Investment
shocks are also linked to financial markets, and frictions in financial markets
determine the pace of conversion of investment goods into consumption goods.
Kamber, Smith, and Thoenissen (2015) exploit this feature by introducing a
collateral constraint (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) into Smets and Wouters (2007)
type of model and demonstrate that the ability of positive investment shocks in
raising entrepreneurial consumption is attenuated in the presence of collateral
constraints.
In the presence of binding collateral constraints, investment shocks’ ability as
a key driver of business cycles is diminished, and identification of robust invest-
ment specific structural shocks in DSGE models is difficult as per Kamber, Smith,
and Thoenissen (2015). They also show that with investment shocks, there is no
co-movement between consumption and output, going back to the original argu-
ment of Barro and King (1984). A positive investment shock lowers the relative
price of investment goods, Tobin’s Q. When the collateral constraint is binding,
the entrepreneur, due to a positive investment shock, loses her collateral value.
An increase in borrowing cannot finance a further increase in investment. There-
fore, the binding collateral constraint stalls entrepreneurs’ borrowing ability, and
additional investment can only be made by reducing entrepreneurial consumption.
Risk shocks replace the role of investment shocks in explaining the variance
in output data once borrowing constraints are included (as in Kamber, Smith,
and Thoenissen (2015)). Their estimated risk premium shock rises sharply at the
beginning of each post-war recession. The effective interest rate, as in Kamber,
Smith, and Thoenissen (2015) is highly counter-cyclical. In the presence of a
favourable risk shock, they find that there is an increase in investment demand.
A negative risk premium shock lowers households and entrepreneurs’ interest
cost, even for those investors for whom the borrowing constraint is binding. This
reduction in borrowing rates and lower debt-service cost allows them to undertake
additional capital purchases simultaneously, raise their consumption, and avoid
the co-movement puzzle of consumption not being pro-cyclical with output. An
increase in Tobin’s Q following a favourable risk shock loosens the borrowing
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constraint and further amplifies this mechanism. In this manner, we can see
that as financial frictions are included, the significance of Investment specific
technology shocks is reduced, and that of risk premium shocks is improved.
Similar mechanisms in Christensen and Dib (2008) and Merola (2015), which
include an external finance premium that is impacted by firms’ net worth, suggest
that the variance decomposition contribution of Investment specific shocks is
reduced in the presence of financial frictions. In a related paper, Nolan and
Thoenissen (2009) describe that shocks to the financial sector in the form of
entrepreneurial net worth play a significant role in business cycles, much more
than TFP or monetary shocks, and these shocks are negatively correlated with
external finance premium. Equity payouts are pro-cyclical, while debt payouts are
countercyclical for US firms, as studied by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). They
also show that events originating in the financial sector end up tightening firms’
financing conditions and are quantitatively crucial in explaining the dynamics
of real and financial variables and contributing to the great recession of 2007-08.
Amano and Shukayev (2012) show that risk premium shocks are particularly
important in driving the economy to ZLB.
DSGE model in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) through agency
problems of asymmetric information and costly monitoring (like Townsend (1979)
and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)) introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty
to the way entrepreneurs can convert raw capital into useful capital. Entrepreneurs
pay a premium to borrow capital. This premium represents the riskiness of bet on
each entrepreneur. By estimating their model using macroeconomic and financial
variables, they conclude that shocks to the volatility of idiosyncratic uncertainty
or risk shocks account for most fluctuations in GDP at business cycle frequency.
The risk shocks-based view of business cycles is compelling; however, in DSGE
models without some form of financial frictions, it gets challenging to disengage
between risk shocks and the marginal efficiency of investment shocks.
1.7.4 News and Uncertainty shocks
The hypothesis that future technology expectations play an important role in
driving business cycles was formalized in Beaudry and Portier (2004). By using
stock prices as the basis for forming expectations about future economic conditions
and by using two sequential identification schemes; first which makes innovations
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to stock prices orthogonal to TFP shocks, and second which drives the long term
movement in TFP, Beaudry and Portier (2006) demonstrate that their news-
driven shocks anticipate TFP growth by a couple of years. Beaudry and Portier
(2005), Beaudry and Lucke (2010), Beaudry, Dupaigne, and Portier (2011) reach
similar conclusions. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) in a DSGE model further
posit that news shocks about economic fundamentals generate comovement in
aggregate productivity and account for comovement in sectoral productivity as
well. However, in a different VAR scheme by identifying news shocks as orthogonal
to technology innovation and one which maximizes future variation in technology,
Barsky and E. R. Sims (2009) show that the positive wealth effect generated from
positive news about future productivity cannot lead to an expansion in RBC
models. The increase in consumption and leisure from the wealth effect leads
to a fall in output and hours. Suppose instead, because of the high elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, the real rate of return effect dominates. In that case,
investment and hours increase, but the increase in output does not compensate
for the increase in investment, and so consumption falls.
The strength of the news-driven business cycle is also challenged when con-
sidering the significant relation between periods of economic downturn and high
uncertainty. The volatility of the stock market or GDP is an often-used mea-
sure of uncertainty. This volatility surges during recessions. However, this surge
cannot be explained by a measure of bad news or an increase in risk aversion
(during recessions) alone. Only 1 of the 17 instances of volatility jumps from 1962
to 2008 that lowered the expected GDP growth and led to an increase in eco-
nomic uncertainty was due to ‘bad news’ (Bloom, 2009). It is not surprising then
that the macroeconomic research since the Global financial crisis has emphasized
considering uncertainty, volatility, information, and sentiment-based shocks to
understand the business cycle fluctuations.
On the one hand, uncertainty negatively impacts growth and spending. Romer
(1990) says uncertainty near the Global Depression is responsible for a fall in
durable consumer spending. In an influential paper Bloom (2009) depicts the
cyclical variation in the standard deviation of firm-level stock returns, which he
calls as uncertainty, to be an important determinant of business cycles. Uncer-
tainty results in cautious decision-making on behalf of firms, as they deliberate
on hiring and investment decisions since adjustment costs make those decisions
expensive to reverse. It also results in cautious decision-making on behalf of con-
sumers, as during high uncertainty, they delay consumption, especially of durable
goods. Both these responses also reduce the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy.
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On the other hand, negative growth creates uncertainty. Period of negative
growth, or recessions, also raise uncertainty by slowing down trading activity,
difficult forecasting ability, policy miscommunication, and hyper-activism. Baker,
Bloom, and Davis (2016) show that due to slackness in business activity, there
is an increase in micro-level uncertainty since businesses try out new ideas for
the reason that they are now cheaper to try. Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson
(2017) using consumption and growth data from 16 OECD countries find that
periods of lower growth have high fluctuations in long-run volatility. Income and
wages, especially for low-wage earners, show volatility surge during recessions.
Contrary to traditional business cycle models (Kydland and Prescott, 1982),
the uncertainty based results from Bloom (2014) and Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2016) further provide evidence that a fall in productivity is an effect of an
increase in uncertainty, rather than a response to technological regress. They find
that increase in uncertainty has a chilling effect on the productivity-enhancing
reallocation of high productivity and low productivity firms. As uncertainty
increases, high productivity firms do not want to be aggressive in their productivity
allocation, and low productivity firms do not want to cut back on their aggressive
propositions. We know that the reallocation of resources tends to drive most of the
observed productivity growth. Therefore this hiatus in productivity reallocation
during high uncertainty stalls productivity growth and such a stalling effect of
uncertainty underlies the theory of uncertainty driven business cycle.
Uncertainty driven business cycle hypothesis finds support from micro-level
evidence of Panousi and Papanikolaou (2011), which discusses the impact of CEO
level decision making from an increase in uncertainty. CEOs do not make risky
investments if their net worth is tied to or highly exposed to the firm’s equity
valuation and its risk valuation. The structural model in Bloom (2014) estimates
that an average uncertainty shock has reduced the GDP by 1.3%. The uncertainty
after the great recession was thrice as compared to previous uncertainty shocks.
So around 3-4% of the fall in GDP during GFC could be attributed to uncertainty.
A sudden increase in uncertainty due to natural disasters, terrorist events explain
about 50% of the variation in output (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016) following
the event.
Arguably, the business cycle impact of uncertainty is limited only for the short
term (Bloom, 2014). In the short run, investment and output reduce, but as
uncertainty is reduced and once pent-up demand increases, an increase in hiring
and investment leads to a rebound. Similarly, L. Stein and Stone (2010) show
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uncertainty accounts for a third of the fall in capital investment during 2008-
10. However, uncertainty also seems to increase spending in R&D. Many new
ventures are undertaken in uncertain times because there are more avenues for
growth but less certainty about which avenues would be successful. The surge in
R&D activity in 2020 to devise a vaccine that could eradicate the Covid-19 virus
is one example.
1.7.5 Reconciling Business cycles with Flight to Safety
In a nutshell, various attempts undertaken over the past three decades to explain
the co-movement in macroeconomic variables through business cycles have been
successful in some parts. They have led to inconsistencies and puzzles in oth-
ers. Neutral technology shocks explain most of the fluctuations for output and
consumption but do not account for their co-movement with hours. Investment-
related technology shocks using real frictions in the transformation of raw capital
into meaningful capital can break the Barro-King (1984) curse, explain most of
the output fluctuations, and reconcile hours to business cycles, but the results
diminish in the presence of financial frictions. Agency cost, collateral constraints,
asymmetric information, and risk-based models explain co-movements in busi-
ness cycles. However, there is difficulty in specifying structural shocks robust to
modest changes in these financial frictions. Expectations and uncertainty shocks
are promising indicators of the future economic climate and driving economic
fluctuations, but their impact on business cycles is mostly limited to the short
run.
As presented in this chapter, the research on business cycles showcases - Flight
to Safety - shocks as the major driver of economic fluctuations in the long run.
There is a striking similarity between an increase in uncertainty and Flight to
Safety. An increase in uncertainty leads to precautionary savings, which reduces
consumption (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) and leads to Flight to Safety. Some of
this increase in savings also flies abroad, as Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2009)
show that an increase in uncertainty can lead to a flight of capital from small
and open economies to larger and more closed ones, such as the United States.
Greater uncertainty leads to higher default risk, an increase in risk premia, and
makes ambiguity averse investors (Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini, 1999) act as if
the worst possible outcome is expected to occur. If uncertainty led expectations
are the key drivers of investment rationale and business cycles fluctuations, then
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one mechanism where the impact of uncertainty is immediately reflected is FTS.
Measures of uncertainty developed in the last decade are at best proxies of
the central phenomenon; one additional potent measure to that list could be FTS.
Figure 1.22 on page 93 describes the growth of US investment series that can be
explained by shocks to other comparable series. These alternate time-series are
similar to the Price of risk developed in this chapter in containing information
about Flight to Safety and which have been explored in literature for capturing
sentiments, uncertainty, and risk aversion pertaining to investments.
The thick solid lines in that figure represent variables that closely resemble the
contribution to Investment growth made by FTS shocks. Shocks to investment-
related variables series that are used in investment-specific TFP shocks literature,
such as the TFP in Equipment and Durables consumption [TFP(EqDur)], and the
Relative price of Investment and Durables Consumption to price of Consumption
of Non-Durables and Services (Rel.Px Inv+DurC). These shocks exhibit higher
contribution to deviation in investment growth. In comparison shocks related
to consumer sentiment and liquidity spread between 1-year and 10-year yields
(1y-10y) show lower contribution. There is also a similarity in results from the
corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) as
both these series reflect the impact of Flight to Safety. The significant Granger
causality (which we have already noticed in table 1.5 on page 78) running from
Price of Risk series to these alternate series reassures the faith in pursuing Flight
to Safety as germane to understanding the nature of business cycles.
The main finding of this paper is to show that Flight to Safety has a long
term impact on the economy. Flight to Safety shocks can also provide additional
fillip of generating a long-term impact on the economy, which is missing in the
uncertainty based literature. It would be interesting to establish the relevance of
Flight to Safety through an estimated DSGE model, which has a safe and risky
investment technology and a precautionary mechanism for investors to allocate
between those two. That would be a fascinating avenue for future research.
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Figure 1.22: Contribution from sentiment variables
Notes: Investment growth in data (thin solid line in all charts, %y/y) in comparison with the
investment series fitted with shocks identified from Sign and Zero restrictions discussed in
Strategy 1. Data: 1985:Q1 to 2019:Q3. The benchmark configuration of the model identifies
‘FTS’ shocks as disturbances to ‘Price of Risk’ series. In other iterations of the model this is
replaced with other interesting proxies for consumer expectations/sentiment and results from
shocks to that replacement series of interest are reported. Such as: ‘EPU’ is Baker, Bloom
and Davis (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty index. ‘1y-10y spread’ is liquidity spread on
US 1 year and10 year T-bills. ‘Rel.Px Cons to Eq.’ is Relative price of Consumption to
price of Equipment. ‘Util-Adj TFP (Eq+Dur)’ is the Utilisation-adjusted TFP in producing
Equipment and Consumer Durables. ‘Baa-Aaa’ is the spread on corporate bonds rated Aaa
and Baa. ‘Rel.Px Inv+DurCons’ is the Relative price of Durables Consumption and Investment
to Consumption of Non-Durables and Services. ‘Eq.+Dur’ share is the share of Equipment
and Consumer Durables to Output. ‘Cons. Sentiment’ is US Consumer Sentiment indicator.
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1.8 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter’s central conviction is to identify the role of Flight to Safety as the
critical driver of business cycle fluctuations. It achieves so by using a Price of risk
series that measures the price differential of a safe and risky asset in a five variable
structural vector autoregressions model identified using Uhlig (2005) sign based
restrictions. The results show that Flight to Safety shocks predate any regress
in total factor productivity by several years. Flight to Safety shocks can account
for more than 50% of fluctuations in macroeconomic variables at business cycle
frequency. This analysis is robust to small alterations in the identification strategy
and excluding the post-Global financial crisis period data from this investigation.
FTS shocks have gained a more prominent role in the past three decades as
expectations formation, and policy communication has improved in that time.
Flight to Safety shocks lead to a long and sustained decline in investment-
related macroeconomic variables, the mechanism with which they can achieve
so asks several questions from the established tenets of business cycle dynamics.
Various business cycle researchers at different stages have posited neutral tech-
nology, investment-specific technology, financial frictions, among others, as the
main reason for economic fluctuations. Recently there is a focus on looking at
expectations formation, in the form of news shocks and uncertainty shocks, as the
main drivers of business cycles. This chapter proposes an alternative view that
shocks to investor risk aversion lead to booms and busts in business cycles.
A typical FTS episode is signified by a sudden increase in appetite for safe
assets with respect to risky investments. The notion that during times of uncer-
tainty, economic agents change their behaviour, by exhibiting caution towards
consumption and increasing their savings is quite old and one of the defining
reasons for the study of macroeconomics. How FTS shocks impact the long term
fluctuations in business cycle variables inclines us to support the view that Flight
to Safety works through the Expectations channel. Rational, risk-averse investors,
in response to an increase in uncertainty about their future income and employ-
ment, exhibit precautionary behaviour to increase savings today to smooth out
their consumption path and alleviate the impact of realization of a bad state in
the future. Investors smooth their consumption by shifting long term savings
from risky to safer assets. Such a shift by a large number of people leads to a drop
in macroeconomic activity that is visible through a fall in output, investment,
productivity, hours, consumption, and in a broader economic gloom.
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One of the primary motivations for pursuing this empirical exercise was search-
ing for explanations for the unprecedented fall in output and the long-term decline
in investment after the global financial crisis. Through identification and evidence
posted, we can safely say that the surge in FTS episodes over the last two decades
is a crucial variable of significance in understanding business cycles. The explana-
tory power of FTS is promising and stands in contrast to the ineffectiveness of
standard measures of productivity, sentiment, and expectations in explaining the
slow recovery post-global financial crisis. This chapter has merely scratched the
surface of the possible channels in which the Flight to Safety mechanism impacts
both closed and open economies. There has been another surge in risk aversion
during the Covid-19 phase, and therefore improved understanding of the Flight
to Safety mechanism would be useful in making effective policies for recovery.
In particular, what would be interesting to look out for in future research is an
estimated micro-founded DSGE model with the causes and effects of the Flight
to Safety phenomenon.
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2. Asymmetry of Optimal Policy in Costly
Recessions
Standard analyses using the New-Keynesian (NK) model find that the policymaker
cares far more about inflation stabilisation than any other policy objective. Em-
pirical evidence, however, suggests that stabilisation of output, especially during
recessions, is a more significant concern for policymakers than what the benchmark
NK model implies. Evidence also suggests that the pre-Global financial crisis
the Federal Reserve followed an asymmetric monetary policy. It involved slow
reaction to increasing rates in expansionary phases but swift response to cutting
rates during the recessionary periods. This chapter, therefore, solves for the glob-
ally optimal policy using Chebyshev’s collocation method in an NK model which
features costly recessions. The device used to generate costly recessions is taken
from the literature on the equity risk premium which can generate such premia
by assuming that household consumption habits make any loss of consumption in
a bad state (or economic contraction) particularly harmful for households. The
optimal discretionary policy result is non-linear and asymmetric during good and
bad states of the economy. During bad states, it is geared towards addressing the
output gap ahead of the inflationary gap. The asymmetry of the optimal policy is
motivated to correct for the inherent asymmetries in the way households’ precau-
tionary behaviour is affected by the various states of the macroeconomy. Ignoring
the households’ precautionary motives could lead to costly policy mistakes.
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2.1 Introduction
Standard analyses using the NK model find that the policymaker cares far more
about inflation stabilisation than any other policy objective. The micro-founded
utility-based welfare functions of NK models, regardless of whether we use tech-
niques which are linear, fully non-linear or higher-order approximations, lead to a
policy reaction function (Taylor rule) where policy rates have far greater sensitiv-
ity to deviations1 in inflation than to deviations in output or to any other policy
variable2. Policymaker’s objective in the linear-quadratic model can be reduced
to minimising a loss function that weighs loss from inflation deviations far higher,
by a multiple of hundred, than loss due to output deviations.
In contrast, most empirical and practical evidence suggests that policymak-
ers care far more about stabilising output than the benchmark model implies,
especially during contractions. Former Bank of England governor Mervyn King
consistently overshot the Bank’s inflation target. He was dismissive of ‘Inflation
nutters’, who were so obsessed with hitting the inflation target that they were in
danger of destabilising the economy3. During contractions, policymakers are more
concerned about the impending costs to consumers and move their attention away
from inflation stabilisation. The US Federal Reserve has a dual mandate of stable
prices and maximum sustainable employment, which it modified4 in August 2020
to allow for inflation to run moderately above 2 per cent for some time, to address
the shortfalls in employment from the Covid-19 pandemic and to accommodate
for previous periods when inflation had been running persistently below 2 per
cent.
This paper seeks to resolve the discrepancy between empirical observations
and theoretical policy responses by introducing costly recessions to the standard
NK model and solving it numerically for the optimal discretionary policy. The
device used to generate costly recessions is taken from the literature on the equity
risk premium. A higher premium for investments in risky assets is generated
in these models by assuming that household consumption habits make any loss
1from trend or target or any other measure
2Both Woodford (2003) and Gali (2015) are good resources on this topic.
3Source: Financial Times - Don’t let the ‘inflation nutters’ get to you, https://www.ft.
com/content/fbcb98dc-016b-11e6-99cb-83242733f755.
4Soure: US Fed - Guide to changes in the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and




of consumption in an economic contraction particularly harmful for households
[Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Cochrane (2017)]. Therefore in a costly recession,
the policymaker, armed with only one policy instrument: the interest rate, cannot
simultaneously stabilise both output and inflation fluctuations and faces a trade-
off.
The results provide a theoretical foundation for the asymmetric response
of monetary policy that is observed in empirical analyses. The optimal policy
recommends placing higher significance on output stabilisation when households
are in adverse states of the economy. The discretionary policymaker bears a higher
cost of inflation in order to obtain a faster normalisation of output deviations
during contractions. She chooses this allocation to jointly respond to the inefficient
wedge in the economy and the precautionary behaviour of its agents. Both of
which are significant for stabilisation policy and are generated by the mechanism
of slow-moving consumption habits which makes recessions costly, a feature that
is lacking in standard NK models.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The two distortions of monopolistic competition and nominal rigidity in conven-
tional NK models lead to inefficiently low output and to a lack of adjustments in
output to changes in preferences and productivity. An optimal policy, therefore,
seeks to vary competitive output one-for-one with changes in the economy’s nat-
ural (or flexible prices) output. However price stability, even though there is no
importance to it in the policy objective, emerges as a strong feature of optimal
policy [See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) Galí (and 2015)]. A price stabilisa-
tion policy through ‘Divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Galí, 2007) also coincides
with an efficient level of output. The recommendation for monetary policy in
micro-founded NK models is twofold, to minimise a loss function which penalises,
through a higher weight any deviations from the objective of price stability and
to communicate this objective well to enhance welfare (Woodford, 2003).
The empirical literature, in contrast, has shown that not only do policymakers
care for output deviations but their response is asymmetric, as they care far
more of output deviations, during recessions. Inflation parameter in Taylor rule
shifts between periods of inflation targeting or recession targeting preferences
(Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2008); Monetary policy reacts strongly during asset
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price busts (Ravn, 2014) in comparison to booms. The transmission of monetary
policy is asymmetric (Santoro, Petrella, Pfajfar, and Gaffeo, 2014); depending
on the sign of intervention (Barnichon and Matthes, 2016). Estimated policy
transmission asymmetry in the US (Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016) is unusually
large during booms than in recessions. European central banks after the 1980s
made asymmetric interest rate increases when inflation & output are above target
in comparison to when they are below (Dolado, María-Dolores, and Naveira,
2005);
Several theoretic models can generate costly recessions. Barlevy (2004) notes
that by including different consumer preferences (such as Epstein and Zin (1989)),
higher weights of shock persistence, high shock volatility, incomplete markets and
individual heterogeneity; the literature arrived a cost of business cycles at around
10% of consumers’ lifetime consumption which is significantly higher than Lucas
(1990) estimate. There are a few studies to optimal policy that include costly
recessions [De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013), Amato and Laubach (2004), Santoro,
Petrella, Pfajfar, and Gaffeo (2014)] but they only evaluate the Ramsey policy.
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in costly recessions literature by
investigating the optimal discretionary policy in case of a distortionary steady
state. The model also has distortions in the from nominal rigidities, habits
externalities and revenue taxes.
Slow-moving consumption habits, as pioneered by Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), are used to make marginal utility of a consumer from an excess unit of
consumption in recessions higher in comparison to booms. It results in a state-
dependent risk aversion. Costly recessions make the consumer more averse to risky
assets and provide validation for equity risk premia. Most of the literature with
consumption habits is based on external habits. Some linearized models suggest
there is not much difference in results, whether habits are formed at an internal
and external level [See Cochrane (2017) and Dennis (2009)]. However, external
habits lead to externalities (Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi, 2012) as consumers are
not able to recognize the impact of their individual consumption choices on the
aggregate level of habits. It is thus creating a chance for policy intervention to
neutralize the externalities by a tax or subsidy (De Paoli and Zabczyk, 2013). In
contrast, the empirical (Chen and Ludvigson, 2009) and behavioural (Yogo, 2008)
evidence recommends that internal habits are better representative of consumer
preferences. The reason for parameterizing habits as mostly internal in this paper
is to make the competitive economic output smaller than social planner output and
to generate a small positive steady-state inflation that is relevant to observations
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in data. The model is calibrated to match observations in US macroeconomic
data form 1985-2006.
In a setup similar to this paper De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013) use higher-order
perturbations to account for investor’s precautionary behaviour in explaining the
observed equity premia. By including non-linearities inherent in NK models, they
shed light on the role of uncertainty in devising optimal policy. They find that
ignoring precautionary motive leads to welfare loss and that loss increases with
the volatility of shocks in the economy.
This paper differs from De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013) in two aspects. The bench-
mark economy in their paper is made efficient by including a subsidy. Instead, the
benchmark output here is smaller than efficient output, while the tax regime and
inflationary bias in the model are relevant to data. De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
demonstrate the significance of including higher-order approximations around a
steady-state in capturing uncertainty and its effects on Ramsey policy. Whereas
given the time-inconsistency offered by the policy problem, this paper uses nu-
merical methods (Chebyshev’s polynomials) to obtain a global solution for the
discretionary policymaker in the absence of any commitment technology.
Structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. The next section 2.2 de-
scribes the model and obtains the maximization conditions for Social planner
and Discretionary policymaker. Section 2.3 describes an apparatus to solve the
model numerically. Calibration, steady-state and impulse responses are discussed
in section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the results in light of the inflationary bias,
the inefficiency wedge, the output gap and the asymmetry of optimal policy. The
last section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 A New-Keynesian model with Habits
We work with a simple variant of the standard new Keynesian model that can
account for costly recessions. The model is set up in a way that for agents
losing a unit of consumption during recessions has a higher cost than losing a
unit of consumption during booms. This is achieved by including a slow-moving
subsistence level of habits in household consumption. Contractions or bad states
of the economy are represented by periods where agents’ consumption is closer
to their subsistence level of habits. And vice-versa, Expansions or good states of
the economy are represented by periods when the agents’ consumption is higher
than their subsistence level of habits.
2.2.1 Description
This set-up is similar to De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013), but with the exception that
this paper uses contemporaneous or Keeping up with Joneses habits. In contrast,
their paper had lagged or Catching up with Joneses habits. The macroeconomic
literature has more commonly relied on the latter Catching up with Joneses habits
(Xt) of the kind Xt = θCt−1 i.e. where habits Xt depend only on past consumption
and the consumer’s utility depends on habits. This habits representation has
also been used to successfully generate the hump-shaped impulse response in
consumption [for.e.g. in Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012)]. However, such
choice of modelling consumption habits also results in large variations in asset
prices that are not observed in macroeconomic data. This paper on the other
hand relies on Keeping up with Joneses habits or which evolve on the basis of both
current and lagged consumption, for.e.g. Xt = (1− θ)Ct + θCt−1. Representing
habits in this manner has two significant advantages. Firstly, it allows us to
avoid the additional state-variable of past period consumption Ct−1, which can
be very helpful in avoiding the curse of dimensionality which has its bearing on
enormously slowing down the numerical solution estimation in models that involve
more than two states. Secondly, the contemporaneous habits in consumption
are slow-moving which makes them useful in generating smooth cycles of risk
aversion5, and in generating a trend6 that evolves with the growth in aggregate
5See Fig.2 in Cochrane (2016) which makes a demonstration of the slow-moving habits and
the resulting cycles of risk aversion.
6In models with time-varying subsistence level of habits ‘external habits’ that adapt to
current and past consumption, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2015) show that government interventions
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and individual consumption. Besides, the marginal utility from an additional
unit of consumption depends on the agent’s surplus consumption which is defined
as the consumption in excess of subsistence level of habits. Slow evolution of
habits leads to smooth transitions in marginal utility and therefore less volatile
risk-aversion and asset prices.
For a simple illustration of slow-moving habits and changes in marginal utility,
consider Figure 2.1 on page 116 which presents the log of total per-capita con-
sumption and log of per-capita consumption of non-durable goods and services.
The latter forms a steady composition of around eighty-five per cent of the total
consumption. For the sake of argument consider that consumers find it challenging
to give up on consumption habits that are formed in choosing non-durables and
services. In contrast, they find it easier to give up on their habits of durables goods
consumption. Although, this may not seem an innocuous and straightforward
assumption to that every reader (including myself) who may have deep habits
in consumption of durables goods, such as mobile phones and laptops, but who
could easily change their mode of transport from taking Uber to riding a bicycle.
Nevertheless, the argument that consumption habits formed in non-durables and
services would be more challenging to give up has its merits. For an example,
consider reducing the internet speed of a user of fibre broadband or as Cochrane
(2016) puts it in a quote from the wife of a hedge-fund manager, "I cannot fly
commercial again".
Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the gap between aggregate consumption and the
consumption of non-durables and services in the US reduces during the NBER
recession periods. The surplus ratio, i.e. one minus the ratio of consumption of
non-durables and services to total consumption too goes down in US recessions
and hovers around the 15% region. A marginal utility of consumption function
that is inversely related to the surplus ratio rises through the peak to trough
periods of US recessions.
that destroy aggregate endowment lead to large welfare gains. Campbell and Cochrane (2015)
contradict that by showing that any welfare gains from endowment destruction result from a
particular discrete approximation of the underlying continuous-time model which allows for
jumps in consumption without allowing for jumps in habits. They show that other calculations
of the discrete-time approximation easily overturn those results.
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Figure 2.1: Consumption, Surplus Ratio and Marginal Utility for the US



















































Notes: Dots: Log of US real per-capita Total consumption (ln(CTotal)). Solid: Log of
US real per-capita Non-durables and Services consumption (ln(CNDur+Svc)). Dash:
Surplus Ratio calculated as 1 − CNDur+SvcCTotal . Grey Bars: peak to trough period of
NBER Recessions. Dash Dots: Marginal Utility of consumption, calibrated using the
parameters of the model as [ln (CTotal)− ln (CNDur+Svc)]−ρ for ρ = 1.37. Marginal
utility is a decreasing function of the Surplus Ratio.
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2.2.2 Household
The model economy inhabits a continuum j of agents/households that are uni-
formly distributed on the unit interval, j ∈ [0, 1]. Under the assumption of
complete markets, all households through risk sharing seek to maximize similar













where h ∈ [0, 1] a parameter that is constant across households, and determines
surplus consumption in excess of habits Xt. Let us call h as the ‘habit size’
parameter. Habits in the model are assumed to be ‘superficial’, partly ‘internal’
and partly ‘external’. The extent of habits externality depends on the parameter
ω for agents. As discussed earlier in the Introduction section, the parameter
ω is chosen to keep the output of competitive economy smaller than efficient
output and to generate small positive steady state inflation which matches with
the observations in data. Agents’ habits evolve on the basis of past individual
habits Xj,t−1, their own current period consumption Cj,t and aggregate per-capita
consumption Ct
Xj,t = (1− φ) (ωCj,t + (1− ω)Ct) + φXj,t−1. (2.2)
In this set-up, all habits become external to agents when the internal habits
parameter ω = 0 and agents can internalise all habits when ω = 1. The first term
in agent’s utility function shows that utility is derived from Surplus consumption
i.e. Consuming in excess of the Subsistence level of habits, the latter being defined
as hX. Second term in Utility function captures disutility from providing Nj,t
units of labour. β is the discount factor, φ is the parameter for habit persistence,
ρ is inverse of elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) and η is inverse of the
Frisch-elasticity of labour supply which measures the inter-temporal substitution
of willingness to work. The ability of agent’s current level of consumption to
influence her habit formation is captured through the free parameter (1−φ). The
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) for household j is:
vj (Cj,t, Xj,t) = −Cj,t
Uj,cc
Uj,c
= ρ (1− h(1− φ)ω)
Sj,t
(2.3)
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where Sj,t is the Surplus Ratio7, a ratio of Surplus consumption to consumption.

















At this time we can take a moment to ignore the j classification and consolidate
all the habits related terminology that have been introduced in this paper in
Table 2.1, so it can serve as a quick reference guide for future.
Table 2.1: Habits terminology
Notation Definition
Xt Habits
h Habits size parameter
hXt Subsistence level of habits
Ct − hXt Surplus Consumption
(Ct − hXt)/Ct Surplus Consumption Ratio or Surplus Ratio
ω Internal habits parameter
φ Habits persistence parameter
Various states of the economy
In steady-state the level of Habits (from habit eq. (2.2)) should be equal to
Consumption. Therefore in the steady state Surplus Ratio (from eq. (2.4)) simply
turns out to be S = 1 − h. Household’s marginal utility during expansionary
states should be lower than its level in the contractionary states. But the marginal
utility of consumption is a decreasing function of Surplus Ratio. So in this utility
specification, we could define good states (or expansions) as the states of the
economy when the Surplus Ratio is higher than steady-state Surplus Ratio of
1− h. This is achieved when either consumption is way too much in comparison
to habits or habits are way too low in comparison to consumption. In both those
cases, the Surplus consumption S should be higher than its steady-state level.
Bad states (or Recessions) by the same analogy are then defined as the states
when agent’s Surplus Ratio is below the steady-state level (1 − h). This is the
case when the agent’s consumption gets closer to the level of subsistence level
7The careful reader may notice, that in the previous chapter Surplus ratio was defined
differently as one minus the ratio of non-durables and services consumption to total consumption.
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of habits (hX), or when subsistence level of habits are high in comparison to
consumption. In both those cases, the marginal utility rises, which is another








= Sj,t < Sj = 1− h (2.7)
and in Good state
Cj,t − hXj,t
Cj,t
= Sj,t > Sj = 1− h (2.8)
Household’s Budget




Pt(i)Cj,t (i) di+ V nt Bnj,t + PtV rt Brj,t + PtV
eq
t Fj,t 6 WtNj,t +Bnj,t−1
+ PtBrj,t−1 + Pt (V
eq
t + dt)Fj,t−1 + τc,t (2.9)
which shows that expenditure made in period t cannot exceed wealth and income
brought into that period.
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)Ct (i) di is the nominal consumption in period t
of all goods of variety i ∈ [0, 1].
Household issue bonds to each other and save by buying one period zero
coupon bonds, indexed as Brj,t and Bnj,t, paying one real and nominal unit in the
next period, respectively. There is also an option to buy units (shares) of real
Stock index F , which is a claim on aggregate profits of all firms in the economy,
and pays a real dividend per share at rate d. Variable V r describes real prices of
real bonds, V n is the nominal price of nominal bonds and V eq is the real price
of the real stock index. τc,t are per capita transfer from government, which are
outside of the decision purview of the individual agent. A distinction in various
asset holdings has been made in Table 2.2 to define necessary asset returns.
Consumption aggregation
Household j consumes a continuum of goods i ∈ [0, 1] where each variety in the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregation has same weight. Household’s consumption
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Table 2.2: Asset Prices and Returns
Variable Definition
Brj,t number of one-period real bonds, paying 1 real unit in period t+ 1
V rt real price in period t of a one-period real bond
Bnj,t number of one-period nominal bonds, paying 1 nominal unit in period t+ 1
V nt nominal price in period t of a one-period nominal bond
Fj,t−1 number of units (shares) of Real Stock index (S&P) held in period t− 1
V eqt real price per unit of Real Stock index in period t











and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between any two
varieties of i. The representative household is able to choose between different
varieties by adjusting their shares in the consumption bundle to minimize its total
cost. Optimization of household expenditure results in the following demand
function for a good of variety i






where the Ct is the aggregate consumption. While the economy-wide price index








The budget constraint for household j can therefore be modified as:
PtCj,t + V nt Bnj,t + PtV rt Brj,t + PtV
eq
t Fj,t 6 WtNj,t +Bnj,t−1 + PtBrj,t−1
+ Pt (V eqt + dt)Fj,t−1 + τc,t (2.13)
Solving for Households Utility optimisation
Considering the specification of the model by which the households cannot
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fully internalize the effects of their choice on aggregate consumption and their
habit formation, we write the Lagrangian for household’s problem by using λmj,t




















WtNj,t +Bnj,t−1 + PtBrj,t−1
+Pt (V eqt + dt)Fj,t−1
−PtCj,t − V nt Bnj,t − PtV rt Brj,t









First order conditions for all t > 1
Cj,t : λmj,tPt = (Cj,t − hXj,t)
−ρ − (1− φ)ωλxj,t (2.15)






Nj,t : λmj,t = N
η
j,t/Wt (2.17)























(V eqt+1 + dt+1)
]
(2.20)
show that a unit increase in real wealth (2.15) generates marginal utility from an
additional unit of consumption but it also tightens the habit constraint further.
The agent loses utility by increasing her habits in the current period (2.16) and
it also tightens the habit constraint for future. Marginal loss of utility from an
additional unit of labour (2.17) gives Wt units of nominal income. (2.18) and
(2.19) are standard bond pricing equations for nominal and real bonds respectively,
and (2.20) relates the real price of equity to future price appreciation and expected
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profitability (dividends) of all firms listed on the stock index. We can define a real
multiplier λrj,t ≡ λmj,tPt for consumer’s budget constraint, which is the disutility

















and (2.16) we can derive an inter-temporal substitution between consumption
and real income:
(Cj,t − hXj,t)−ρ (1− h(1− φ)ω)− λrj,t = βφEt
[
(Cj,t+1 − hXj,t+1)−ρ − λrj,t+1
]
(2.23)
The Consumption Euler Equation can be extracted by dropping the j classification
for homogeneous agents as
(1− h(1− φ)ω) (Ct − hXt)−ρ = λrt + βφEt
[
(Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ − λrt+1
]
(2.24)
As the agent is able to (partly) internalise her habit formation, from eq. (2.24) she
can see that the utility gains from an extra unit of consumption in current period
has to be provided from increasing the lifetime real income or from expected loss
of utility in future periods. Household’s Labour supply (from Equation (2.17))
as a function of real wage wt ≡ Wt/Pt, upon dropping the j classification for
homogeneous households is simply
Nηt = wtλrt (2.25)
Stochastic Discount factor , hereafter SDF, is derived by removing j classifi-


















In absence of internal habits or when ω = 0, habits are determined by a
combination of previous period individual habits and aggregate consumption.
Xj,t = (1− φ)Ct + φXj,t−1. (2.28)
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The habit constraint (2.2) then is non-binding for the household. Habits are
exogenous to household’s maximisation problem and the first order conditions
with respect to consumption and labour result in
λrt = (Ct − hXt)
−ρ (2.29)
Nηt = wt (Ct − hXt)−ρ . (2.30)
Equation (2.30) is familiar labour-supply relation which shows that real wage rate
is equal to the ratio of the marginal loss in utility from labour to the marginal gain






















In absence of internal habits (2.32) the agent’s real discount rate is a ratio of the
expected marginal utility between consuming an extra unit tomorrow vis-á-vis
consuming that unit today.
Whereas, if the agents are aware (or when ω ∈ (0, 1]) of the impact of an
extra unit of consumption today on reducing marginal utility in future then they
are less willing to over-consume today, have a lower discount rate, and require a
















The ratio of intertemporal discounted utitliy on the RHS is decreasing in the
weight of internal habits (ω), the size of habits (h) and it demonstrates the
precautionary nature of agents consumption choices. The presence of internal
habits produces a precautionary wedge in the Consumption Euler equation.
Local-non satiation of preferences ensures that in equilibrium the budget
constraint binds with equality, and the structure of constant EIS utility conforms
to the usual Inada conditions. Additionally, we also need the no-Ponzi game
condition (2.34) to hold with equality in the equilibrium, so that the present
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discounted value of household’s nominal wealth at infinity is non-negative or









The inada condition builds on eq. (2.18) which gives the one-period nominal
rate of return Rnt,t+1 = (V nt )
−1, to arrive at the nominal rate of return (2.20) for











while the nominal wealth brought by household into the period t ≥ 1 is defined as








y,t is non-idiosyncratic across firms and follows an au-
toregressive process (2.37) with εy,t ≡ log(ξy,t) and uncorrelated i.i.d random
disturbances εy,t of mean zero and variance σ2y . Each firm produces a variety Yt(i)











Firms face the following Rotemberg (1982) style price adjustment costs while









Being monopolistic, firms can choose to sell at a price above marginal cost ϕt
which is non-idiosyncratic across i firms as both productivity and real wage rate
are non-idiosyncratic. Firms’ profit maximization problem in period t is to choose
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The nominal stochastic discount factorMnt,t+s from eq. (2.26) is also firm’s nominal
discount rate for s periods. Firms also pay τp,t an exogenous time-varying revenue
tax rate which follows an exogenous process (2.42) with ετ,t ≡ log(1 − τp,t) and
ετ ≡ log(1− τp), where τp is the steady rate of revenue tax. Gross inflation rate
is given by πt+s ≡ Pt+s/Pt+s−1 and in a symmetric equilibrium as Pt+s(i) = Pt+s
and all firms employ similar amount of labour so Yt+s(i) = Yt+s(i′) and the FOC




t,t+sYt+s [(1− σ) (1− τp,t+s) + σϕt+s − ψ (πt+s − 1) πt+s]
+Mnt,t+s+1Yt+s+1ψ (πt+s+1 − 1) π2t+s+1
 (2.44)













which after substituting for s = 0 gets reduced to the following, familiar NKPC
form,
0 = (1− σ) (1− τp,t) + σϕt − ψ (πt − 1)πt + ψβEt
[








A rearrangement of the NKPC leads us to the symmetric equilibrium Rotemberg










(πt − 1) πt − βEt
[
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In the absence of price-stickiness and revenue taxes, the mark-up for the monop-
olistic firm reaches its desired level.
[ϕt]−1 =
σ
σ − 1 when ψ = 0 and τp,t = 0. (2.48)
2.2.4 Market Clearing
In symmetric equilibrium all firms produce the same output, and use the same













Homogeneous households provide an equal amount of labour to all (i) firms and
own all (i) firms. After dropping the j subscript in all First-order conditions (from


























could be accumulated for all homogeneous (i) firms as








2 (πt − 1)
2 Yt (2.52)
or simply
qt = Yt − τp,tYt − wtNt −
ψ
2 (πt − 1)
2 Yt (2.53)
The policy maker makes an equal lump-sum transfer τc,t to agents, inclusion
of which does not affect agents’ relative choices and FOCs. By making these
modifications to the household budget eq. (2.13) we can derive the aggregate
household budget equation as
Ct = wtNt + dtFt−1 + τc,t (2.54)
In every period there is a net zero supply of one-period bonds. As there is
no entry/exit of firms, so in every period there is a constant number of firms
operating in the economy whose common shares Ft−1 = Ft are wholly owned by
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the household. Firms distribute all qt profits as dividends to their shareholders.
The aggregate dividend per share dt received by households is equal to qt/Ft−1.
The total transfer from the government to households τc,t equates to total taxes
collected τp,tYt by the government from the firms. After substituting for dtFt−1 =
qt in the aggregate household budget eq. (2.54) and for τp,tYt = τc,t in the aggregate
firm’s profit eq. (2.53) we arrive at the following resource constraint which shows
that Rotemberg pricing leads to an inefficiency wedge in utilization of full output.
Ct = Yt
[




2.2.5 Social Planner equilibrium
In order to get an understanding of the output gap in decentralised economy,
we have to determine the social planner equilibrium. By ignoring the nominal
rigidities, taxes and habits externalities of the model, a benevolent social planner
can derive the first-best outcome. She chooses real allocations to maximise house-
hold utility subject to aggregate constraints, and all habits are now internalised.
Social planner’s problem is to choose for all j households, {Cj,t, Yj,t, Xj,t}t=∞t=1 to
maximize each household’s utility (2.1) subject to internal habit formation (2.2)
and the aggregate resource constraint (2.55); for an exogenous sequence {ξy,t}t=∞t=1
of productivity (2.37). The Lagrangian for the social planner policy problem,
using λx∗j,t as the multiplier for respective habit constraint for each household and
λy
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This representation of the social planner optimisation problem incorporates
exclusion of pricing inefficiency wedge in the aggregate resource condition (2.55),
and includes individual contribution to aggregate output Yj,t instead of its supply




y,t Nj,t since this constraint always binds. The following FOCs
with respect to social planner choice variables are:










Xj,t : 0 = λx
∗








From (2.58), for a non-zero production in social planner equilibrium λy
∗
t > 0
so the production constraint binds and aggregate output equates to aggregate
consumption in the social planner equilibrium. By corollary per capita output
should also be equal to per capita consumption, or Yt = Ct.
Proposition 2.2.1. The Social planner equilibrium allocation which has equal
units of Consumption, Habits and Output for all j households is efficient.
Proof. For each period t consider an allocation (Ct, Xt, Yt) s.t. for all j households
Cj,t = Ct, Yj,t = Yt and Xj,t = Xt. The efficient social planner equilibrium
allocation should satisfy FOCs (2.57 to 2.59). For non-negative output and non-
zero productivity, from eq. (2.58) the constraint multiplier λy
∗







η . Let’s call it Yt. From the FOC with respect to Cj,t, i.e.
eq. (2.57) ∀j households we can derive λx∗j,t = 11−φ
[
(Ct − hXt)−ρ − ξ−1y,tY ηt
]
which
is common across households, let’s call it λx∗t . Similarly from eq. (2.59) we can
derive the conditional expectation of future habits multiplier to be common across















Therefore, the common equilibrium allocation (Ct, Xt, Yt) satisfies the individ-
ual constraints for each j household and is efficient.
By choosing the common allocation (as per Proposition 2.2.1) we can rewrite
the first order conditions (2.57 to 2.59) as:
Cj,t : 0 = (Ct − hXt)−ρ − λx
∗
t (1− φ)− λ
y∗
t (2.60)





Xj,t : 0 = λx
∗








If for the social planner the habits constraint was non-binding λx∗j,t would be
equal to zero, and the optimal allocation from (2.57) for household j would equate
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marginal utility from an additional unit of consumption to marginal dis-utility
from producing an extra unit of output. When the habits constraint binds (from
2.57), the marginal utility of a unit of consumption gets reduced by the shadow
price of increasing the stock of habits. The shadow price of increasing habits is
given from eq. (2.59) as the sum of the loss of utility in the current period and
discounted sum of the loss of utility from future increases of habits.
When the habits constraint binds (λx∗j,t > 0), from the Kuhn-tucker conditions
we get




which is aggregated for j households as
∑
j








Xt = (1− φ)Ct + φXt−1
where Xt is per-capita habits.
Proposition 2.2.2. Maximizing a common utility function for aggregate con-
straints of habits and production the social planner can obtain efficient allocation




t ) for all households.
Proof. A social planner maximizing the utility by ignoring the nominal rigidities
and other inefficiencies, but obeying the habits and production constraint achieves
the first best outcome. All habits are now internalised. The Lagrangian for the













+λx̂t (Xt − (1− φ)Ct − φXt−1) + λ
ŷ




which gives the following FOCs:
Ct : 0 = (Ct − hXt)−ρ − λx̂t (1− φ)− λ
ŷ
t (2.64)
Yt : 0 = λŷt − ξ−1y,tY
η
t (2.65)





that are equal to the efficient allocation in equations (2.60) to (2.62) in Proposition
2.2.1.
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We can eliminate λŷt from FOC with respect to Ct and Yt in Proposition 2.2.2
to get
(Ct − hXt)−ρ − λx̂t (1− φ) = ξ−1y,tY
η
t (2.67)
This is different from Household maximisation result (eq. (2.15)) as the social
planner can internalise all habits in the economy. The tightening of habit con-
straint λx∗t ≥ 0 affects labour-leisure equilibrium condition. There is a wedge
between marginal utility lost from generating an extra unit of consumption and
net marginal benefit received from consuming that extra unit. This wedge is given
by λx∗t (1− φ) is increasing when the habit constraint binds tightly, or habits are
fast-moving, i.e. current consumption has a more significant impact on future
habits when φ is low. Thus social planner’s decision to raise consumption by extra
units today (t) has an externality and impacts surplus ratio St+s in future as well.
The inter-temporal allocation (2.59) shows that the wedge (or loss of utility) from
tightening the habit constraint today can be written as the discounted sum of
future losses.










In deterministic steady-state, habits X∗ = C∗ and the corresponding social plan-
ner equilibrium, using ξ∗y = 1 is
(1− h(1− φ)− βφ) (C∗ − hC∗)−ρ = (1− βφ)Y ∗η (2.69)
as Y ∗ = C∗, we get the deterministic steady state output level
Y ∗ =
(






Proposition 2.2.3. The Competitive equilibrium has an efficient steady state





, where k = h(1−φ)1−βφ .
Proof. In Appendix B.2.
Whether the level of output is greater in social planner equilibrium or in the
decentralized equilibrium, this can be decided through monopoly power of firms,
degree of habit formation and the prevailing output tax rate. The non-stochastic
steady state of competitive equilibrium will be efficient when the prevailing tax-





, and it will produce
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In the benchmark calibration the tax-rate is higher τp > τp and that leads to
a permanent wedge which cannot be overcome by removing the inefficiencies of
nominal rigidities and habits.
Corollary 2.2.4. In absence of habits externalities τp′ = 1− σσ−1 is sufficient to
make competitive steady state allocation efficient (conditional on k 6= 1).
Proof. Trivial from the above Proposition 2.2.3 after substituting for ω = 1 .
If habits are fully internal (ω = 1) for agents as they are for a social planner,
then only distortions from monopolistic competition and taxes reduce the output
from its efficient level. For a tax rate in benchmark calibration that is greater
than τp′ there is permanent wedge between the competitive output with internal
habits and the social planner outcome, that cannot be overcome by removing
nominal rigidities. Notice that, as k < 1, the tax rate that ensures efficiency of





The inefficiency wedge increases in the proportion of internal habits or ω approach-
ing to 1.
2.2.6 Optimal policy under Discretion
In our model the evolution of habits makes the decision variables history de-
pendent; future policy decisions depend on today’s habits. Policy-maker cannot
establish commitment over future policy decisions and she would have to re-
optimize in each period. The optimal monetary policy under discretion can be
described as a set of decision rules for 5 control variables {Ct, Yt, πt, Xt, λrt} as
functions of 3 state variables {Xt−1, εy,t, ετ,t} which maximise the following Value
function
V D (Xt−1, εy,t, ετ,t) = max
Ct,Yt,πt,Xt,λrt
(









V D (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)
}
(2.72)
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subject to the constraints of habit formation (2.2), resource constraint (2.55),
NKPC (2.46), Consumption euler equation (2.24). By defining an auxiliary
function ΩP that depends on next period state variables
ΩP (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1) ≡ (πt+1 − 1) πt+1λrt+1Yt+1 (2.73)
we can re-write the policy maker’s NKPC constraint as:





ΩP (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)
]
(2.74)
Similarly using other auxiliary function
ΩC(Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1) ≡ ((1− h(1− φ))Ct+1 − hφXt)−ρ − λrt+1 (2.75)
we can modify the Consumption Euler Equation (2.24) to





This auxiliary function captures the impact that policy decisions have on future
state but policy-makers are limited in their commitment beyond the current state,
as a result we have a time-consistent policy.
Therefore by substituting ϕt in terms of wages and real multiplier from
Marginal cost relation eq. (2.50) and Labour supply relation eq. (2.25), and
by using respective lagrange multipliers {Λ1,t,Λ2,t,Λ3,t,Λ4,t} for the following four
constraints,
Habit:














ΩP (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)
]
(2.79)
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CEE modified:





the Lagrangian for the discretionary policy problem can be written as,






1 + η + βEt
{
VD (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)
}

































The first order conditions with respect to control variables are given as,
Ct : 0 = (Ct − hXt)−ρ − Λ1,t(1− φ)− Λ2,t
+ Λ4,t (1− h(1− φ)ω) ρ (Ct − hXt)−ρ−1 (2.82)
shows that an increase in consumption (2.82) increases utility, tightens both the
habit constraint (Λ1,t > 0), and the resource constraint (Λ2,t > 0), and lowers the
stochastic discount factor (Λ4,t > 0) but improves the inflation-output trade-off
(Λ3,t 6 0).















Et{ΩP (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)}
]
(2.83)
Similarly producing an extra unit of output (2.83) generates (dis)utility, relaxes
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the resource constraint and improves the inflation-output trade-off (Λ3,t 6 0).
πt : 0 = Λ2,tYtψ (πt − 1) + Λ3,t [ψ (2πt − 1)] (2.84)
Increase in inflation (2.84) tightens the resource constraint and its impact on the
inflation-output trade-off also depends on the level of output.
Xt : 0 =






















∂VD (Xt−1, εy,t, ετ,t)
∂Xt−1
= −φΛ1,t (2.86)
and one-step forward iteration
∂Et
{
VD (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)
}
∂Xt
= −φEt {Λ1,t+1} (2.87)
we can re-write the FOC for Habit as,
Xt : 0 =



















and FOC for λrt , shows that rise in real income leads to higher SDF and worse
inflation-output trade-off






ΩP (Xt, εy,t+1, ετ,t+1)
]]
+ Λ4,t (2.89)
The discretionary equilibrium is given by the following system of equations:
a) FOCs (2.82), (2.83), (2.84), (2.88) and (2.89)
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b) multipliers on constraints of: Habits (2.2), resources (2.55), NKPC (2.46) and
Consumption Euler relation (2.24)
c) asset pricing conditions (B.3, B.4, B.5, B.11, B.12) for 5 variables
(Rft,t+1, Rnt,t+1, V
eq
t , E[Reqt,t+1], dt), respectively, without any additional multipliers
as the respective constraints are binding,
d) two exogenous processes of productivity (2.37) and taxes (2.42),
e) and for a given value of parameters ρ, η, ω, σ, ψ, φ, h, β.
To solve this non-linear problem we need to find time-invariant Markov perfect
policy rules for these 14 variables{
Ct, Yt, πt, Xt, λ
r
t ,Λ1,t,Λ2,t,Λ3,t,Λ4,t, Rnt,t+1, Rrt,t+1, E[R
eq
t,t+1], V eqt , dt
}
as functions
of state variables {Xt−1, εy,t, ετ,t}. Since the policy functions cannot be com-
puted in closed form, we solve it by numerically using Chebyshev’s collocation
method in the following section.
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2.3 Numerical Solution
In the extended NK model of this chapter there are externalities in the form of
consumption habits, nominal rigidity in the form of Rotemberg adjustment costs
and distortions in the form of output taxes. There are three state variables viz.
an internal state of last period habits (Xt−1), an external state of technological
productivity (ξy,t) and an external state of output taxes (τp,t). The previous
section presents the various optimal policy functions as functions of the three
states. This section describes the global solution methodology adopted to solve
the discretionary optimal policy problem numerically.
2.3.1 Chebyshev Collocation
Chebyshev collocation method uses time iteration on a state subspace of Cheby-
shev’s polynomials to approximate global optimisation solutions for non-linear
partial differential equations. Due to the inherent non-linearities of the optimal
policy and the uncertainty involved therein, solving for global optimisation using
this numerical method is a preferred way to obtain the functional optimisation of
our model and to investigate its economic dynamics in depth. This investigation
is an improvement on DePaoli and Zabczyk’s (2013) higher-order local approxi-
mations to the policy problem as this approach approximates for the solution at
bigger deviations from the steady-state, such as the good and bad states of the
model economy which are +/- 2 s.d. from the stochastic steady state. The Cheby-
shev collocation solution approach proceeds in the following manner. The two
external states are transformed into their AR(1) representations of εy,t ετ,t, respec-
tively. The state spaces for (Xt−1, εy,t, ετ,t) are discretized into set of (n1, n2, n3)
collocation nodes. Where, each collocation node in the state space is a mapping
of the roots of Chebyshev’s polynomial of the respective order (n1, n2, n3) on the
space ∈ [−1, 1]. Accordingly, the space of approximating functions is generated
by the tensor products of these three sets of Chebyshev polynomials of order
(n1 ⊗ n2 ⊗ n3). The residuals equations are obtained from the 14 Euler equations
wherein Gauss-Hermite Quadrature is used to approximate the expectation terms
and first differencing of the Chebyshev polynomials8 is used to approximate the
partial derivatives with respect to the habits state.
8Appendix of Leith and Liu (2016) is a good resource to learn about this procedure and
provides algorithms to solving global optimal policy for endogenous variables of upto 2 states.
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2.3.2 Solution procedure
Following Leith and Liu (2016) a 3-dimensional grid of internal state, productivity
state and the tax state are formed. The order of polynomial selections is [8,8,8]
for all the state variables of the model: [Xt−1, εy,t, ετ,t] . Hence Chebyshev’s
collocation technique generates a square matrix of orthogonal polynomials of order
83 = 512 which when mapped into the range [1.40, 1.55] or similar-sized range for
















for cost shock form the state space of 512 grid points or collocation nodes which
are later used for interpolating the optimal functions for our 14 policy variables.
Christopher A. Sims’ non-linear solver9 is employed to solve the resultant
system of residual equations. It evaluates them at each collocation node to obtain
the coefficients for each policy function. For a function evaluated on n points, we
can obtain a polynomial of order n − 1 that will fit its value at those n points
with accuracy, that is why we are able to generate those coefficients. Gauss-
Hermite quadrature nodes (of order 12) are used to form conditional expectations
of the functions at time t + 1, whereas any partial derivatives are calculated
by first-differencing the Chebyshev’s polynomials, and the polynomial matrix is
simultaneously updated. By repeatedly iterating on the set of coefficients until
they reach a convergence level of 10−8, the procedure can narrow down on the
coefficients. As per Judd (1998) any convergence smaller than 10−5 is acceptable.
The solution has high convergence at off the grid points. Sims’ non-linear solver
is employed to check off-the-grid convergence at equally spaced 21 points on each
grid.
The size of errors off-grid points is of the order 10−7. The maximum errors at
off-grid points is smaller than 1.4 x10−6. The mean of errors is below 1.1 x10−7.
The standard deviation of Euler errors is smaller than 2.2 x10−7 and the median
of errors is less than 1.1 x10−8. Considering that this procedure was performed on
a wide grid of internal state variable as the selection of grid for the internal state
variable Xt−1 captures more than 99.99% of the values that it can take after a
million simulations, the convergence obtained through this procedure has a highly
acceptable level of accuracy.
9Source page url: http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize/
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2.4 Quantitative analysis
The model is calibrated to have reasonable asset pricing properties and to match
observed level and volatility of key macroeconomic data in the US for 1986-2006.
This section briefly discusses the parametrization strategy and the stochastic
steady state of the model, which is followed by an assessment of the model in
response to productivity and cost shocks. The model is then used to make a
comparison of optimal policy responses during various states of the economy.
2.4.1 Calibration
The ‘benchmark’ model calibration strategy (See Table 2.3) follows from De Paoli
and Zabczyk (2013). As a standard calibration, one-period discount rate is set as
β = 0.99 to generate near ∼ 4% p.a. steady-state risk-free real interest rate. The
calibration of EIS in dynamic macro-economic models is close to 1, but micro
evidence relates it closer to zero. An average consumer is different from an average
stockholder (Guvenen, 2006) the varying estimates of EIS can be reconciled by
heterogeneity in these two classes of representative agents. A middle ground can
be chosen by using the fact that near 20 per cent of US consumers own 80 per cent
of its assets, but constitute for only 30 per cent participation in consumption. A
simple average between EIS of 0.1 for non-stock owners and 1.0 for stock owners
results in an EIS of approx 0.40. Therefore, the benchmark choice of the inverse of
EIS is ρ = 2.37 in this chapter. This calibration is slightly higher than Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) but in line with De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013).
Habit persistence parameter φ, is set at high levels of 0.97 similar to De
Paoli and Zabczyk (2013). Another comparable reference for habit persistence
parameter can be found in sensitivity function λ(.) from the seminal paper on
habits (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and that sensitivity function too refers to a
high estimate of habit persistence. The slow-moving habit specification (1−φ) and
high limit of habit persistence φ agrees with the notion that consumption habits
once formed are difficult to cut-back. Due to the specification of habit formation
(in eq. (2.2)), the parameter φ and its free counterpart (1− φ) determine which
of the two, current consumption or past habits respectively, is more significant
for agents’ habits.
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Table 2.3: Parameters for the Benchmark habits model
Parameters Symbol Value References
Inverse of EIS ρ 2.37 De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013) &
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
Discount factor β 0.99 Leith and Liu (2016)
Inverse of Frisch Elasticity η 6 De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
Habits persistence φ 0.97 De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013) &
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
Rotemberg Cost ψ 30 Leith and Liu (2016)
CES σ 7.5 Leith and Liu (2016) &
De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
Habits size h 0.85 De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
Internal habits proportion ω 0.75 Chen and Ludvigson (2009)
Revenue tax τp 0.35 US corporate tax rate
Persistence of prod. shock γy 0.95 Smets and Wouters (2007)
Stdev. of prod. shock σy 0.095 De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
Persistence of cost shock γτ 0.95 Smets and Wouters (2007)
Volatility of shocks σ2y/σ2τ 2.5 De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
Parameter ω describes the proportion of habits that are internal to agents.
Chen and Ludvigson (2009) empirically find that internal habits fit the observa-
tions in consumption data better than external ones. A choice of ω (=0.75) closer
to 1, in the benchmark model, also reduces the size of the competitive economy
and generates a low positive rate of inflation similar to what we observe in data.
The level of Surplus consumption or consumption in excess of subsistence
habits C − hX is determined by habit size parameter h. In deterministic steady
state the Surplus ratio S = C−hX
C
is solely determined by the habit size parameter
h, as S = 1 − h. By calibrating h at 0.85 the model ensures that subsistence
habits are sufficiently close to the agent’s total consumption and she would be
extremely uncomfortable with a 10-15% drop in current consumption. To put it
in perspective, consider that during the Great Recession, the biggest quarterly
drop in US per capita GDP was near 11% p.a. De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013)
recommends a high habit size parameter because risk aversion alone is insufficient
to generate precautionary savings. Customers must feel a sustainable drop in their
standard of living for them to save for precautionary reasons. Persistent shocks
and a high h parameter suits their model in which they obtain the precautionary
behaviour through higher-order approximation of the consumption Euler equation.
In the benchmark model Tax rate τp is kept at the prevailing (state + federal)
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corporate tax rate in the US of 35%. For the period in consideration 1985-2006,
Tax receipts or tax revenue to GDP ratio in the US is near 26-28%, while the share
of total Expenditure to GDP is near 35%. The latter is chosen for calibration as
there are no borrowings from the government to fund expenditure in the model.
Rotemberg adjustment cost (ψ) is set to 30 which accounts for 8-10 months
of price rigidity, depending on other parameters of the model and is within an
acceptable range of Leith and Liu (2016) whereas, the elasticity of substitution
parameter σ at 7.5 resulting in ∼ 15% of markup is in line with its standard
estimate used in literature. For exogenous shocks of technology and taxes the
persistence parameters γy, γτ are both set to be 0.95. Auto-regressive parameter
value of 0.95 for technology γy is towards the higher end of Smets and Wouters
(2007) and the choice of 0.95 for γτ is in line with Leith and Liu (2016). The
standard deviation of exogenous shock σy = 0.095 and its ratio with the στ are
calibrated to match the observed level of volatility (∼ 0.34%) in quarterly log
Non-Durables and Services Consumption growth in US data from 1985-2006. The
beginning date of that period is chosen to avoid changes in US monetary policy
regime during pre and post-Volcker era, and the Great moderation, while the
end date avoids the excess volatility and ZLB period since the onset of the Great
Recession. A parametrization which replicates observed behaviour in data and
generates equity premium of ∼ 6% without resulting in a risk-free rate puzzle, or
in other words, parameters which capture the observed risk-dynamics accurately
should sufficiently help the model account for policy outcome during fluctuations
in risk-premium and precautionary savings.
2.4.2 Stochastic steady state
The stochastic steady state, also known as the Risky Steady State [See Coeur-
dacier, Rey, and Winant (2011)], is the point where given that the current real-
ization of shocks is zero, the agents choose to stay if they expect future shocks.
For a decision rule for policy variable P such that Pt = f(Xt−1, ξt; ξt+1) where
X is endogenous state (habits), ξt the exogenous shock states of productivity
and taxes, and ξt+1 is the conditional expectional of next period exogenous state
variables. The risky steady state is then defined as a steady state value of P
denoted as P such that, P = f(P ; 0). The stochastic steady state results in
Table 2.4 on page 141 highlight the role of uncertainty in both consumption and
production decisions. Parameterization for volatility of technology (σy) and tax
(στ ) states (in Table 2.3 on page 139) was selected so that the log-consumption
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Table 2.4: Stochastic Steady State Results
Benchmark Internal External U.S. Data
ω = 0.75 ω = 0.99 ω = 0.01 1985-2006
Stochastic Steady State
Consumption 1.47 1.40 1.60 -
Output 1.47 1.40 1.60 -
Inflation (%p.a.) 1.12 2.58 -3.86 2.50
Habits 1.47 1.40 1.60 -
Real Income Multiplier 18.0 13.7 29.5 -
Nominal Rate (%p.a.) 2.18 3.36 -2.54 4.71
Real Rate (%p.a.) 0.96 0.68 1.29 2.21
Exp. Equity Return (%p.a.) 7.23 7.61 6.14 7.62
Equity Index 12.7 12.0 13.73 -
Dividends 0.128 0.121 0.138 -
Simulated Volatility %p.a.
σ∆c 0.74 0.58 0.51 0.67∗, 1.16∗∗
σ∆y 0.72 0.56 0.58 1.01
σrn 3.7 4.0 2.0 0.96
σrr 3.2 3.3 1.4 0.81
σlog(E[Req ]) 4.7 4.9 2.1 14.4
σπ 0.89 1.50 1.19 0.57
Sharpe Ratio ann. 1.32 1.40 1.12 0.41
Source: Data column reports Annualised data from qtrly series of US FRED
database for period Q1:1985 to Q4:2006: Consumption c is *Non-Durables and
Services per capita and **Non-Durables per capita; Output y is Real per Capita GDP,
rn is 3m T-bill rate. Robert Shiller’s database is used for Real S&P Index and π which
is Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) excl. Food and Energy.
Notes: The annualized standard deviation σ of key variables in subscript results from
simulating the model for 100,000 periods and calculating the variance from its Risky
Steady State. ∆z represents the log difference in variable Z, whereas z represents the
logarithm of variable Z.
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growth from the benchmark model would be similar to the observations in US
data. As expected, the stochastic steady state for Consumption, Output and
Habits is similar for all models (Top section in Table 2.4). Due to the inefficiency
wedge (Proposition 2.2.3) there is small positive inflation is steady-state for the
benchmark calibration. For a low value of EIS (ρ−1) the benchmark calibration
can generate a high equity risk premium without any significant increase in the
level of the risk-free rate, and thus avoids both the equity premium puzzle and
the risk-free rate puzzle.
The stochastic volatility of various variables is reported in the middle section of
Table 2.4. The simulated stochastic volatility of both consumption and output is
in range with the observations of data. As stated previously, the parameterization
of the ratio of the variance of exogenous shock variables, σ2y/σ2τ is chosen so that
the model can match the stochastic volatility of consumption found in US data.
Although these parameters were not selected to model the volatility in inflation, yet
the benchmark model is also able to approximate the observed inflation volatility
of the US data closely. This non-zero inflation volatility from the model stands
in contrast to inflation stabilization recommendations of standard optimal policy
results. The model generates slightly bigger than observed inflation volatility
and slightly smaller than observed volatility in output. This volatility trade-off
between output and inflation in the stochastic results reflects that optimal policy
in the model favours a higher stabilization in output during costly recessions.
Although the expected equity return from the simulated results matches the data
yet the ratio of excess returns (i..e above the risk-free rate) from the stock index
to the volatility of stock returns, also known as the Sharpe ratio, is higher for the
model in comparison with US data. It could be explained by the excess volatility
of stock returns that is prevalent in data but missing from the model due to lack
of heterogeneity in risky investments. It could also be the reason for a similar
level of volatility in risk-free and risky investments in the model.
2.4.3 Impact of Productivity shocks
The composition of Habits in the benchmark model is mostly internal (as the
parameter ω = 0.75). Standard analyses show that nominal rigidities, if habits
are entirely internal, do not pose a concern to the policymaker in the presence
of productivity shock as the efficient allocation can always be replicated [See
Amato and Laubach (2004) and Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012)]. Therefore
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given that the size of habits externalities is relatively small in the benchmark
calibration, we should expect ‘Divine coincidence’ to hold10, i.e. in response to
productivity disturbance, the change in policy rates should be able to stabilise
inflation immediately and which coincides with output stabilisation.
The impulse responses to productivity shocks for the benchmark model are
presented in Figure 2.2 on page 144. Each policy variable is a function of three
states, viz. past habits (Xt−1), technology (εy,t) and revenue taxes (τp,t). The
impulse responses in Figure 2.2 consider habits to be at its steady-state in the
beginning of the period when shocks hit the economy and all the responses are
conditioned on the tax state being at its steady-state level of 35%. In response
to a +1% quarterly increase in firms’ productivity, the central banker lowers real
rates by more than 1% per annum. The cut in real rates is essential to stimulate
demand otherwise firms would have to bear adjustment costs (due to nominal
rigidity) to lower prices in order to sell the additional output generated from the
increase in productivity. The resulting drop in inflation after the rate cut by
the central banker is small (approx 0.1% p.a.) but it is not transitory. Inflation
stays low for more than 20 quarters after the shock. The optimal discretionary
policy does not immediately remove inflation deviations, and there appears to be
a trade-off between output and inflation stabilisation.
The responses in Consumption and Output to the productivity shock are
immediate and continue for long periods after the shock. This is unsurprising if
we consider that a policymaker whose objective is to maximise household’s utility
would focus attention not on agent’s consumption but instead on her Surplus
consumption, i.e. consumption in excess of subsistence level of habits (Ct − hXt).
Habits are slow-moving which can be confirmed by the hump in habits chart in
Figure 2.2. Therefore an immediate increase in Consumption raises the Surplus
ratio (St). The optimal policy seeks to stabilise this ratio by reducing the increase
in consumption which can be achieved by normalising real rates to their pre-shock
levels as the impact of the positive productivity shock begins to fade. In selecting
the real rate path, the policymaker also acknowledges the humped increase of
habits due to the initial rise in consumption; therefore, she can opt for a faster
normalisation. As a result Real rate, Inflation and Surplus ratio revert to the
pre-shock state faster than Output or Consumption.
Additional impulses responses in Figure 2.3 on page 145 show that a positive
productivity shock is beneficial for the firms as they employ less units of labour
10See Blanchard and Gali (2007) for ‘Divine coincidence’.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses to Productivity Shocks I


































Notes: Impulse responses to +1% quarterly increase in Productivity. Inflation, Real
rate and Equity premium (Equity pr.) are captured in % p.a., while all others are
in their standard representation. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state in the shock
period and all the responses are conditional on assuming no change in Tax rate for
the entire horizon. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters). Impulse responses for the
remaining variables are posted in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses to Productivity Shocks II
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Notes: Impulse responses to +1% quarterly increase in Productivity. Nominal
rate and Expected Return on Equity (E[Eq. Ret.]) and TFP are captured in %
p.a., while all others are in their standard representation. M.U. is marginal utility
of Consumption (C) and Labour (L). Policy functions depend on three states viz.
Habits, Productivity and Taxes. Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state in the
shock period and the responses are conditional on assuming no change in Tax rate for
the entire horizon. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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(first row in fig. 2.3). Although there is an increase in real wages as households’
productivity increase, which also relaxes the Real multiplier on households lifetime
income (λrt ), yet the net effect of higher wages and lower workforce is to reduce the
marginal cost for firms. Marginal cost is an inverse of the markup, which is plotted
in the second row in fig. 2.3. Fall in marginal cost improves firms’ profitability
and the expected dividend stream (second row in fig. 2.3). This further leads to
an increase in the Equity index, which is a function of the discounted value of
firms’ future dividends. Household investors become more risk-taking and accept
a lower expected rate of returns from equity investments, which is denoted in
fig. 2.3 as E[Eq. Ret.]. Despite that the equity premium slightly increases, because
the real rate cut by the policymaker to clear markets from an increase in supply
leads to drop in real rates which more than compensates for the drop in equity
premium from high productivity. With interest rates being cut and staying low
for a longer period, the optimal policy also results in maintaining a stable equity
premium. The marginal utility is inversely related to Surplus consumption; it is
decreasing when households are consuming in excess of the steady-state Surplus
ratio (15%). Another way in which agents optimize their utility in response to
a positive technology shock is by increasing their leisure, or by reducing their
labour supply.
2.4.3.1 Productivity shocks in different habits externalities
Figure 2.4 on page 149 and Figure 2.5 on 150 compare the impulse responses of
benchmark model in fig. 2.2 - 2.3 to varying degrees of habits externalities. The
benchmark calibration of ω = 0.75 is compared with the other extremes of habits
calibration, namely Internal habits (ω = 1.0) and External11 habits (ω = 0.0).
The impulse responses in fig. 2.4 - 2.5 are reported in their percent deviation from
their pre-shock steady state.
Similar to the previous exercise, all policy variables in fig. 2.4 - 2.5 consider
habits to be at their respective steady-state at the beginning of the period when
shocks hit the economy, and all the responses are conditional on the tax state
being at its steady-state rate of 35%. The general feature of most of the impulse
responses are similar, but the size of the impact of the productivity shock to
output is bigger when habits are external. Habits continue with the slow-moving
11Calibrating ω = 0 and ω = 1 changes nature of households utility maximisation as the
habits constraint (2.2) reaches its corners. To keep the results comparable External habits
model is calibrated at ω = 0.01. and internal habits at ω = 0.99.
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humped response and Surplus Ratio stabilises faster than output or interest rates.
Markup is the inverse of marginal cost, and it is increasing in equilibrium output.
The responses of inflation are different, and for internal habits model, the optimal
policy can contain inflation deviations [See inflation chart in Figure 2.4].
Monetary policy has real effects. Figure 2.4 shows that in the presence of
habits externalities and with only one policy instrument interest rates at hand,
the policymaker cannot ensure that efficient allocation is replicated without in-
flationary repercussions. The inflation chart in Figure 2.4 shows that with an
increase in habits externalities the trade-off between inflation and Surplus ratio
stabilisation worsens. The real rate cut required in response to a 1% quarterly
increase in productivity is increasing in size of habits externalities. The more
households become unaware of the impact of their consumption on aggregate
habits, the more they increase their consumption when productivity increases.
This observation differs from the existing optimal policy literature [See Amato
and Laubach (2004), Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012), De Paoli and Zabczyk
(2013)] which recommends a smaller rate cut for the Ramsey planner as the size
of habits externalities increases. After a positive productivity shock, Ramsey
Optimal policy in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013) favours a smaller rate cut when
habit externalities are large and persistent. The size of a rate cut during external
habits for Optimal discretionary policy is larger than Optimal commitment policy
in Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012). However, in their model no comparison
has been made between the discretionary policy results for internal and external
habits. The central banker in these models curbs the temptation to lower interest
rates following a rise in productivity since an increase in current consumption
would lower the household’s lifetime utility due to the externalities of habits. The
model in this chapter which features costly recessions has similar properties to pre-
viously cited habits related literature and the deterioration of household’s lifetime
utility should worsen for an increase in consumption when habits externalities
increase.
We must, therefore understand the anomaly that Optimal policy responses in
Figure 2.4 poses. When agents are not aware of the impact of increasing current
period consumption on future aggregate habits and therefore lower surplus ratio
in future then why does the central banker persist with a high rate cut than she
would if habits were internal? Or why doesn’t she respond with a ‘lean against
the wind’ smaller rate cut when habits are external and by doing so reduce the
increase in output and habits, despite the high cost of not doing so to household’s
welfare? We will look to answer the next section, but before that, we also need
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to discuss the optimal policy responses to cost shocks.
2.4.4 Impact of Cost shocks
In standard NK models cost shocks offer a trade-off between output and inflation
by generating a time-varying gap between the efficient and the flexible prices
output, a gap that is not generated by demand/productivity shocks, and this
gap creates a trade-off for monetary policy. The prevailing tax rate directly
impacts the wedge between the competitive and efficient (Social Planner) output,
as discussed in Proposition 2.2.3. Therefore the cost shock, which is administered
by changes in the prevailing revenue taxes rate12, also impacts the inefficiency
wedge. In standard NK analyses, optimal policy in the presence of persistent
cost shocks has higher volatility in inflation (Galí, 2015) as the policymaker
with only one policy instrument cannot simultaneously attain zero inflation and
efficient output allocation. Addressing inflationary cost shocks with an increase
in real rates to lower inflation, also worsens the negative output gap when the
steady-state competitive output is inefficient as it is so in our benchmark model.
Therefore the policymaker has to mitigate the interest rate response in the face
of this output-inflation trade-off.
Figure 2.6 on page 151 presents the impulse responses for key variables to cost
shocks for the benchmark model. Additional impulse responses to cost shocks
are presented in Figure 2.7 on page 152. As stated earlier, each policy variable
is a function of three states of past habits (Xt−1), productivity (εy,t) and revenue
taxes (τp,t). These impulse responses in fig. 2.6 and fig. 2.7 consider habits to be at
its steady-state at the beginning of the period the shock hits the economy and all
responses are conditioned on productivity state being constant at its steady-state
level of 0% growth.
In response to a +1% quarterly increase in the revenue tax rate, the central
banker raises the real rates by 0.3% per annum approximately. The hike in
interest rates is essential to reduce demand following the cost shock; otherwise,
firms would have to bear adjustment costs (due to nominal rigidity) to raise their
prices. Demand falls due to the increase in the interest rate, both consumption
and output follow suit. Households’ habits reduce slowly, and therefore we observe
a steep fall in the Surplus Ratio. As stated earlier, the objective of the policy is
12Refer the AR(1) Equation (2.42) for revenue taxes
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Figure 2.4: Productivity Shocks and Habits Externalities I




































Notes: Impact of Productivity Shocks in models of various Habits Externalities.
Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1% quarterly
productivity shock. For Surplus ratio the deviations are in basis points (0.01% =
1 bps), while for all others they are in %. Policy functions depend on three states
viz. Habits, Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditional on assuming
no change in tax rate for the entire horizon. The various models are defined as:
Benchmark habits - when Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external.
Internal habits - when Habits are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External
habits - when Habits are 1% internal (ω = 0.01) and 99% external. X-axis: time
horizon (in quarters). Impulse responses for the remaining variables are posted in
Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Productivity Shocks and Habits Externalities II



















































Notes: Impact of Productivity Shocks in models of various Habits Externalities.
Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1% quarterly
productivity shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity
and Taxes. All the responses are conditional on assuming no change in tax rate for
the entire horizon. The various models are defined as: Benchmark habits - when
Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal habits - when Habits
are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External habits - when Habits are 1%
internal (ω = 0.01) and 99% external. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to Cost Shocks I





































Notes: Impulse responses to +1% quarterly shock to the Tax rate. Inflation, Real
rate and Equity premium (Equity pr.) are captured in % p.a., while all others are
in their standard representation. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state in the shock
period and the responses are conditioned by assuming no change in Productivity
(TFP) for the entire horizon. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters). Impulse responses
for the remaining variables are posted in Figure 2.7.
to stabilize the Surplus ratio, and policymaker could achieve that by reducing the
interest rates once the impact of cost shock subsides.
From charts related to the firm’s operating environment (in Figure 2.7 on page
152), we notice that the cost shock increase firm’s operating expenses and lower its
profits/dividends. Firms employ less labour as their supply curve shifts to the left.
After being hit by a cost shock firms produce at less than the profit-maximizing
level of output and want to raise their markup in order to raise profitability. The
net impact of higher markup, high costs, and low demand is a fall in a firm’s
profits, and future expected dividend stream (profitability). Lower profitability
of firms reduces the dividend income for households, and the equity index falls.
Lower production by firms widens the wedge between the efficient and compet-
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to Cost Shocks II
































































Notes: Impulse responses to +1% quarterly shock to the Tax rate. Nominal rate and
Expected Return on Equity (E[Eq. Ret.]) and TFP are captured in % p.a., while all
others are in their standard representation. M.U. is marginal utility of Consumption
(C) and Labour (L). Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity
and Taxes. Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state in the shock period and the
responses are conditioned by assuming no change in Productivity (TFP) for the entire
horizon. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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itive output. Figure 2.6 on page 151 confirms this by showing that an increase in
real rates (borrowing costs) by the central banker can reduce the spike in inflation.
However it also leads to a drop in consumer demand and worsens the gap between
efficient and competitive output.
Because if the steady-state output is inefficiently low, then interest rate hike
by the central banker would lower output further and worsen the inefficiency.
However, by responding with a lower rate hike (see rates and inflation charts in
fig. 2.6) and letting the inflation to rise the optimal policy acknowledges the pres-
ence of a trade-off between output and inflation and favours output stabilization.
The drop in consumption has a gradual impact on reducing habits. Therefore
the Surplus ratio also recovers gradually and reverts to its pre-shock levels in
60 quarters. Due to a rise in their borrowing costs and a drop in Surplus ratio,
the household’s marginal utility from an additional unit of consumption is high.
As a result, households become more risk-averse, they demand extra returns for
investing in risky assets, and that increases the Equity premium. The increase in
risk-free real rates mitigates the impact of higher expected returns from equity
investments on the Equity risk premium.
The policymaker faces a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization
and seems to choose an interest rate path that seeks to normalize Surplus ratio.
By raising the real rates, the policymaker is also able to curb any runway increase
in Equity premium.
2.4.4.1 Cost shocks in different habits externalities
The trade-off between inflation and Surplus consumption exists for all levels
of habits externalities (See Figure 2.8 - 2.9 on page 155 - 156). However, the
trade-off expectedly worsens in the size of externalities. Cost shocks result in a
smaller decrease in consumption and habits when the size of internal habits is
larger; in comparison, the reduction in both consumption and habits is bigger
when the habits are external. This is because as households become aware of the
impact of their consumption on aggregate habits so they begin to complement
the efforts of the policymaker in leading the Surplus ratio back to its steady-state
level. Contrary to standard optimal policy recommendation of divine coincidence,
we observe that as the size of habits externalities reduces there is an increased
tolerance in optimal policy for inflation volatility. In Figure 2.8 the policymaker
responds with similar size of a rate hike in response to a +1% change in the tax
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rate for various habits (externalities) models. However, it can achieve the best
output-inflation trade-off when habits are fully internal.
This abnormality begs the question as to why does the policymaker not respond
with a smaller rate hike in case of external habits and control the drop in output
and habits when the households are not aware of these externalities? Or its
complementary question as to why does the policymaker not choose a lower
interest rate hike when habits are internal to agents and thus accept a more
considerable drop in output that she would if habits were external? Plausible
explanations are sought in the following section.
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Figure 2.8: Cost Shocks and Habits Externalities I


































Notes: Impact of Cost Shocks in models of various Habits Externalities. Annualised
deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1% quarterly Tax rate
shock. For Surplus ratio the deviations are in basis points (0.01% = 1 bps), while
for all others they are in % p.a. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditional on assuming no change in
Productivity for the entire horizon. The various models are defined as: Benchmark
habits - when Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal habits
- when Habits are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External habits - when
Habits are 1% internal (ω = 0.01) and 99% external. X-axis: time horizon (in
quarters). Impulse responses for the remaining variables are posted in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: Cost Shocks and Habits Externalities II

















































Notes: Impact of Cost Shocks in models of various Habits Externalities. Annualised
deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1% quarterly Tax rate
shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity and Taxes.
All the responses are conditional on assuming no change in Productivity for the entire
horizon. The various models are defined as: Benchmark habits - when Habits are
75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal habits - when Habits are 99%
internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External habits - when Habits are 1% internal
(ω = 0.01) and 99% external. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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2.5 Discussion
The answer to the atypical findings in analysis of productivity and cost shocks can
be found in the steady-state inflationary bias of the economy and the precautionary
behaviour of its household when contractions are costly.
2.5.1 The Inflationary bias
The presence of distortions via nominal rigidity, monopolistic competition and
taxes make the steady-state output in our benchmark calibration (refer Table 2.4
on page 141, benchmark column) inefficient, as it is lower than Social planner’s
output. As stated in Proposition 2.2.3, even the flexible price output is inefficient
due to persistent wedge in the economy generated by monopolistic competition
and taxes. The benchmark calibration does not have any significant externalities
from habits (1 − ω = 0.25). So there is negligible counter-impact of habits’
externalities in raising the competitive economy output (Leith, Moldovan, and
Rossi, 2012) to negate the inefficiencies from monopolistic competition and taxes.
Since the competitive output is smaller than efficient output the discretionary
policymaker has temptation to inflate the economy which results in the classical
inflationary bias problem [Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) Leith and Liu (2016)
and Galí (2015)]. In the benchmark calibration, we see that the steady-state
inflationary bias is 1.12%, and it is increasing in the size of internal habits ω
(See Table 2.4). Figure 2.10 on page 158 shows the Optimal policy response
of Inflation as a function of its state variables. As there are 3 states (Habits,
Productivity, Tax rate) so we can only see the 3-dimensional policy surface charts
in two states at a time, and conditional on a particular realization of the third
state. The inflationary bias in the benchmark model is non-linear. Figure 2.10
also shows that positive productivity shocks reduce inflationary bias (left chart)
and the volatility of inflation increases when tax rates (right chart) increase. The
gap between various surfaces shows that inflation is more volatile over changes
in tax rates than it is over changes in productivity growth. As shown in the
right-hand chart of fig. 2.10, the increase in tax rates has an overwhelming effect
on the inflationary bias irrespective of the level of habits or productivity state.
The inflationary bias reduces when there is high productivity and low rate of



















Figure 2.10: Inflationary bias in Benchmark habits model
Note: Optimal response of Inflation in the Benchmark habits model. Optimal policy of Inflation is a function three states, viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. The surface plots demonstrate the conditional optimal policy when either the Tax state (in left chart) or the
Productivity state (in right chart) is constant at Steady state, High or Low level. Steady state Tax rate is 35%, High Tax rate is 48.4%,
Low Tax rate is 18.1%. Steady state rate of productivity growth is 0%, High productivity is +5.3% and low productivity is -5.0%.
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Leith and Liu (2016) note that the inherent non-linearities in the NKPC result
in an inflationary bias. This bias increases non-linearly in the size of monopolistic
distortion for Rotemberg price models. It is due to firms raising their markup when
the firms’ monopolistic power increases. Whereas, the inflationary bias problem in
Leith and Liu (2016) reduces when nominal inertia increases as firms also discount
their future adjustments costs and delay raising markup in the presence of existing
inflation. But the inflationary bias in our model can adjust without any increase
in the firm’s monopolistic power or changes in nominal inertia. It is because
the benchmark economy in our model has an inflationary bias. The presence
of habits externalities, monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities and revenue
taxes reduce equilibrium output. An increase in taxes reduces the competitive
output further, thus increasing the wedge and strengthening the central banker’s
motive to increase output by inflating the economy.









(π − 1) π(1− β)
]−1
(2.90)
a function of monopolistic competition, nominal rigidity, taxes and the prevailing
average rate of inflation. It is increasing in taxes τp (or cost), but the interpretation
is not straight forward. It can be easily seen that ∂ϕ−1
∂τp
> 0, it is also highly non-
linear and relies on the average inflation rate in the economy. This representation
of the firm’s average markup can explain the impact of cost shocks on the price
level and the resulting drop in demand and output. The action taken by firms in
raising their markup to overcome the shock also pushes the central banker to be
gentle with the interest rate hike and to avoid further reducing the equilibrium
output.
The steady-state inflationary bias reduces as habits externalities increase. The
size of externalities in External habits model makes the equilibrium output bigger
than the efficient. Therefore, there is a deflationary bias, as shown in Figure 2.11
on page 161. The deflationary bias worsens in the External habits model when
there are high productivity or low taxes.
Whereas, the Inflationary bias, as shown by the internal habits model, plotted
in Figure 2.12 on page 162, increases as taxes or productivity increase.
A comparison between the Inflationary bias charts of the Benchmark model
(fig. 2.10) and the Internal habits model (fig. 2.12) shows a contrasting optimal
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policy for inflation when habits are high, and productivity is high. In the internal
habits model, we notice that optimal policy response in a positive productivity
state is to create more inflation (left chart fig. 2.12) rather than reducing the
inflationary bias by raising output as it does in the benchmark economy (left-hand
chart Figure 2.10). Therefore the optimal response to positive productivity shocks,
when agents can fully internalize their habits, restricts any increase in output by
not lowering rates as the policymaker would do if the habits were less than fully
internalized by agents (for.e.g in the benchmark model).
In order to understand these subtle changes in optimal policy and the inflation-
ary bias, we need to look at another representation of the firm’s average markup








Figure 2.11: Inflationary bias in External habits model
Note: Optimal response of Inflation in the External habits model. Optimal policy of Inflation is a function three states, viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. The surface plots demonstrate the conditional optimal policy when either the Tax state (in left chart) or the
Productivity state (in right chart) is constant at Steady state, High or Low level. Steady state Tax rate is 35%, High Tax rate is 48.4%,



















Figure 2.12: Inflationary bias in Internal habits model
Note: Optimal response of Inflation in the Internal habits model. Optimal policy of Inflation is a function three states, viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. The surface plots demonstrate the conditional optimal policy when either the Tax state (in left chart) or the
Productivity state (in right chart) is constant at Steady state, High or Low level. Steady state Tax rate is 35%, High Tax rate is 48.4%,
Low Tax rate is 18.1%. Steady state rate of productivity growth is 0%, High productivity is +5.3% and low productivity is -5.0%.
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2.5.2 The Inefficiency wedge and Markup
The competitive economy equilibrium has a steady-state inflationary (or dis-
inflationary) bias, if taxes (τp) are not efficient and create a distortion in the
competitive output (Y ) by making it either smaller (or bigger) than the Social
planner’s efficient output allocation (Y ∗). Proposition 2.2.3 discusses the presence
of a permanent wedge due to monopolistic competition which makes even the















where OR is the Rotemberg pricing wedge
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. For fully internal
(ω = 1) habits, the wedge is reduced13 to
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if habits are fully external the wedge increases as


















then by definition in the
flexible price equilibrium the Rotemberg pricing wedge should dissolve and we see
Oω = 0. (2.94)
The size of the wedge Oω changes when the competitive output changes vis-à-vis
the efficient allocation output. A change in the size of the wedge also represents
a shift in the output gap and inflationary bias. Firms account for this wedge in
their decision making through the average markup relation which can now be
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, (2.96)
13Note that k = h (1−φ)1−βφ and for the chosen calibration of h, β, φ all < 1 we get 0 < k < 1.
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as by construction the average inflationary bias should cease to exist in the
flexible price efficient economy (1− Oω = OR = 1). It shows the firms markup in
a flexible price economy with efficient taxes is determined by the size of habits,
habits persistence, and the proportion of internal habits (ω). The average markup
for the efficient economy is increasing in the proportion of internal habits. It is
not difficult to see that the firms’ market power14 increases if households become
more aware of their consumption habits.
The transition dynamics of firms’ average markup in an inefficient economy
depend on the initial condition of the wedge, inflationary bias and internal habits.
In response to these variables, the behaviour of average markup is not unambigu-
ous. A negative output gap (Oω < 1) in steady-state implies that competitive
output is smaller than efficient output. And there is inflationary bias. So with
an increase in the size of internal habits, the competitive economy output is get-
ting smaller, and the inflation bias is getting larger. Ceteris paribus the optimal
response by firms should be to reduce markup. Whereas if the initial condition
was different and the competitive economy had a deflationary bias (Oω > 1) then
firms’ optimal response would be to increase the markup when households habits
become more internal.
The response of firms and their markup can then be worked out through the
following analogy. If the existing output gap between competitive and efficient
output is negative, then it widens as firms charge a higher markup. On the other
hand, if the gap is positive, then it narrows down due to higher markup. Since
the inflationary bias [See fig. 2.10 to 2.12] is non-linear and state dependent, the
output gap must be non-linear and state dependent. Therefore firms’ optimal
responses are non-linear and dependent on various states of the economy, on the
prevailing inflationary bias and the output gap during those states. However,
that is not all. The firms’ optimal policy is also impacted by the demand side
behaviour, determining that is not straightforward either. The presence of costly
recessions also makes consumption behaviour non-linear and state-dependent. A
complete picture cannot emerge without considering the behaviour of the output
gap during various states of the economy.
14Leith, Moldovan and Rossi (2012) show a similar feature with deep habits.
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2.5.3 Gap variables of the model
The welfare relevant output gap15 of the model, can be obtained from the difference
between the competitive economy output and the social planner’s allocation (first
best). We begin by considering the responses of gap variables for various models
to +1% shock to productivity conditional on different initial states of habits
and conditional on no changes in the tax state from its steady-state level (of
35%). Here we take a moment to recall that Surplus Consumption, is C above
subsistence Habits (hX) and that Consumption equals Habits in steady-state.
Based on this we defined Normal (economic) times as when the Surplus ratio is
equal to 1 − h, Expansion when the Surplus ratio is more than the 1 − h and
Contraction is when households surplus is less than 1− h. In the Normal state,
habits are at their steady-state when a shock hits the economy. In Contraction
state, habits are +2 s.d. above their steady-state, so the surplus ratio is lower
than its level in the normal state (= 1 − h). In Expansion state, habits are −2
s.d. below their steady-state, while the surplus ratio is > 1− h.
Figure 2.13 on page 168 presents the response of gap variables for the bench-
mark model. It shows that the output gap is close to −2.5% and improves (i.e.
becomes smaller) when positive productivity shock hits the economy. Presence
of inherent inflationary bias in the benchmark model leads to a bigger increase in
output after being hit by a productivity shock than the increase in output for the
social planner. This results in the shrinking of the output gap. The Consumption
gap and Labour gap also reduce due to this increase in the level of production.
The habits gap follows its expected slow-moving trend. In the long term, there is
an improvement in gap variables as over 100 quarterly periods later they return
to their pre-shock Normal state values.
In the normal state by construction, there is no gap in the Surplus ratio. After
being hit by a productivity shock, the Surplus ratio in normal state stabilises in
less than 20 quarters. This is because the objective of the optimal policy after
the positive productivity shock is to stabilise the Surplus ratio by lowering rates
initially (Refer impulse responses in fig. 2.2 on page 144) and normalising them
to curtail any runaway increases of habits.
On the consumer side of the economy, if there is an existing negative output
15Throughout the chapter, the term Gap refers to the difference between results of the
respective model and its Social planner outcome. A negative gap shows that the allocation of a
variable in the model is less than Social planner’s allocation.
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gap when there is a positive inflationary bias, the optimal policy response to
positive productivity shocks is to reduce that gap or surplus ratio by using the
policy instrument of interest rates.
In comparison for the External habits models after a +1% productivity shock,
as shown in Figure 2.14 on page 169, there is an increase in the output gap, which
is already very high at +5.5% in the normal state. As the underlying competitive
economy has habits externalities and households are not aware of the impact
of their consumption on external habits, after a productivity shock, there is a
jump in consumption and output that further widens this gap. The increase in
the gap is also bigger in comparison to the Benchmark model (fig. 2.13). In the
Benchmark model, when households can control a high proportion of (ω = 0.75)
of their habit formation, they exhibit precaution in increasing consumption in
response to positive productivity shocks. But consumption in the steady-state
of the External habits model is very high. Therefore Optimal policy needs to
respond to positive productivity shocks with a smaller rate cut as a result of
which the firms bear price adjustment costs and cut prices to clear their excess
produce, and there is a deflationary bias.
We have already seen from the impulse response comparisons in various habits
externalities from fig. 2.4 that the rate cut implemented after a positive produc-
tivity shock is most effective in stabilising output and inflation when habits are
internal. The deviation in inflation from its pre-shock level returns to zero, and
there is very little change in Surplus ratio. The gap variables charts once again
confirm all these features of the Internal habits model in Figure 2.15 on page 170.
There is less than efficient output in the Internal habits model as the output gap
with respect to the efficient output is −6.9% in the normal state. However, there
is very little difference in the output gap between Expansion and Contraction
states. As mentioned earlier, these are the states when the habits are −/+ 2 s.d.
their Stochastic steady-state level.
There is a clear indication that if households are aware of their habits, then
they run a very tight hold over their surplus consumption and their marginal
utility. The Surplus ratio after the productivity shock is less than 0.01 bps16
for internal habits, while the spread in the Surplus ratio between Expansion and
Contraction states is below 0.02 bps, the least in comparison to Benchmark and
External habits model.
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This also indicates that households actions and precautionary motives com-
plement the optimal interest rate policy after an expansionary shock. Agents
realise the long term impact of increasing their consumption and therefore the
central banker can obtain a better output-inflation trade-off. The discussion of
gap variables of the various Habits externalities models in this sub-section has
shown that the size and the nature of agents’ precautionary motives play a crucial
role in setting up the optimal policy and ignoring it could lead to policy mistakes.
Now we turn to explain, why is there better convergence of inflation to its
pre-shock levels for internal habits model during productivity shocks and cost
shocks. The efficient tax condition from Proposition 2.2.3 states that the flexible









for given values of parameters σ, ω, h, φ, k and β. We can rewrite it to say that













for given values of parameters σ, h, φ, β and τp. For the benchmark calibration
given in Table 2.3 this value for ω comes out to be 0.5683 i.e. when the calibration
of the proportion of internal habits becomes greater than 0.5683 the competitive
output is then lower than efficient output and vice-versa.
2.5.4 Precautionary motives
Households save for precautionary reasons to smooth out their consumption path
given the uncertainty of future income. The benchmark model expects to generate
precautionary behaviour in agents from costly recessions as loss of consumption
during recessions is costlier than during normal times. If recessions are costly, then
we should expect to see a consumer’s precautionary savings as a function of varying
degrees of economic inefficiency and to various states of the economy. De Paoli and
Zabczyk (2013) show that in a non-linear NK model with cyclical risk aversion,
an increase in perceived riskiness of the economic environment by investors after
a negative supply shock raises their willingness to save. They recommend that
optimal policy should account for precautionary savings by responding less than
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Figure 2.13: Optimal policy gap in Benchmark habits model
Notes: Gap refers to the difference between competitive output of the model
and the Social planner’s optimal outcome. Charts represent gaps variables in %
deviation from the efficient outcome, and how they respond to a +1% quarterly
Productivity Shock, which is administered in period 5. The various states are
defined as: Normal state - when Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state
(SSS) Contraction state - when Habits are above +2 s.d. of their SSS, and
Expansion state - when Habits are below -2 s.d. below their SSS, in the shock
period. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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Figure 2.14: Optimal policy gap in External habits model
Note: Gap refers to the difference between competitive output of the model
and the Social planner’s optimal outcome. Charts represent gaps variables in %
deviation from the efficient outcome, and how they respond to a +1% quarterly
Productivity Shock, which is administered in period 5. The various states are
defined as: Normal state - when Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state
(SSS) Contraction state - when Habits are above +2 s.d. of their SSS, and
Expansion state - when Habits are below -2 s.d. below their SSS, in the shock
period. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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Figure 2.15: Optimal policy gap in Internal habits model
Note: Gap refers to the difference between competitive output of the model
and the Social planner’s optimal outcome. Charts represent gaps variables in %
deviation from the efficient outcome, and how they respond to a +1% quarterly
Productivity Shock, which is administered in period 5. The various states are
defined as: Normal state - when Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state
(SSS) Contraction state - when Habits are above +2 s.d. of their SSS, and
Expansion state - when Habits are below -2 s.d. below their SSS, in the shock
period. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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it would in a linear model which has no precautionary behaviour.
It is not straightforward to determine whether the household’s desire to save
for precautionary motives is increasing or decreasing in size of internal habits in
our model.
To obtain an analytical representation of the precautionary savings17, let’s
consider the simplified case of no internal habits in the model, ω = 0. The










and the real rate relation from real bond pricing equation [Rrt ]−1 = V rt is,







Under the assumptions of log-normality of M r′t,t+1, the euler eq. (2.101) becomes,












where logRrt = rt, logM r
′
t,t+1 = mt+1 and the asterix(*) super-script describes the
equilibrium interest rate consistent with price stability, or flexible price equilibrium
rate. Therefore the interest rate that clears the bond market in price stability is










Appendix B.3 on page 268 discusses the derivation of precautionary savings.







1 + 2Ψ20 + 3Ψ20 (κxx∗t − κτετ,t − κyηεy,t)
]
. (2.104)
17 Precautionary savings capture the effect of uncertainty on intertemporal wealth allocation.
The concept was formalised by Leland (1968) which found that there is ‘extra saving’ when
income is uncertain in comparison to the certainty equivalent framework if the third derivative
of utility is positive. See Baiardi, Magnani and Menegatti (2020) for a literature review of the
concept. In NK models based analyses of precautionary savings, such as in Baele, Bekaert,
and Inghelbrecht (2010) which show these in a habits formulation that is similar to Campbell
and Cochrane (1999), and in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2013) which demonstrate these in habits
formulation that is similar to the one used in this chapter, a distinction between precautionary
savings and consumption smoothing has been made through the log-normality of market clearing
rate of interest from the consumption euler equation.
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and Φ1 = η(1− h) + ρ, and
κx =








η−1ρh(2− h)(1− φ) + Φ1γy(1− h) + Φ1(γy + φ− 1)
Φ21
(2.107)
The above condition for vart(m∗t+1) highlights three channels through which uncer-





the overall risk aversion which determines Φ0, and the past (state x∗ ) and current
economic conditions (ετ,t, εy,t). On close inspection we can see that without habit
formation h = 0, the precautionary saving motive is time invariant over the cycle
Ψ0 = 0. Moreover we can see that since all other terms are positive the signs of
κy and κτ are determined by the conditions whether,
γy + φ > 1 (2.108)
γτ + φ > 1 (2.109)
which specify that when shocks are persistent and habits are slow to adjust,
adverse shocks to cost or technology raise uncertainty and precautionary motives.
2.5.5 Policy asymmetry
Due to inherent nonlinearities in the model and policy functions, it is difficult
to explicitly break down the stochastic discount factor into inter-temporal and
precautionary parts which are explicit functions of various states and parameters.
Therefore any analytical explanation of the transmission mechanism of optimal
policy needs to be extracted from differences in responses obtained during various
states and shocks to the economy.
This section discusses the results of simulations run to look for changes in
optimal policy responses for various:
a) Models of Habits externalities, i.e. External, Benchmark or Internal habits,
b) Initial conditions of the pre-shock economy, i.e. whether in Expansion, Normal
or Contraction state,
c) The nature of shock hitting the economy, i.e. whether productivity or cost,
and
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d) The magnitude and direction of the shock hitting the economy, i.e. whether it
is +/-1% or +/-3%.
Figure 2.16 and 2.17 look at how the policy instrument (interest rates) ac-
counts for the changes in agent’s precautionary behaviour which is increasing
in uncertainty about the future income and alters agent’s expected consumption
path. The central banker can limit interest rate response to both productivity and
cost shocks when habits become more internal, and we notice that across all mod-
els (Figure 2.16 to 2.17) policy interest rates are kept lower during contractionary
states.
The optimal policy response to +ve productivity shocks is also state-dependent,
as seen in Figure 2.16. If habits are fully external (first column of fig. 2.16) then
agents cannot acknowledge the impact of their present consumption on future
habits. Therefore, we see a faster normalization in interest rate when the economy
is in Expansion. In contrast, if the economy’s initial state is one of Contraction
and its hit by a positive shock, then interest rate remains low for longer. Similarly,
after the initial rate cut, the optimal policy recommends normalizing rates back to
their pre-shock levels slowly when the economy is in contraction. The simulations
reveal that this normalization of interest rates is enhanced when the size of
externalities reduces and agents precautionary motives are taken into account.
As agents can better internalize their habit formation, the trade-off between
inflation and Surplus ratio stabilization improves. Recall that the Surplus ratio
is above its steady-state level when the economy is in expansions and vice versa
during contractions. So the optimal policy sets out an interest rate path to restore
the Surplus ratio, which simultaneously also stabilizes the Equity premium.
During inflationary cost shocks, as Figure 2.17 suggests, the central banker
with only interest rates in hand as a policy tool should be less aggressive in
both raising and cutting rates when habits are more internal, or when agent’s
precaution is high. The comparison between Benchmark (column 2 fig. 2.17) and
Internal habits (column 3 fig. 2.17) is interesting as we observe that when habits
are fully internal, then central bank responds with a bigger rate hike in the shock
period. But as agents precautionary savings (due to internal habits) leads to
drop in consumption and surplus ratio the central banker corrects its interest
rates faster (during expansions) and responds with lower rates for longer when
the economy is in contractions. This results is substantiated by comparing the
optimal policy responses of positive and negative shocks to the economy.
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Notes: Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1%
quarterly Productivity shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditioned by assuming no change in
tax rate for the entire horizon. The various states are defined as: Normal state - when
Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state (SSS) in the shock period, Contraction
state - when Habits are above +2s.d. of their SSS, and Expansion state - when Habits
are below -2.s.d. below their SSS. The various models are defined as: Benchmark -
when Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal - when Habits
are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External - when Habits are 1% internal
(ω = 0.01) and 99% external. All charts in a row share a common Y-axis which is
labelled for charts in first column. All charts in a column share a common X-axis
which is labelled for charts in the last row. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters). Impulse
responses for the remaining variables are posted in Figure B.3.
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Notes: Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a
+1% quarterly Tax rate shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditional on assuming no change
in Productivity for the entire horizon. The various states are defined as: Normal
state - when Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state (SSS) in the shock period,
Contraction state - when Habits are above +2s.d. of their SSS, and Expansion state
- when Habits are below -2.s.d. below their SSS. The various models are defined as:
Benchmark - when Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal -
when Habits are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External - when Habits
are 1% internal (ω = 0.01) and 99% external. All charts in a row share a common
Y-axis which is labelled for charts in first column. All charts in a column share a
common X-axis which is labelled for charts in the last row. X-axis: time horizon (in
quarters). Impulse responses for the remaining variables are posted in Figure B.4.
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Figure 2.18: Asymmetric response to Productivity shocks
















-1% TFP (mirror image)
+3% TFP
-3% TFP (mirror image)
Notes: Impulse responses in annualised basis point (1bps = 0.01%) from their pre shock levels.
The negative of impulse response to -1% and -3% productivity shocks and plotted. Policy
functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are
conditioned by assuming no change in Tax rate for the entire horizon. Habits are assumed
to be at their Stochastic steady state level in the shock period. X axis : Time horizon in
quarters.
Figure 2.19: Asymmetric response to Cost shocks
















-1% Tax rate (mirror image)
+3% Tax rate
-3% Tax rate (mirror image)
Notes: Impulse responses in annualised basis point (1bps = 0.01%) from their pre shock
levels. The negative of impulse response to -1% and -3% Tax rate shocks and plotted. Policy
functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are
conditioned by assuming no change in Productivity for the entire horizon. Habits are assumed
to be at their Stochastic steady state level in the shock period. X axis : Time horizon in
quarters.
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Not only is the optimal policy more accommodative of agents’ precautionary
motives during recessions, but it is also asymmetric between positive and negative
shocks hitting the economy in any state. Figure 2.18 and 2.19 on page 176 show
that policy response is asymmetric to the size of disturbance hitting the economy.
Whereas, Figure 2.20 and 2.21 on pages 179 to 180 highlight the policy asymmetry
to productivity and cost shocks during in the different Habits externalities models
when the economy in pre-shock period is in Contraction state, i.e. its Habits are
above +2 s.d. and its Surplus ratio is above 1− h. In these figures, mirror image
(i.e. −1 times) of the impulse response to adverse shocks Productivity (TFP) and
Taxes (Cost) are plotted.
The following features in these charts that stand out. Firstly, a three times
potent shock requires more than three times the optimal policy response, which
highlight the inherent non-linearity of optimal policy. Secondly, the size of real
rate adjustment decreases in habits externalities. Thirdly, the model with entirely
internal habits achieves the best stabilisation of inflation and Equity premium.
Lastly, the initial responses to positive and negative shocks are symmetric. How-
ever, there is an asymmetric pace of real rate normalisation, i.e. rollback to its
pre-shock level, which depends on the pre-shock state and the nature of the shock.
In the presence of asset bubbles the ‘leaning against the wind’ policy utilizing
a stronger interest rate response may raise the volatility of asset prices and their
bubble component as per the backward-looking sunspot solution around a stable
bubble state (Galí, 2014). So stabilisation of bubble component takes precedence
in optimal monetary policy over stabilisation of aggregate demand. In contrast
the forward-looking solution around an unstable bubbly state (Miao, Shen, and
Wang, 2019), esp when bubble shocks are serially correlated, shows that asset
bubbles respond similar to asset prices to increase in interest rates, and therefore
the conventional ‘lean against the wind’ policy is optimal.
Recall, that our benchmark habits model has an inflationary bias. Its com-
petitive output is inefficiently smaller to the first-best outcome. Therefore, the
discretionary policymaker is more accommodative to expansionary (or deflation-
ary) shocks, and pursues a faster normalisation of interest rates in response to the
contractionary (or inflationary) shocks. This asymmetry is particularly visible
in the various impulse responses during contractions (fig. 2.20 - 2.21). Optimal
policy shows a greater tolerance for keeping rates ‘low for longer’ period during
positive productivity shocks and cut in the Tax rates, and it normalises the real
rates faster when hit by a negative Productivity and a rise in Taxes.
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We learn from these simulations that in costly recessions household’s display
higher precautionary motives: when they have more control over the composition
of their habits and their utility, and when they have a low surplus ratio. The
optimal policy recommends asymmetric responses to alleviate the agent’s precau-
tionary behaviour. Ignoring the agent’s behaviour in optimal policy decisions
could reduce welfare and prove to be costly.
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Horizon
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Horizon
+1% TFP
-1% TFP (mirror image)
Notes: Impulse responses in annualised basis point (1bps = 0.01%) from their pre
shock levels. The negative of the impulse response to -1% productivity shocks is
plotted. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity and Taxes.
All the responses are conditioned by assuming no change in Tax rate for the entire
horizon. Contraction state is defined as the state when Habits in the pre-shock period
are above +2s.d. of their Stochastic steady state level. X axis : Time horizon in
quarters. The various models are defined as: Benchmark - when Habits are 75%
internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal - when Habits are 99% internal
(ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External - when Habits are 0% internal (ω = 0.01) and
100% external.
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Horizon
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Horizon
+1% Tax rate
-1% Tax rate (mirror image)
Notes: Impulse responses in annualised basis point (1bps = 0.01%) from their pre
shock levels. The negative of the impulse response to -1% productivity shocks is
plotted. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits, Productivity and Taxes.
All the responses are conditioned by assuming no change in Productivity for the entire
horizon. Contraction state is defined as the state when Habits in the pre-shock period
are above +2s.d. of their Stochastic steady state level. X axis : Time horizon in
quarters. The various models are defined as: Benchmark - when Habits are 75%
internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal - when Habits are 99% internal
(ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External - when Habits are 0% internal (ω = 0.01) and
100% external.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter introduces costly recessions and cyclical risk aversion to standard
New Keynesian analysis. Its global optimisation solution shows that optimal
discretionary policy during bad states, is geared towards stabilising the output
gap and the surplus ratio ahead of its usual care for inflation stabilisation that
standard New Keynesian models attribute to it.
Precautionary savings matter, since agents are more protective of their con-
sumption during recessions in comparison to booms. This precautionary behaviour
is asymmetric, and it is increasing non-linearly in the amount of information and
control agents have over their future consumption.
There is, therefore, need for active policy management which complements this
precautionary behaviour. The optimal discretionary policy result is non-linear
and asymmetric during good and bad states of the economy. During adverse
productivity and cost shocks, it seeks to stabilise agent’s surplus consumption
(or consumption in excess of the subsistence level of habits), which subsequently
neutralises the Equity premium.
In the presence of cyclical risk aversion, equity premium is a manifestation
of the agent’s precautionary motives. They have a similar impact to an agent’s
utility, which is that as the surplus consumption falls, risk-aversion increases, and
both equity premium and marginal utility rises. Thus a policymaker without an
ability to observe output gap can also sufficiently replicate the optimal strategy
by restoring the equity premium to its steady-state.
The results hinge on the ability of the policymaker to reduce rates when
required. Therefore including zero lower bound, capital with adjustment costs,
availability of unconventional policy with the policymaker, heterogeneity of in-
vestment technology, and idiosyncratic income shocks could be other exciting
extensions for future.
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3. Flight to Safety as Optimal Policy in
Cyclical Risk Aversion
The Flight to Safety phenomenon has been portrayed in literature as an aberrant
reaction to some form of market externalities, valuation constraints or Knightian
uncertainty. This consideration of Flight to Safety as a short-term and an asset
market phenomenon has also resulted in it being overlooked for the purposes of
macroeconomic theory and policymaking. Whereas, recent empirical evidence
suggests that the Flight to Safety that exists even in low-frequency data, has
significant information about future productivity and business cycle performance.
Therefore this chapter produces a new micro-founded general equilibrium approach
to model Flight to Safety phenomenon observed during recessions or bad states
of the economy. It showcases Flight to Safety as an optimal policy response
by individuals in an NK model which features costly recessions and an option
to switch between risky and safer production technology. Due to the presence
of consumption habits, there is a non-linear increase in marginal utility once
consumption gets closer to the subsistence level of habits, this makes recessions
costly. The households find it more hurtful losing a unit of consumption in bad
states than losing a unit in boom times. However, making a precautionary switch
towards a safer asset allocation safeguards the investors against any loss of future
income. Global solution methods demonstrate that ex-ante Flight to Safety is the
optimal response for individuals that are consuming closer to their subsistence,
and that calls for a remedial policy response. These findings substantiate the
macro-finance based explanations of recessions by demonstrating that Flight to
Safety stems inherently from individual’s risk aversion even in the absence of
intermediate credit constraints or information asymmetry.
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3.1 Introduction
Macro-finance literature has shown that both risk premia and precautionary sav-
ings motives increase during recessions or economic bad times. A deterioration of
the near term economic growth outlook and periods of poor employment prospects
are accompanied by an enhanced preference for safe vis-à-vis less safe or risky
investments. Such sudden movement of capital during bad economic times from
risky to safe assets is commonly referred to as Flight to Quality or Flight to
Safety, and a counter phenomenon of sudden movement of capital from safe to
risky assets during good economic times is known as Flight to Risk. Conventional
attempts to model the Flight to Safety (or Risk) have relied on some form of
assumptions of credit or information constraints or Knighting uncertainty. This
paper proposes a new micro-founded model of Flight to Safety during costly re-
cessions and cyclical risk aversion. The model is a modification of the standard
New Keynesian model used in policy analysis, with the following modifications. It
accounts for an individual’s cyclical (or time-varying) risk aversion. Also, it has
the provision of investment options for that individual to safeguard them against
any expected loss of future income. The parsimonious model is solved non-linearly
using Chebyshev’s numerical approximation, and it captures fundamental asset
price dynamics observed in data.
The model economy incorporates costly recessions, the mechanism of which
emerges from including internal habits in household consumption. The previous
chapter has shown that in a standard new-Keynesian model with Rotemberg costs,
a drop in consumption with respect to habits during bad states makes it partic-
ularly hurtful to consumers and they require a higher premium for undertaking
risky investments even in good states. That same mechanism is carried forward
in this chapter. A detailed description of the various good and bad states of the
model is presented in Box 3.2.1.1 of section 3.2. Another distinguishing feature of
the model is that the risk-averse representative agent has an option to alter the
composition of risk in the production technology, by changing the proportion of
two kinds of firms, safe firms and risky firms that operate in the economy.
In macroeconomic models of costly recessions, as we have seen from Chapter 2,
the agent’s risk aversion is countercyclical, and it leads to non-linear pricing of
risk and returns. In these models, as the current consumption of the household
becomes low, they reduce their habits and alter their stochastic discount factor.
We have seen in the previous chapter that such actions have an asymmetric impact
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on the firm’s marginal cost and optimal choice of production. The homogeneity in
production opportunity set for the household in such models restricts them from
making an influence on the riskiness of the production process itself. There is a
lack of a feedback mechanism from household utility decision to risk allocation in
such models. Whereas, empirical evidence and asset price observations from data
suggest that investors align the risk composition of the portfolio often, as they
expect an adverse or favourable future state of nature. Therefore, this chapter
aims to address this gap and contributes to the literature by proposing a model
of costly recessions which provides the representative agent with the option to
alter the composition of risk operating in the economy. Moreover, in doing so,
which can provide a theoretical grounding for the sudden changes in portfolio risk
compositions that are observed in Flight to Safety and Flight to Risk episodes.
Establishing a model where Flight to Safety is an innate development as a
reaction to the individual’s utility optimisation and the producer’s profit max-
imisation behaviour, requires introducing heterogeneity in production and giving
control to the consumer to alter the output in future states by acting on it today.
In the model economy, there are two kinds of intermediate firms that operate
they are either Safe or Risky. Safe firms in the model offer less productive but
also less risky technology or one which has a smaller unconditional variance of the
technology process, whereas the Risky firms offer a more productive but also an
ex-ante riskier or with a higher unconditional variance of the technology process.
Based on her state-dependent risk aversion, the representative agent can decide
upon the proportion of safe or risky firms that will operate in the economy. The
ratio of risky firms that operate in the economy determines the aggregate risk
in the economy. The representative agent’s decision to ex-ante shutdown firms
of risky category with respect to increasing state-varying risk aversion is called
Flight to Safety. Furthermore, instead, if she chooses to shut down safe firms in
favour of risky firms, then that phenomenon is captured as Flight to Risk.
The general equilibrium set up in this paper shows how a representative profit-
seeking agent when acting as a producer maximises the firm’s value in each state
of nature by equating marginal rate of transformation with the stochastic discount
factor. Therefore she chooses higher production (employing more risky technology)
in states when consumption (output) is more valuable, or the stochastic discount
factor is low. However, when the same producer dons the hat of a risk-averse
consumer, she also equates the stochastic discount factor to her marginal rate
of substitution. She, therefore, stays away from indulging in risky ventures in
periods when consumption is dear.
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The model also depicts how an increase in habits with respect to consumption
or fall in consumption with respect to habits raises the marginal utility from
consumption and the risk-aversion of the agent. Increase in habits lowers the
stochastic discount factor and raises the expected return from a risky investment.
As the agents become risk-averse, they shut down risky firms. This trade-off leads
to a shift in the composition of risky and safe firms in the economy and impacts
lifetime production, employment and welfare. This desire for investors to shift
production from risky to safe technology as their cyclical risk aversion increases
are captured in the model as Flight to Safety.
Similar to the solution approach in the previous chapter of this thesis, this
model, too, is solved non-linearly using numerical methods. A key implication of
pursuing global solution methods in macro-finance models is that they can avoid
asset pricing puzzles such as equity premium puzzle and risk-free rate puzzle for
plausible levels of risk aversion coefficient.
A necessary corollary that emerges from the results of this chapter is that
Flight to Safety can be studied without using credit or information constraints or
assumptions of Knightian uncertainty. This chapter also investigates the policy
implications from the viewpoint of an efficient planner and find that competitive
allocation has excessive risk-taking when the risk premium is low and not enough
risk allocation when risk premium is high. Inefficient allocation of risk generates
an inflationary bias in the steady-state.
The methodology used here to include intra-investment flows between high
and safe investment opportunities to capture Flight to Safety has applications in
empirical studies in estimating the welfare loss from recessions.
Finally, this model contributes to the policy debate in choosing the right micro-
foundations to model Flight to Safety. As different micro assumptions would have
different policy outcomes. If Flight to Safety is emerging from a lack of liquidity
in intermediary capital, then bailouts are a justified policy response. Otherwise,
if the observed Flight to Safety is a measure of balance sheet constraint faced
by intermediaries, then regulatory involvement will include setting up alternate
markets, removing inefficiencies and taking the role as lender of last resort. Instead,
suppose Knightian uncertainty leads to Flight to Safety, as speculators take
excessive risk in complex instruments that they do not understand and expect to
being bailed out as they fail. In that case, the policymakers could intervene to
prevent systemic fallout but also not intervene to stop moral hazard by letting a
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few rotten ones fail. However, suppose Flight to Safety is a common phenomenon
of business cycles as modelled in this paper and it can occur due to widespread
individual risk-aversion, even in the absence of financial intermediaries, financial
innovation, credit constraints, or information asymmetry. In that case, policy
interventions to modulate the process of risk allocation by investors are needed.
3.1.1 Related Literature
The Flight to Safety phenomenon does not have a single definition, but it is a
particular term related to the process of ‘sudden’ restructuring of risk allocation
during times of economic uncertainty as investors divest from risky assets in
favour of safe assets. In recent memory, the Global financial crisis presented us
with bouts of high volatility and uncertainty where capital allocation between
safe and risky assets fluctuated leading into episodes1 where there were excessive
risk-taking or ‘risk on’ and where there were very little risk-taking or ‘risk off’.
This restructuring of investments from risky to safe assets is known as FTS, and
its counterpart in the reverse direction, from safer to risky assets is known as
FTR. Capital flights leading into re-allocation of risk can occur between two
investment opportunities within the same sector, the same asset class. They can
also occur between different issues (new and old) of the same asset, or between
different assets, or between different classes of assets in the same country, or
between domestic and international portfolios. There is also a wide range of
assets that could classify as ‘high’ risk (risky) or ‘low’ risk (safe). In a panel
study Apergis (2015) demonstrate that FTS and FTR are global phenomena and
certain currencies such as the US Dollar (USD), the Swiss Franc (CHF) and the
Japanese Yen (JPY) offer a safer haven than others to safeguard investments.
A feature of this ‘sudden’ nature of Flight to Safety episode is that it results
in ‘sharp’ short term rise in prices (or fall in expected returns) of the sought after,
i.e. less risky asset, and vice-versa for the more risky asset. This is the reason
there is a vast literature that has focused on pricing and quantity behaviour
of assets to understanding the Flight to Safety, and the Great Recession has
once again brought this research to forefront [See Caballero (2010), Caballero
1The HSBC risk on risk off (RORO) index points to a significant shift in ‘risk on’ and ‘risk
off’ during 2008-2010 period. Source: https://impact.ref.ac.uk/casestudies/CaseStudy.
aspx?Id=20291. Whereas Fed Atlanta research article argues the periods of correlation in
positive stock prices and negative treasury prices during the ‘risk on’ and vice versa during
‘risk off’ has lost its appeal in recent times. Source: https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/
publications/notesfromthevault/11-risk-on-risk-off-in-the-long-run-2017-11-28.
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and Kurlat (2009), DeLong (2012), Cochrane (2011), DeLong (2010)]. But the
FTS episodes have an impact beyond short term asset price fluctuations. In the
shorter term, the supply of assets is fixed, and so the Flight to Safety behaviours
have led to savings glut (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996) and hitting of
Zero-lower bound (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2017) on eligible securities.
Safe assets are subject to lower margin requirements as their prices deviate less
from their fundamental values. Therefore during volatile times, large deviations
of prices of risky assets from their fundamental price lead to hoarding of safe asset
(Brunnermeier, 2009).
The theoretical literature on Flight to Safety argues that agency problems lead
to Flight to Safety during times of risk aversion. Several attempts to model Flight
to Safety mechanisms, especially in the theoretical literature following the great
recession, revolve around a common theme of investigating FTS from the lens
of market imperfections (Caballero and Kurlat, 2009). These commonly include
introducing imperfections in the form of information asymmetries, incentive asym-
metries, principal-agent problem, uncertainty-aversion, Knightian-uncertainty, the
complexity of financial products, in generating the risk and illiquidity premia
which motivates the Flight to Safety behaviour.
Fund managers incentives are modelled by Vayanos (2004) to benefit from a
management fee which they receive in the proportion of assets under manage-
ment. These managers depict liquidity preference and risk aversion when market
volatility is high as then there is a higher chance of their fund value falling below
its liquidation threshold. The drop in asset prices during Flight to Safety periods
can be more severe if fund managers have margin requirements (as hedge funds
do). A unique feature of periods of high illiquidity and uncertainty is that it
raises margin requirements on collaterals. If then in order to meet margin require-
ments, overleveraged managers would look to resell their assets to the banks, then
banks with limited capital would drag down their prices further (Krishnamurthy,
2010) and exacerbate the spiral. Besides, there exists a typical principal-agent
problem where investors lack sufficient control over the fund managers to act in
their best interests. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) model that investors cannot
expect specialist (bank/fund managers) to exert full effort. Investors could forgo
a portion of realised returns to provide incentives for fund managers. Even then,
the intermediaries may choose their own desired level of market risk and ignore
the investors’ risk allocation recommendation. In order to then alter risk in their
portfolio, the investors have to provide more incentives to fund managers, such as
de-linking the managers’ compensation with their performance. However, there
3.1. INTRODUCTION 193
is a limit to which this could be achieved, and that restricts the investor’s ability
to make meaningful changes to portfolio risk.
When faced with the worst-case possibility, the investment intermediaries
look to minimise losses. Brock and Manski (2011) confirm Flight to Safety
effect is more significant when specialists choose to maximise their payoff in
the worst scenario (max-min) or minimise the maximum possible regret (min-max
regret) from the worst case. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) describe that
Knightian uncertainty or a lack of knowledge about complex financial instruments
or uncertainty of available information, forces the specialists to follow a max-min
strategy where they focus on the worst possible outcome and hoard safe assets as
a safeguard. It leaves them underinsured in other adverse scenarios. Therefore
when a negative shock hits the market, liquidity dries too soon.
In a nutshell, theoretical studies focus on intermediaries and their liquidity
preferences, as a critical mechanism that builds into Flight to Safety and freezing of
credit markets. The story goes, that due to an external shock, there is information
friction such as lack of knowledge of complex investment products or uncertainty
about future, that hinders the intermediaries’ assessment of the present situation.
There is some real or perceived weakness in the wealth of intermediary, which
builds into a sudden market reaction, preference for liquidity and Flight to Safety.
The intermediary based perspective of Flight to Safety places too high a value
of information asymmetry and credit constraints. This approach has been useful
in explaining the extraordinary turn of events such as the inter-bank credit freeze
that occurred during the Great Recession. However, it ignores the more common
Flight to Safety episodes when assets flow towards banks (intermediaries) instead
of risky opportunities. Therefore, it is also problematic in determining the impact
of Flight to Safety on the real economy from these models. Moreover, in this
literature, the role of individual investors as being in control of their investment
decisions is often ignored.
This paper borrows from the production side models of asset pricing, to provide
a different perspective on Flight to Safety hypothesis. Key motivating literature
for this paper is based on the partial equilibrium models such as Cochrane (2016),
Belo (2010), Jermann (2010) and Cochrane (1991) that use producers’ ability to
transform production across various states of nature to establish the observed
asset price behaviour. These papers have shown that a production-based measure
of stochastic discount factor (SDF) is created by allowing consumers with a
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choice of productivity set in various states of nature. Such a measure of the
SDF can also be useful in explaining the observed asset-pricing phenomenon. For
e.g. Cochrane (1991) and Jermann (2010) consider the implications of including
two production technologies in the model on asset prices. By giving producers
access to two technologies, one for each state of nature, they extract a stochastic
discount factor purely from the producer’s first-order condition and marginal rate
of transformation. They also match key moments of consumption-based asset-
pricing literature. Further on this line of investigation Belo (2010) allows for an
arbitrary number of states of nature in the economy and strengthens the results
of production side models of asset pricing by matching for cross-sectional variance
in stock returns.
However, asset pricing literature or models of the production side of the
economy have not explained the risk on, risk off behaviour observed during bad
states. There is a brief mention of it in a stylised example in Cochrane (2016) as
it elucidates the expected changes in consumption and de-leveraging during Flight
to Safety. However, his ad-hoc representation lacks the backing of a fully solved
DSGE model. This chapter extends the research on Flight to Safety and Cochrane
(2016) example of an endowment based economy into a general equilibrium model.
The substitution of risk in an agent’s production technology considered in this
chapter results in ex-ante Flight to Safety that is endogenous and precedes changes
in total factor productivity.
Rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Next section 3.2 describes the
model economy, and it is solved for the discretionary planner in section 3.3.
Section 3.4 describes the calibration and numerical solution. Section 3.5 discusses
the results and policy implications, while the last section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Model with habits and two technologies
A standard new Keynesian model2 with Rotemberg cost is extended to account
for costly recessions. Internal habits in consumption are included to make the
economic bad times in the model costly for the consumer, as they make losing
a unit of consumption in bad times costlier to losing a unit of consumption in
good times. The consumption habits included in this model are contemporaneous
or Keeping up with the Joneses instead of the more common approach of using
Catching up with Joneses form of habits in macroeconomic literature. Keeping
up with the Joneses form of habits are used to make current subsistence level
of habits a function of past habits and present consumption. The dependence
of present habits on the present period consumption is small enough to keep
consumption habits as slow-moving, but the parameter is sufficient enough to
make the consumer take into account the impact of an increase in present period
consumption on present period habits and future utility.
The marginal utility from an additional unit of consumption derives from
the difference between the level of consumption and the subsistence level of
habits. Subsistence habits are assumed to be slow-moving. Therefore current
changes in consumption have little impact on the subsistence level of habits. In
this representation, the marginal utility and thus risk-aversion increases when
consumption falls closer to a subsistence level of habits. Using the slow-moving
contemporaneous representation of habits has a distinct advantage. It generates
lower variation in asset prices with smooth cycles in risk aversion and presents
a trend that confirms with the growth in aggregate and individual consumption
observed in data. In contrast, the more common approach in macroeconomics is
to model habits of the kind Ut = Ct − θCt−1, i.e. where utility Ut depends on
the difference between current and lagged consumption. It successfully generates
the slow, hump-shaped response in consumption Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi
(2012) but also leads to the large variation in asset prices that we do not observe
in data. Slow-moving habits [Cochrane (2016), Fig.2] in comparison, produce
smooth cycles in risk aversion.
Additionally, the model economy also involves a choice set in the TFP of
intermediate good firms, and they operate with either risky or safe technology.
The risky firms operate with higher productivity but also higher volatility of
2The central framework is similar to the New Keynesian DSGE model with internal habits
that was developed in Chapter 2.
196 3. FTS AS OPTIMAL POLICY
productivity than safe firms. The final goods firm in the economy then aggregates
intermediate firms’ output over a combination of the two technologies and sells it
to households. Households own representative firms and receive firms’ profits as
dividends.
In every period the representative household exercises its operational or risk
allocation and decides over the composition of risky or safe intermediate firms that
would operate in the economy in the following period. Other intermediate firms
that do not receive this operating permission from households cease to exist in
that period. Another way to look at the risk composition of the intermediate firms
is to consider that there is only a single intermediate firm which could produce
using risky and safe technology and in each period. The household then in each
period, decides the risk composition of its operational technology of the next
period. The household bases this decision on its stochastic discount factor and
the expected returns from both types of technology. It is this choice of operational
allocation between the two types of technology that creates the possibility of a
Flight to Safety when the household’s precautionary motives increase.
In this chapter, the letter R represents variables in relation to risky technology
and the letter S represents variables with safe technology. The next sub-section
describes the model which has two agents: households and firms. Firms are further
divided into categories: intermediate (risky and safe) and final (with adjustment
costs). Risky technology is an explicit function of safe technology. So we have 3
states in the model: consumption habits, safe technology, and proportion of risky
technology firms in the economy.
3.2.1 Household
There is a continuum of identical j households on unit measure, j ∈ [0, 1]. Each
household then makes their consumption, labour and risk allocation decisions
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subject to the their habits that accumulate on the basis of past habits Xj,t−1,
their own consumption Cj,t and aggregate per-capita consumption Ct as
Xj,t = (1− φ) (ωCj,t + (1− ω)Ct) + φXj,t−1, (3.2)
where ‘habit size’ parameter h determines the Surplus Consumption Cj,t − hXj,t.
We assume habits are ‘superficial’, partly ‘internal’ and partly ‘external’ depending
on the parameter ω for households. As discussed earlier in the Introduction section
of Chapter 2, the parameter ω is chosen to keep the output of competitive economy
smaller than efficient output and to generate small positive steady state inflation
that matches with observations in data. Let us include all habits related terms
in one place.
Table 3.1: Habits terminology - repeat
Notation Definition
Xt Habits
h Habits size parameter
hXt Subsistence level of habits
Ct − hXt Surplus Consumption
(Ct − hXt)/Ct Surplus Consumption Ratio or Surplus Ratio
ω Internal habits parameter
φ Habits persistence parameter
Notes: Same as Table 2.1 on page 118, which has the description of
habit related terminology for the previous chapter
The budget constraint of all j households is given as








6 wtNj,t +Brj,t−1 + τc,t
+Dft +
[
DRt qj,t−1 +DSt (1− qj,t−1)
]
. (3.3)
The Real bonds (Brj,t) are the number of one-period zero-coupon bonds that are
issued by households to each other. And τc,t are the time varying per-capita
lump-sum transfers from the government. For a real bond, the jth household pays
today the discounted value of V rt Brj,t which gives Brj,t in the next period. Cj,t is
the consumption and Nj,t is the labour supplied by the household which is paid
at the prevailing real wage rate wt.
The household receives three forms of dividends. Dft is the real dividends paid
by final firms. DRt and DSt are total dividends received from a risky and a safe
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technology intermediate firms. In any period, as 0 6 qj,t−1 6 1, the household
receives qj,t−1 share of the dividends from the risky technology firm and (1− qj,t−1)
share of dividends from safe technology firm. The household can change its risk
allocation and choose to receive a different proportion of dividends from the risky
firm in period t+ 1 by altering qj,t. But choosing a qj,t different than qj,t−1 would
have an exogenous real (strictly non-zero) cost to the household, which is given by
product of the non-zero parameter χ and the quadratic adjustment in proportion
of risky technology as χ2 (qj,t − 1/2)
2. The inclusion of quadratic risk adjustment
costs disallows for big reduction on risk allocation qj,t.
Before solving for the households optimization I would like to present a case3
for subsistence habits and various states of nature in the economy (See Box 1).
3The reader will notice similarity in this and the model in Chapter 1.
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3.2.1.1 Good and Bad states of the economy
In steady state the level of Habits (from habit equation 3.2) should be
equal to Consumption. Therefore the steady state Surplus Ratio is simply
S = 1− h. As during Expansions household’s marginal utility should be
low, so in this utility specification we define good states (or expansion)
as the states of the economy when the Surplus Ratio is higher than
steady state Surplus Ratio of 1 − h. This can be achieved when either
the consumption is way too much in comparison to the level of habits
or habits are way too low in comparison to level of consumption in the
economy. In both cases the Surplus consumption S should be higher.
Bad states (or Recesssions) by corollary are then defined as the state
when agent’s Surplus Ratio is below the steady state level (1− h). It can
happen when agent’s consumption falls (or is low) so that it gets closer
to sustainable habits (hX), or when habits are high in comparison to
consumption. In both cases the marginal utility rises which is another








= Sj,t < Sj = 1− h (3.5)
and in Good state
Cj,t − hXj,t
Cj,t
= Sj,t > Sj = 1− h (3.6)
An example of subsistence habits
As an illustration in Figure 2.1 on page 116 showcases the real consump-
tion data from the US and create an aggregate per-capita habit process:
Xt = (1 − φ)Xt−1 + φCt. Habits are slow moving for φ = 0.97. During
NBER recessions the gap between Consumption (Ct) and Subsistence
habits (hXt) reduces. As expected the marginal utility rises during re-
cessions or whenever per-capita consumption gets closer to per-capita
subsistence habits.
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3.2.1.2 Household’s Utility optimisation
A household does not internalize fully the effects of its choice on aggregate con-
sumption and its habit formation. Hence we write the Lagrangian for household’s
problem, using λrj,t > 0 and λxj,t 6 0 as multipliers of its budget constraint (3.3)















 wtNj,t +Brj,t−1 + τc,t +Dft +
[
DRt qj,t−1 +DSt (1− qj,t−1)
]







Xj,t − φXj,t−1 − (1− φ) (ωCj,t + (1− ω)Ct)
)
+λqqj,t + λq̂(1− qj,t) (3.7)
First order conditions for all t > 1
Cj,t : λrj,t = (Cj,t − hXj,t)
−ρ − (1− φ)ωλxj,t (3.8)






Nj,t : λrj,t = N
η
j,t/wt (3.10)




















+ λq − λq̂ (3.12)
The Kuhn-tucker conditions on qj,t ∈ [0, 1] are :
λqqj,t ≥ 0 (3.13)
λq̂(1− qj,t) ≥ 0 (3.14)
The pricing equations with respect to Real bonds (Brj,t) is provided to define
asset returns. All j households face the same constraints and have similar opti-
mization results, so we can drop the j classification for homogeneous households.
The Consumption Euler equation from FOC’s wrt Consumption and Habits for
homogeneous households is then given by
(1− h(1− φ)ω) (Ct − hXt)−ρ = λrt + βφEt
[
(Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ − λrt+1
]
, (3.15)
which shows that marginal utility from an extra unit of consumption is provided
from increase in the lifetime real income and from discounting the expected loss
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of utility in future periods for increasing habits by φ. Representative household’s
Labour supply (from equation 3.10) as a function of real wage wt, once we drop
the j classification for homogeneous households is simply
Nηt = wtλrt , (3.16)
Similarly, the representative household (from equation 3.12) changes the propor-
tion of risky firms (from qt−1 to qt) in the economy to accommodate the changes
in expected discounted lifetime dividend returns after covering the cost χ of this
current (qt) and future (qt+n;n > 0) changes in proportion of risky firms. The
quadratic nature of the adjustments costs implies that in any period small changes
in risk proportion cost less than large changes. From the Euler equation (3.12)














When qt ≤ 0 or it hits the lower bound the multiplier on the upper bound of
qt constraint no longer binds λq̂ = 0, and there are zero expected dividends
from risky firms DRt+1 = 0. In that case the multiplier λq on lower bound or











Similarly if the choice of qt ≥ 1 hits the upper bound, then the constraint multiplier
on the lower bound of qt no longer binds and λq = 0 and there are zero expected
dividends from safe firms DSt+1 = 0. In that case the value of the multiplier on











Stochastic Discount factor , hereafter SDF, is derived by removing j classifi-
cation in homogeneous agents, for nominal pay-offs Mnt,t+1 and for real pay-offs
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Local-non satiation of preferences ensures that in equilibrium the budget con-
straint binds with equality, and the structure of constant EIS utility conforms to
the usual Inada conditions. Additionally, we also need the no-Ponzi game condi-
tion (3.22) to hold with equality in the equilibrium, so that present discounted










Household optimisation with respect to real bonds (3.11) gives one-period real
rate of return Rrt,t+1 = (V rt )
−1 and $j,t = Brj,t−1 +D
f
t +DRt qj,t−1 +DSt (1− qj,t−1)
is the real wealth brought by household j into the period t. For the representative
household as the net supply of bonds is zero the real wealth brought into the
period is, $t = Dft +DRt qt−1 +DSt (1− qt−1), and the no-Ponzi games condition





























Dft+i +DRt+iqt+i−1 +DSt+i (1− qt+i−1)
)]
. (3.25)
Household’s choice of qt in all periods obeys the optimisation result (3.12) such
that the any change in qt is justified by the change in discounted earnings from






DfT + qTDRT−1 + (1− qT )DST−1
)
V DT = 0 (3.26)
which rules out any over-accumulation of wealth.
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3.2.1.3 Household’s expenditure minimisation
The household bundles the consumption good Ct by aggregating the final goods Cit











where σ is the CES between any two varieties of i. The household looks to






subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (3.27). We can derive household’s demand







where λc is the Lagrange multiplier or the marginal value from an extra unit of
bundled good. By substituting the value of Cit in Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (3.27),
we get the cost Pt of obtaining an extra bundled good is equal to its marginal
















There are two types of firms in the model economy. Firstly, there is a continuum
[0, 1] of monopolistic intermediate firms producing imperfect substitutes, of which,
in any period t, there are two types. The first type is r ∈ [0, qt−1] that operate
with risky technology and the second type is l ∈ [qt−1, 1] that operate with safe
technology. Secondly, there is a continuum i of monopolistic final good firms on
the unit measure i ∈ [0, 1], producing imperfect substitutes from goods produced
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by the risky and safe intermediate firms.
3.2.2.1 The monopolistic final goods firms
There is a continuum i ∈ [0, 1] of monopolistic firms that are owned by households.
The ith firm does not hire any labour but produces the monopolistic good Yit by
putting together the intermediate goods from both risky and safe firms by using

















where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between any two
varieties of intermediate goods produced within and between (risky or safe) inter-
mediate firms.















subject to the production aggregator (3.29) at given prices of risky and safe





























we write the multiplier µ′t as marginal cost for firm i of producing an extra unit



































 11−σ . (3.33)
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Profit maximization of final firms: Final goods monopolistic firm in order










It chooses prices Pit and Yit in order to maximize the discounted present value
















subject to Consumer’s demand (3.28). The term τp is the rate of revenue tax that
is set by the government. µit+s is the firm’s marginal cost. Yt+s and Pt+s are the
level of final output and prices in the economy. Households own all firms and
they use their s-period stochastic discount factor, Mnt,t+s from optimization result
(3.20) to discount firm’s profits. From firm’s FOC wrt Pit, for s = 0 we can derive
the final goods firms supply curve or NKPC as






(πt+1 − 1) πt+1
}
(3.35)
where µt is real marginal cost of the firm, and in a symmetric equilibrium ∀i, Pit =
Pt, µit = µt and Yit = Yt.
3.2.2.2 Safe intermediate firms’ problem




Y Slt − wtNSlt (3.36)
where wt is the real wage. Subject to following Production function (for safe
firms)
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We can derive firm’s optimization condition by substituting for both P Slt and NSlt
in firm’s profit equation5. The FOC wrt Y Slt gives the inverse supply curve for the
firm producing good of variety l with safe technology as












Since all safe firms have the same technology they all hire the same amount of
labour (NSt ), produce the same output (Y St ), face the same demand curve, get
same price (P St ) which is a markup over its marginal cost, and make the same





























3.2.2.3 Risky intermediate firms’ problem
Similarly there is a continuum of perfectly competitive risky firms r ∈ [0, qt−1]




Y Rrt − wtNRrt (3.44)
subject to following Production function for risky firms






4by using ∀i, Pit = Pt, the marginal cost µit = µt and Yit = Yt.
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The total factor productivity of risky firm ϑtξ
1
1+η
S,t is dependent on the time-varying































S,l are the maximum and minimum values of low risk firm’s tfp. All of






S,l are constant parameters. Therefore k becomes the constant
slope parameter of risky firm TFP to safe firm TFP. With value of k > 1 the
multiple ϑt and risky firm’s tfp are an increasing function of safe firm’s tfp.
Similar to the safe firm, all risky firms too hire the same amount of labour
(NRt ), produce the same output (Y Rt )










































Pricing relations for both risky and safe firms can be substituted into final goods
firms’ cost minimization (3.33) to derive the real marginal cost in terms produc-





















The market power of intermediate firms increases marginal cost by the markup
σ
σ−1 while the productivity differential between risky and safe firms lowers the
marginal cost. In absence of this productivity differential (or when risk allocation
is zero, qt−1 = 0) the marginal cost is given by the usual setup of markup times
the ratio of wage to productivity.
Aggregate production function (see derivation Section C.2.4 in appendix) can











which is increasing in the share of more risky intermediate firms in the economy.







We can substitute wages from the above relations and use the labour market
equilibrium (3.16) to define the marginal cost in terms of aggregate output, pro-















Similarly, by substituting out the real wages by (3.52), total profits (3.51) for
as qt−1 risky firms, which are distributed to owner households in the form of











These are increasing in the monopoly power and the productivity multiple ϑt
of risky firms. Similarly total profits (3.43) from 1 − qt−1 safe firms which are
distributed to owner households as dividends DSt are,








Therefore sum of dividends from qt−1 risky and 1− qt−1 safe firms is reflected in
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the monopoly power of these firms and the marginal cost as,
qt−1D
R




Recall, from (3.52) that the marginal cost is decreasing in the ratio of risky firms
and the productivity differential between risky and safe firms. Therefore, house-
hold dividend earnings are increasing in the proportion of risky firms. Difference




















































Dividends (profits) from final firms are given by the difference between total
output and total costs (viz. taxes, marginal and price adjustment),
Dft =
[
(1− τp)− µt −
ψ
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3.2.4 Market clearing
In the economy there are at any point in time only qt−1 ∈ [0, 1] risky firms and
1 − qt−1 safe firms that are operating. The aggregate budget constraint for the
economy is found by integrating the following household budget constraint for all
j households, j ∈ [0, 1]:
Cj,t + V rt Brj,t + χ2
(
qj,t − 12
)2 = wtNj,t +Brj,t−1 + τc,t +Dft
+
[




The net supply of real bonds is zero. All taxes collected are transferred to house-










= wtNt + τpYt +
[
Dft +DRt qt−1 +DSt (1− qt−1)
]
, (3.66)
The last term on RHS of the above equation captures total real profits from
monopolistic final firms (Dft ), from risky (qt−1DRt ) intermediate firms and from
safe ((1− qt−1)DSt ) intermediate firms. We can use the equations (3.54 to 3.64)
















(1− τp)− µt −
ψ








which gives the aggregate resource constraint
Ct = Yt
[
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3.2.5 Summary of the model
1. Habits accumulation:
Xt = (1− φ)Ct + φXt−1 (3.69)
2. Aggregate Resource constraint
Ct =
[













0 = (1− σ) (1− τp) + µtσ









4. The Consumption Euler Equation:
[1− h(1− φ)ω] (Ct − hXt)−ρ = λrt + βφEt
[
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3.3 Optimal policy
The presence of habits (Xt−1) and discretion between technologies (qt−1) makes
the optimum decision variables history dependent; future policy decisions de-
pend on current period’s habits (Xt) and proportion of risky technology firms
(qt). Policy-maker cannot establish commitment over future policy decisions and
she would have to re-optimize in each period. The optimal monetary policy un-
der discretion can be described as a set of decision rules for 6 control variables
{Ct, Yt, πt, Xt, λrt , qt} as functions of 3 state variables {εS,t, Xt−1, qt−1} which max-
imise the following Value function,



























subject to the following 5 constraints.
Habits accumulation:

































(πt+1 − 1) πt+1λrt+1Yt+1
]
(3.79)
Consumption Euler equation CEE :
[1− h(1− φ)ω] (Ct − hXt)−ρ = λrt + βφEt
[
(Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ − λrt+1
]
(3.80)
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By defining the following auxiliary functions that take on future states as their
argument,
ΩP (εS,t+1, Xt, qt) ≡ (πt+1 − 1) πt+1λrt+1Yt+1 (3.82)
ΩC(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) ≡ (Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ − λrt+1 (3.83)







we can rewrite the constraints (3.79, 3.80 and 3.81) as:

















ΩP (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
]
(3.85)





















These auxiliary functions show that the policy maker recognises the impact of
their actions on the endogenous state, but they cannot commit to future policy
i.e. we have a time-consistent policy. Notice that the NKPC has marginal cost7
substituted into it, and the risk allocation constraint has the real dividends from
safe and risky firms substituted into it from the the firm’s maximisation problem
[See 3.59 in section 3.2.3, reproduced here8]. The policymakers constraint on
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3.3.1 Solving for Optimal policy with Discretion
The Lagrangian for the discretionary problem is formed as
Ld =
(















Vd (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
}
+Λ1,t (Xt − (1− φ)Ct − φXt−1)
+Λ2,t
([































































where {Λ1,t,Λ2,t,Λ3,t,Λ4,t,Λ5,t} are the Lagrange multipliers. The policy rate in
constraint (3.75) is chosen to optimize other policy functions. It is always binding
and therefore not included in the Lagrangian specification.
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First order conditions In order to compactly write the FOCs we make use of













The FOCs with respect to the decision variables.
Ct : 0 = (Ct − hXt)−ρ − Λ1,t(1− φ)− Λ2,t
+ Λ4,t [1− h(1− φ)ω] ρ (Ct − hXt)−ρ−1 (3.89)
This shows that an increase in consumption (3.89) increases utility, tightens both
the habit constraint (Λ1,t > 0), and the resource constraint (Λ2,t > 0), and lowers
the stochastic discount factor (Λ4,t > 0).
























ΩP (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
]]
(3.90)
Similarly producing an extra unit of output (3.90) generates (dis)utility, relaxes
the resource constraint and improves the inflation-output trade-off (Λ3,t 6 0).
πt : 0 = −Λ2,tYtψ (πt − 1)− Λ3,t [ψ (2πt − 1)] (3.91)
Increase in inflation (3.91) tightens the resource constraint and its impact on
the inflation-output trade-off also depends on the level of output. The FOC wrt
Habits using Envelope theorem (See Appendix C.4 for derivation), is
Xt : 0 = −
h
(Ct − hXt)ρ






∂ΩP (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
∂Xt
}]


























The FOC for λrt , shows that rise in real income leads to higher SDF and worse
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inflation-output trade-off.













ΩP (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
]]
+ Λ4,t − Λ5,t
β
χ(σ − 1) (λrt )2
Et
[





The FOC, using envelope theorem, for second endogenous state in the model (qt)
which is the proportion of risky firms (See Appendix C.4 for derivation) is



















































































The optimal policy results for the special cases when qt hits the bounds of
[0, 1] are mentioned in appendix sections Appendix C.5 and Appendix C.6.
3.3. OPTIMAL POLICY 217
To solve for the optimal policy equilibrium we need to find time-invariant
Markov perfect optimal policy rules for :
a) Six policy variables Ct, Yt, πt, Xt, λrt , qt
b) Five multipliers Λ1,t,Λ2,t,Λ3,t,Λ4,t,Λ5,t, on binding constraints
c) Two pricing conditions for real rates Rrt,t+1, nominal rates Rnt,t+1
d) Two pricing condition for the expected return on equity Et[Reqt,t+1] and the
Value of equity holdings V eqt .
For given exogenous processes of productivity for safe (3.38) firms, a time-
varying multiple (ϑt) for risky firms, and calibrated values of parameters (given
in Table 3.2),
β, ρ, η, h, ω, φ, σ, ψ, χ, τp, γS , σS , ϑ
h, ϑl, k. The discretionary optimal policy is
numerically solved in following section 3.4.
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3.3.2 Solving for Efficient planner
The social planner looks to optimise aggregate household utility subject to feasi-
bility constraints. The value function with respect to a representative household
for the efficient planner is:




















+βEt {Vsp (εS,t+1, Xt, qt, ϑt+1)}











the first order conditions are:
Ct : Λsp2,t = (Ct − hXt)
−ρ − Λsp1,t(1− φ) (3.96)



































By eliminating Λsp2,t in the FOC w.r.t. Yt and qt we can get the optimal risk













































the Consumption Euler equation is
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The above two euler equations alongwith the aggregate habits and the resource
constraints solve for the Social planner equilibrium.
Definition 3.3.1. The social planner’s deterministic equilibrium is given by a
path of allocations for {Ct, Yt, Xt, qt} such that for all t, when ξS,t = 1, ϑt = ϑ
the allocation is stable at {C, Y ,X, q}.
In deterministic steady-state, from the aggregate habits constraint we get that
the steady state of habits is equal to the steady state of consumption, So: X = C
































1− h(1− φ)1− βφ
)
C
−ρ (1− h)−ρ (3.104)
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Therefore from the resource constraint
















which does not have a straightforward solution.
Proposition 3.3.2. The social planner’s deterministic equilibrium exists for any
ϑ.
Proof. See lemma 3.3.3.
Lemma 3.3.3. (i) If ϑ = 1, then A: Y = C = X and B: q = 12 are equivalent.
(ii) If ϑ > 1, then q ∈ (12 , 1].
(iii) If ϑ < 1, then q ∈ [0, 12).
Proof. (i) A implies B, B implies A. Also if monopoly power of the firm increases,
σ ∼ 1 even then the previous solution holds as ϑσ−1 ' ϑ0 = 1.





















can only be negative for feasible values of q ∈ (12 , 1].






















can only be positive for feasible values of q ∈ [0, 12).
Based on the above results it is clear that the first best risk allocation is
> 12 when the expected value of risky firm’s productivity multiple ϑ is > 1, and
it is < 12 when the expected value of risky firm’s productivity multiple is < 1.
Therefore in the first best equilibrium a risk allocation q 6= 12 produces a wedge
between C and Y .
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3.4 Calibration and Numerical solution
The calibrations of parameters are similar to the ones chosen in Chapter 2 and
are mostly standard (as described in Table 3.2). The key difference in these two
chapters is the choice of parameter k (from section 3.2.2.3) which controls for
the slope of risky firm tfp vis-a-vis the safe firm tfp, and the transaction cost
parameter χ.
The slope parameter k depends on the choice of maximum (ϑh) and minimum
(ϑl) values of the risky firm tfp multiple ϑt, and the chosen extreme values of the






S,l . The calibrated value of quarterly parameters of ϑh
is 1.06, and ϑl is 0.94. As a result, the risky firms provides an annual productivity
gain (above safe firm productivity) of around 25% if it stays in the high multiple
state ϑh and an annual loss of around 25% in productivity if it produces at low






S,l are determined from the
extreme ends of the tfp state grid which is at +/- 3 standard deviations from its
mean.
This calibration of productivity parameters is formed on the average pro-
ductivity in the US. The trend multi-factor productivity growth in non-farm
manufacturing sector in the US from 1948-2017 is around 1.02%. The average
multi-factor tfp growth goes up to 1.36% for periods when it is above trend and
falls to -1.15% in years with below-trend productivity growth. Whereas, the
labour productivity in the US from 1988-2017 is more volatile and rises to 100%
annual growth in some periods and falls to -10% in others. On average the labour
factor productivity is +70% in years when it is above trend and -50% in years
when it is below trend. Based on these facts, there is a wide range of calibration
available for high state ϑh and low state ϑl multiples. The calibration chosen in
this paper aims to replicate the stationary trend of US multi-factor productivity.
Quarterly S&P returns are non-negative only around 55% of the times, there-
fore an equally likely choice of ϑ > 1 and ϑ < 1 is not unusual. In this calibration,
both high multiple and low multiple states are equally likely, and it offers a neutral
bet to the risk-neutral agent. A risk-neutral consumer should opt for a 50% pro-
portion of risky firms in the steady-state, which is not far from the international
panel study Apergis, 2015 evidence which puts the risky investments form 35-45%
of the total portfolio.
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The transaction cost parameter χ is freely chosen at 0.05, which effectively
generates a cost of χ/2 or 0.025 that is equal to the ten per cent of steady-







= [0, 0.625%] unit of notional capital. This is a standard transaction
cost faced by investors in financial markets. The calibration of other parameters
is reasonably standard and in line with evidence from micro and macro data.
The inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution parameter ρ is set at 2 as
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and the inverse of Frisch-elasticity η is set
at 4, most estimates place the inverse of Frisch-elasticity for intensive margin
in the range 0 to 0.7 with median around 0.2 (Keane, 2011). The Rotemberg
cost parameter ψ is chosen at 30 to map [as per (Leith and Liu, 2016)] an 8-9
month nominal rigidity under Calvo prices. The CES parameter σ is equal to
6 to give a stationary markup of 20%. The discount factor β is set at 0.99 to
generate a 4.01% annual risk-free rate. Similar to the previous chapter, the habit
parameters for persistence φ is set high at 0.97 to generate the costly recession
effect in agents’ marginal utility. The habit size parameter is set high at 0.85 to
smooth out volatility in asset prices, and the internal habits parameter ω is set at
0.75 which makes the bulk of the habits as internal and generates an inflationary
bias that is closer to observations in data. The corporate tax rate is set at pre-
Trump effective US corporate tax rate of 35%. These parameters solve for global
optimisation of the non-linear model.
3.4.1 Solution procedure
We cannot write the equilibrium policy functions for the discretionary planner as
explicit functions of states and so we cannot solve them in closed form. Therefore,
the policy problem is solved by using Chebyshev’s collation technique9. The
polynomial approximation method looks to identify the Markov-perfect equilibria
where the policy functions evolve according to various states of the model. The
majority of the solution procedure is similar to one described in Section 2.3.1. In
order to avoid the risk of repetition, this section presents only a brief description
of the solution approach and any significant changes to it.
The state space is three dimensional. One of the states is external (εS,t) and
the remaining two (Xt−1, qt−1) are internal. The state spaces for (εS,t, Xt−1, qt−1)
9Chebyshev’s polynomial method used in this thesis derives from its version described in
Leith and Liu (2016), the appendix of that paper also provides algorithms for applying this
technique to optimal policy problems with 1 and 2 state variables.
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Table 3.2: Calibration of Parameters
Parameters Value Target Source
Inverse of EIS ρ 2.0 avg data Campbell et al. (1999)
Discount factor β 0.99 4% p.a. avg return Leith et al. (2016)
Inv. of Frisch Elasticity η 4.0 avg data Keane (2011)
Habits persistence φ 0.97 low vol of asset px Cochrane (2016)
Habits size h 0.85 vol in MU De Paoli et al. (2013)
Internal habits ω 0.75 Chapter 2 result Chen et al. (2009)
Rotemberg Cost ψ 30 8-10m rigidity Leith et al. (2016)
CES σ 6 avg data De Paoli et al. (2013)
Tech adj. Cost χ 0.05 6 period decumu. Rognlie et al. (2018)
Revenue tax τp 0.35 corp tax rate US statistics
safe firms Prod
AR(1) coefficient γS 0.95 Smets et al. (2007)
Stdev. prod. shock σS 0.015 vol of tfp = 2.6% De Paoli et al. (2013)
risky firms Prod
High Prod Multiple ϑh 1.06 +25% in high state US multi tfp, std. cal.
Low Prod Multiple ϑl 0.94 −25% in low state US multi tfp, std. cal.
Safe tfp Grid εS,t [-0.144, 0.144]
Habit Grid Xt−1 [1.46, 1.52]
Risk Grid qt−1 [0.01, 0.99]
Notes : avg data = average micro macro data , MU = marginal utility, px =
price, std. cal. = standard calibration. decumu = Decumulation refers to the
de-accumulation period of assets. Prod = productivity
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Inflation % p.a. π 3.9
Habits X 1.4771
Real multiplier λr 10.60
Risk allocation % q 49.76
Nominal rates % p.a. Rn 7.95
Real rates % p.a. Rr 3.9
Return on Equity % p.a. Req 4.14
Value of Equity V eq 28.6
Simul. volatility US qtrly data Model
Log Cons growth 0.5 - 0.6 % 0.24%
Log Real rate 0.4% 2.22%
Log Output growth 0.6% 0.30%
Log Inflation 0.3% 1.04%
Sharpe ratio 0.2 0.0329
Notes : Parameters of the model are in Table 3.2.
are each divided into set of 9 collocation nodes. The state space is given by their
tensor product or (9⊗ 9⊗ 9). Each node in the state space is a mapping of the
roots of chebyshev’s polynomial of a selected order on the space ∈ [−1, 1]. The
space of approximating functions is three-dimensional and given by the three sets
of Chebyshev polynomials of order 93. The residual equations are defined from
the 15 Euler equations. Gauss-Hermite Quadrature is used to approximate the
expectation terms and first differencing of the Chebyshev polynomials is used to
approximate the partial derivatives to internal states of habits and risk allocation.
Sims’ non-linear solver is employed to solve the resulting non-linear equations for
the choice of parameters given in Table 3.2. The solver guesses the coefficients
that would solve the residual equations in the state space. The guess is updated
until the residual equations converge. According to Judd (1998) convergence
criteria below 10−5 is acceptable. The policy problem is solved when the residual
equations at grid points result in an error of size smaller than 10−8. Size of errors
at off grid points is also very small, the maximum error is below 7.6 x 10−4, mean
error is below 4.6 x 10−5, standard deviation below 9.2x10−5, and considering
that we have included a wide grid of all states where the the optimal policy result
runs into significant non-linearity, this is a very acceptable degree of accuracy.
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The stochastic steady-state results of the procedure are given in Table 3.3. The
stochastic steady-state for consumption and habits is similar and slightly lower
than that of output. The inefficiency wedge from adjustment costs and transaction
costs creates small positive inflation is steady-state for the benchmark calibration.
The simulated stochastic volatility of inflation is higher while both volatilities of
consumption growth and output growth are lower than the observations of data.
This volatility trade-off between output and inflation in the stochastic results
reflects that optimal policy in the model favours a higher stabilization in output
during costly recessions. The expected equity return from the simulated results
is smaller than the 5-6% equity premium observed in data. Including a higher
CES parameter, or an independent stochastic process for tfp for the risky firm
could raise this premium. The ratio of excess returns from the stock index to
the volatility of stock returns, also known as the Sharpe ratio, is smaller for the
model in comparison with US data. It is a result of the excess volatility of stock
returns generated in the model due to a lack of heterogeneity in risky investments.
Including more heterogeneity in risky investments can raise the Sharpe ratio but
will also raise the complexity of the benchmark model. We leave that for future
research.
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3.5 Results and Discussion
The main contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate a Flight to Safety or
reduction in risk allocation qt when risk aversion increases. Risk aversion is state
dependent and varies inversely with the Surplus ratio i.e. ratio of Consumption in
excess of subsistence level of Habits to Consumption. St = Ct−hXtCt . The optimal
path for surplus ratio like its constituents consumption and habits is a function of
all three states viz. safe firm technology (εS,t), habits (Xt−1) and risk allocation
(qt−1), and it responds to various shocks and changes in these states. An increase
in surplus ratio symbolises a reduction in marginal utility and a decrease in
risk aversion and vice versa. However, it is not straightforward to identify what
determines an increase in surplus ratio. For a given combination of habits state
(whether it be low, high or at steady state), the surplus ratio could also be low
or high. It will also be motivated by the level of consumption in those states,
which in itself is determined by the level of risk allocation state qt−1 and safe
firms technology (εS,t). Therefore instead of looking at the three states separately
a better picture of the state of the economy emerges if we consider the optimal
policy choice in the space of the surplus ratio.
3.5.1 Optimal risk allocation policy
Figure 3.1 on page 228 demonstrates the optimal path for risk allocation qt, which
shifts non-linearly with respect to changes in the surplus ratio. The steady-state
level of surplus ratio for the chosen calibration in this model is 1− h = 0.15, and
marked with the red asterisk in fig. 3.1. The first impressions from the fig. 3.1
show that risk allocation is stable at level 1 or there are only risky intermediate
firms in the economy when the surplus ratio is comfortably above the steady-state
level. Whereas, the risk allocation is at 0, or there are 0% risky intermediate firms
in the economy when the surplus ratio is uncomfortably below the steady-state
level. Additional insights from the figure come by reading it in two parts, from
going right to left for lines marked with ‘left arrows’, and from going left to right
for lines marked with ‘squares’.
In the ‘left arrows’ marked lines, there is a change in optimal risk allocation
when the surplus ratio reduces to its steady-state level. The drop in risk allocation
is non-linear and suddenly there is a preference for safe assets (firms) vis-à-vis
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risky assets. The sudden change from 100% risk allocation is a Flight to Safety.
Similarly going from left to right on the solid lines marked with ‘squares’ in
the figure, we can see that at low levels of surplus ratio there is no change in risk
allocation. It is stable at level 0. The household is keeping all investments in
safe technology when its surplus ratio is far lower than the steady-state value of
0.15. As the surplus ratio increases, there is an increase in risk allocation, and the
investor now prefers some risky firms in the portfolio. This abrupt shift in risk
allocation captures a Flight to Risk. As we follow from left to right, improvements
in surplus ratio up to the point of the steady-state level lead to an increase in the
optimal choice of risk allocation.
Figure 3.1 presents a stylised example of optimal policy convergence. Any
point on the Risk-Surplus ratio space is an optimal path depending on the three
different states of the model, viz. safe firm technology (εS,t), past habits (Xt−1)
and past risk allocation (qt−1). This figure shows convergence in optimal policy
over time, for a given initial value of all three states. In the first period, the ‘left
arrows’ marked lines represent states where the safe firm’s tfp is +2 s.d. above
its steady-state, and the habits state is either high (solid lines), low (dash-dots
lines) or at steady state (dotted lines). That is why there are three lines marked
with ‘left arrows’ where each one represents a different starting state of habits
for a common (+2 s.d.) starting state of safe firm’s tfp. Similarly, in ‘squares’
marked lines, the safe firm’s tfp in the first period begins at -2 s.d. away from
its steady-state level. The habits state is either high (solid lines), low (dash-dots
lines) or at steady state (dotted lines) in the first period. Value of risk allocation
state in the first period is at its steady-state level in all lines of this figure. The
surplus ratio varies inversely with an increase of habits. Therefore the initial
position of habit state can also be determined from the starting points of various
lines. After the initial setup, all three states are allowed to evolve optimally, and
the figure plots the resulting optimal policy paths of risk allocation and surplus
ratio. Each line in this figure shows the quarterly time evolution of the optimal
policy, where ‘left arrows’ or ‘squares’ markers mark the first 24 quarterly periods
that are separated by a distance of 4 quarters.
A better picture of the Flight to Safety mechanism emerges in Figure 3.2 on
page 229 which zooms in on one section of Figure 3.1. Instead of plotting three
separate lines for three (high, low and steady-state) different first period allocation
of habits, this figure focuses on one initial state of habits. In both charts of this
fig. 3.1 the ‘left arrows’ marked lines represent the transition when the initial
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Figure 3.1: Optimal path for Risk allocation
Notes: Convergence of Risk allocation in the Surplus ratio space. Risk alloca-
tion and Surplus ratio are a function of 3 states, viz. current TFP, past Habits
and past Risk allocation. This stylised example chooses the first period value
of these three states and thereafter plots the optimal policy evolution for risk
allocation and surplus ratio over time. In the ‘Left arrows’ marked lines the
first period value of TFP state is at 2 s.d. above its steady state level, Risk
allocation is at steady state and the Habits state is at a level that is either
above, below or at its steady state. The 3 different ‘left arrows’ marked lines
represent this evolution for various initial states of habits. Similarly, in the
‘Squares’ marked lines the first period value of TFP state is at 2 s.d. below its
steady state level, Risk allocation is at steady state and the Habits state is at a
level that is either above, below or at its steady state. The 3 different ‘squares’
marked lines represent this evolution for various initial states of habits. The
Red asterix represents the Stochastic steady state allocation.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal path for Flight to Safety
Notes: Convergence of Risk allocation in the Surplus ratio space. ∆ represents
one-period change in the variable. Risk allocation and Surplus ratio are a
function of 3 states, viz. current TFP, past Habits and past Risk allocation.
This stylised example chooses the first period value of these three states and
thereafter plots the optimal policy evolution for risk allocation and surplus ratio
over time. In the ‘Left arrows’ marked lines the first period value of TFP state
is at 2 s.d. above its steady state level, Risk allocation is at steady state and
the Habits state is below its steady state. Similarly, in the ‘Squares’ marked
lines the first period value of TFP state is at 2 s.d. below its steady state level,
Risk allocation is at steady state and the Habits state is above its steady state.
The Red asterix represents the Stochastic steady state allocation.
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(first period) state of habits is below its steady-state allocation, and safe firm’s
technology is 2 s.d. above its steady-state level. Whereas the ‘squares’ marked
lines in both charts of this figure represent the transition where the first period
allocation of habits is higher than the steady-state level of habits and the safe
firm’s technology is 2 s.d. below its steady-state level. The risk allocation state
in all lines of this figure begins from its steady-state level. The surplus ratio is
inversely related to habits and starts above 0.15 level for ‘left arrows’ marked lines
and below 0.15 for ‘squares’ marked lines. The risk allocation exhibits Flight to
Safety as there is a sudden preference for safety when the surplus ratio falls from
the 0.16 level towards its steady-state level. Risk aversion decreases, or there is a
Flight to Risk when surplus ratio increases above 0.14 in ‘squares’ marked line.
Interestingly the right-hand chart in Figure 3.2 captures this Flight to Safety
and Flight to Risk phenomena better. It showcases the one-period changes in risk
allocation for various surplus ratio. Around 0.16 and 0.14 levels, there is a sudden
structural shift in risk allocation. Reading the chart from right to left for the
‘left arrows’ marked lines, we can see that the investor does not change her risk
allocation until the time it nears 0.16 and then there is a sudden re-allocation of
the portfolio to favour safety. This significant and sudden drop in risk allocation
captures Flight to Safety.
Similarly, while reading the right-hand chart in Figure 3.2 form left to right,
the ‘squares’ marked lines show a sudden increase in risk allocation when the
surplus ratio increases above 0.14. It demonstrates a Flight to Risk for the investor
whose marginal utility or stochastic discount factor improved for an increase in
the surplus ratio. We can further corroborate these findings from the optimal
policy choices for other variables of the model.
3.5.2 Optimal policy and Surplus ratio
Figure 3.3 on page 231 demonstrates further the non-linearity in optimal policy
choices based on shifts in surplus ratio. In these charts, the vertical green line
highlights the steady-state level (0.15) of Surplus ratio for the current choice
of parameters of the model. Let us read the charts in this figure in two parts.
Going from left to right on the ‘squares’ marked solid lines, and going from right
to left on the ‘left arrows’ marked dash dots lines. Each policy variable is a
function of three states. This figure showcases the convergence of optimal policy
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Figure 3.3: Optimal path for Policy variables
Notes: Convergence of optimal policy choices in the Surplus ratio space. Various
policy functions and Surplus ratio are a function of 3 states, viz. current
TFP, past Habits and past Risk allocation. This stylised example chooses
the first period value of these three states and thereafter plots the optimal
policy evolution for risk allocation and surplus ratio over time. In the ‘Left
arrows’ marked lines the first period value of TFP state is at 2 s.d. above its
steady state level, Risk allocation is at steady state and the Habits state is
below its steady state. Similarly, in the ‘Squares’ marked lines the first period
value of TFP state is at 2 s.d. below its steady state level, Risk allocation is
at steady state and the Habits state is above its steady state. Exp.ret.Equity
is the Expected return from equity investments. The vertical green line in all
charts, marks the steady state level of surplus ratio (0.15). The Red asterix
represents the Stochastic steady state allocation.
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functions for decision variables in the surplus ratio space, for given initial/starting
value of the three states. The ‘left arrows’ marked lines showcase the transition
to steady-state when the first period safe firm’s tfp state was 2 s.d. above its
steady-state, habits state was below its steady-state level, and the risk allocation
state was at its steady-state level. Whereas the ‘squares’ marked lines showcase
the transition to steady-state when the first period safe firm’s tfp state was 2 s.d.
below its steady-state, habits state was below its steady-state level, and the risk
allocation state was at its steady level. The ‘left arrows’ or ‘squares’ markers also
demonstrate the first 24 quarters/periods of the transition, where the spacing
period between two markers represents a lapse of 4 quarters.
Following from right to left in charts of fig. 3.3, any reduction in surplus ratio
leads to a reduction in the optimal choice of consumption and output but an
increase of habits. This increase of habits is not surprising since the high level of
surplus ratio in ‘left arrows’ is partly due to habits being low in comparison to
consumption. Habits keep up with the higher level of consumption and stabilise as
surplus ratio reaches its steady-state mark of 0.15. Following from left to right in
the various charts of fig. 3.3, we see that habits, consumption and output fall very
dramatically to stabilise the surplus ratio. In the presence of costly recessions,
and the way marginal utility is set up in this chapter, and the previous one, a
surplus ratio smaller than 0.15 means the consumption Ct is getting closer to a
subsistence level of habits hXt, and the marginal utility is very high. In that
situation, the objective of the optimal policy is to quickly stabilise the surplus
ratio, which could be done from reducing habits and by avoiding risky ventures,
as shown in previous fig. 3.2. The marginal value of an additional unit of income,
or the real multiplier (λrt ) increases as surplus ratio reduces.
The competitive economy is inefficient, and there is an inflationary bias. The
bias is increasing in the deviation from steady-state of surplus ratio on either
side, and it is minimised when the surplus ratio stabilises. The Expected return
on equity is very high towards both extreme ends of the surplus ratio, but for
different reasons. The high value of the expected return on equity in ‘left arrows’
marked line is due to irrational exuberance, the marginal utility of the agents is
low, the surplus ratio is high, and there is an expectation of the positive TFP
growth to continue. The risk allocation in this phase of the economy is hitting
the upper bound of 1 as equity investors expect to make higher returns on their
investments. Whereas on the left portion of the chart, in ‘squares’ marked line,
investors are exhibiting precautionary behaviour and extreme risk aversion; the
surplus ratio is below steady-state, and the risk allocation is closer to the lower
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Figure 3.4: Scatter plot of Optimal Risk allocation and Surplus ratio































Notes: Results from a 100,000 simulations. ∆ is one-period change in the variable.
bound of 0. Investors in this situation require very high expected return on equity
to part with their savings.
3.5.3 Simulations and Flight to Safety
The optimal policy results have shown us that risk aversion and risk allocation
change with changes in the surplus ratio or agent’s marginal utility. Nevertheless,
the stylised nature of policy results and their dependence on the initial condition
of safe firm’s tfp could make one doubt the feasibility and believability of these
paths or points on the optimal policy - surplus ratio space. Therefore we should
look at optimal policy results from the simulated model, and identify if they
corroborate the previous findings. Figure 3.4 on page 233 describes the optimal
policy results from 100,000 simulations of the model. Markov Chain Monte Carlo
methods are used to simulate the model for various possible initial states of safe
tfp, habits state and risk allocation state. The chart on the left-hand side of the
fig. 3.4 shows the scatter plots of optimal policy results for risk allocation and
surplus ratio in the simulated model. A key theme which emerges from this chart
is that at high levels of surplus ratio, there is 100% risk allocation and at low
levels of surplus ratio, there is 0% risk allocation. The chart on the left hand
has the presence of a flatter scatter pattern in the surplus ratio for each level of
risk allocation, this chart by itself provides inconclusive information about the
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Figure 3.5: Violin plots for Surplus ratio
Notes: Distribution of Surplus ratio in quarters leading up to and following
the onset of Recession. The onset of recessions are mapped to period 0 on
the X-axis. The recessionary periods are identified as those sequences in the
simulated model which initiate periods of negative output growth that last for
at least 4 quarters.
transition dynamics of optimal risk allocation. The left-hand chart is inconclusive
because risk allocation could be high, low or steady depending on initial values
of various states, for any level of surplus ratio.
A clear message emerges from the right-hand chart in this Figure 3.4 on page
233, which plots the one period change in risk allocation vs one period change in
surplus ratio. It demonstrates an increasing relationship between the change in
risk allocation and change in surplus ratio. When surplus ratio decreases, whether
it be from habits being too high in comparison to consumption, or from a windfall
drop in output/consumption due to an adverse tfp surge, or low dividends resulting
from risky equity holdings, or a combination of such factors, such a decrease in the
surplus ratio is coincident with a fall in risk allocation. There are also occasional
values in the right-hand chart of fig. 3.4 when there is no change in risk allocation
(i.e. scatter marks on the y-axis value of zero) for both positive and negative
changes in surplus ratio. These periods represent the phenomenon similar to the
flat lines in fig. 3.1. The risk allocation in these periods was near its lower or
upper bounds. There is either a total aversion of risk or a total acceptance of
risk as the surplus ratio (and marginal utility) is either at a highly comfortable
of highly uncomfortable level for the investor.
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Figure 3.6: Violin plots for Risk allocation
Notes: Distribution of Risk allocation in quarters leading up to and following
the onset of Recession. The onset of recessions are mapped to period 0 on
the X-axis. The recessionary periods are identified as those sequences in the
simulated model which initiate periods of negative output growth that last for
at least 4 quarters.
3.5.4 Ex-ante Flight to Safety
A key finding of the empirical results of the Chapter 1 is that Flight to Safety leads
TFP changes by many quarters, esp. during recessions. The distribution of risk
allocation in the simulated model reveals a similar pattern during periods before
and after the onset recession. The onset of recessions is the beginning period
of a sequence in the simulated model, which initiates periods of negative output
growth that last for at least four quarters. Figure 3.6 on 235 demonstrates that
the simulated model presents dichotomous risk allocation in periods running up to
a recession. The violin (probability) distribution of risk allocation in the recession
period in this figure is highlighted in red colour and mapped to zero on the x-axis.
The violin plots for ten periods before the recession show normal distribution
with fat tails. However, as we approach the period of onset of a recession, the
distribution turns into bimodal. As the economy approaches the recessionary
period there are two kinds of investors, they either have more than 50% or less
than 50% levels of risk allocation. The median risk allocation, which the fig. 3.6
shows as white circles marks on each violin, is increasing as we approach the onset
period of recessions. This dichotomy is corroborated from the median Surplus
ratio responses, displayed as white circles marks on each violin in Figure 3.5 on
234. The surplus ratio distribution displays right-skewness, it has thin tails on the
236 3. FTS AS OPTIMAL POLICY
right side (i.e., above 0.15) several quarters before onset of recessions. It becomes
somewhat bi-modal with a larger density below the steady-state level of 0.15, as
we approach the onset of recessions. The median surplus ratio recovers quickly
post-recessions, as expected since it is revealed to us as the main objective of
optimal policy, and it has a near normal distribution thereafter.
The distribution pattern of risk-allocation is interesting. Considering that
pre-recession there was a normal distribution of risk allocation, with a median of
around 50%, the change of risk allocation distribution as we approach the onset
of recessions from uniform to bimodal represents that some investors exhibited
a Flight to Safety and other exhibited a Flight to Risk in anticipation of a
recessions. The median allocation of risk gets below 0.5 or 50% following the
onset of recessions. It continues falling for some quarters before a full recovery
sets in and the distribution of risk allocation gets back to normal around eight
quarters after the recession. In the case of a single representative agent, the
bimodal distribution of risk allocation before a recession also represents that agent
fluctuating between high and low levels of risk allocation. Thereby exhibiting the
‘risk on’, ‘risk off’ type of pattern that is a feature of episodes of high uncertainty.
The existing models of macro-finance do not exhibit such ex-ante adjustment in
risk allocation.
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions
We have learned that Flight to Safety is an Optimal policy when risk aversion
increases for investors who are facing costly recessions but which also have the
option to control the future riskiness of their income-generating process. The
inclusion of time-varying internal habits which is a device of producing costly
recessions also generates a non-linear increase in the household’s marginal util-
ity and risk aversion. Households at either end of their risk-bearing capacity,
those that consume too close to their subsistence levels or those very well to do,
demonstrate sudden changes in their risk allocation. Such non-linear changes of
risk allocation echo with the ‘risk on’ and ‘risk off’ phenomenon observed in data
during periods of economic uncertainty surrounding the global financial crisis.
This chapter demonstrates the possibility of exploring Flight to Safety from
the perspective of a micro-founded DSGE mechanism and by using non-linear
solution methods to solve for optimal policy. It develops a New Keynesian model
which features internal habits in consumption and an option to switch between
investment projects of different riskiness. It also challenges the standing approach
in literature to consider Flight to Safety phenomenon only as an aberrant re-
action to some form of market externalities, valuation constraints or Knightian
uncertainty and thereby overlooking it for monetary policy.
The simulation results from the model also lend support to the ex-ante changes
in time-varying risk-bearing capacity, which pre-empt the onset of recessions. The
results reinforce the findings from empirical studies, including the ones from this
thesis, that the Flight to Safety that exists even in low-frequency data, has sig-
nificant information about future productivity and business cycle performance.
Habits provide an endogenous and elegant way to generate time-varying risk aver-
sion in the model. A similar parsimonious solution that works with a continuous
set of productive technology with heterogeneity in shock processes would go a
long way in devising a risk-based view of business cycles. It is a challenge worth
surmounting to establish recessions and behaviours, thereby being driven from
individual risk aversion, risk-bearing capacity and desire to shift risk allocation
over time.
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A. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Numerical approach to sign restrictions
Uhlig (2005) shows that a ∈ Rm is an impulse vector iff a is a column of A such
that A is a decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix Σ = AA′ (see Equ.
1.6). Let ÃÃ′ be a Cholesky decomposition of Σ, then a is an impulse vector iff
a = Ãα (A.1)
for some vector α of unit length. Let ri(k) ∈ Rm be the vector response at k
horizon to ith shock in Cholesky decomposition of Σ. Then the impulse response





Given some B = [B′(1), ....,B′(l)], variance-covariance matrix Σ and someK period
ahead forecast horizon after the shock, we need to obtain A(B,Σ, K) the set of all
such impulse vectors. One approach is to use the OLS estimate of VAR, B = B̂
and Σ = Σ̂, for a few choices of K. Monte-Carlo methods can be applied to pick
impulse vectors that lie in set A and obey the sign restrictions. The maximum
and minimum of those impulse responses can be plot to get an estimate of the
bounds of the impulse responses. Analytically Uhlig (2005) discusses a way of
making inference on these impulse responses, by making the following assumption.
Assumption A.1.1. Let Ã(Σ) be the lower-triangular Cholesky factorisation
of Σ. Let Pm be the space of positive-definite m × m matrices and Sm be the
unit sphere in Rm, Sm = {α ∈ Rm : ||α|| = 1}. The parameters (B,Σ, α) are
jointly drawn from a prior on Rl×m×m×Pm×Sm. For both criteria function and
sign-restrictions approach, this prior is proportional to a Normal-Wishart prior
in (B,Σ) whenever the impulse vector a = Ã(Σ)α satisfies a ∈ A(B,Σ, K) and
zero elsewhere.
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If we make this assumption, the impulse vector is parameterized in A(B,Σ, α)
space rather than A(B,Σ, a) space. So the prior is proportional to the Normal-
Wishart prior times an indicator function on Ã(Σ)α ∈ A(B,Σ, K). Therefore,
the posterior is given by usual posterior on (B,Σ) times the indicator function
Ã(Σ)α ∈ A(B,Σ, K).
To draw inference (in the sign-restrictions approach) from this posterior, jointly
draw from unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for (B,Σ) as well as a uniform
distribution over the unit sphere α ∈ Sm. Construct impulse vector using (A.1)
and calculate impulse responses ra(k, j) for k = 1, 2...K horizons, for the j vari-
ables (which are restricted in sign for the K horizon periods). If all the impulse
responses obey sign restrictions, keep the draw, otherwise discard it. Repeat
sufficiently (for 200 times) and do inference on the draws kept.
In the criteria function approach, a penalty function f(j) is written which
penalises the impulse response of a variable in the expected direction (positive
or negative after the shock) significantly less than what it penalises the response
in the opposite of expected direction. The impulse vector a is then defined as
the vector that minimises the total penalty function ψ(a) which is the sum of
all impulse responses for all variables (of interest) to the shock. Calculating the
impulse response in this way requires numerical minimisation. Save both the draw
which is made from the Normal-Wishart prior on (B,Σ) and the resulting impulse
vector for statistical analysis. In order to obtain inference in this approach, make
Assumption A.1.1 and use Monte-Carlo method to pick n = 100 draws from it.
Do numerical minimisation of the total penalty function ψ(a) on each draw and
save the results.
A.2 High-frequency approach to FTS
The structural VAR analysis of the FTS shocks on the macroeconomy has iden-
tified the FTS shocks for the benchmark model with respect to identification
strategy 1. In this section, I discuss another method from the literature that
has been considered in generating FTS series. This comparative analysis follows
from Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) in defining FTS as days of
high stress and high volatility in asset markets that coincide with days of neg-
ative stock-bond return correlation where equity returns are negative and bond
returns are positive. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) used a plethora
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of econometric techniques to develop specific measures of FTS. Based on daily
returns data of benchmark equity index (risky asset) and benchmark 10-yr trea-
sury bond (safe and liquid asset) they have found that on average FTS days are
less than 3% of the sample (trading days between 1980 to 2013 of 23 developed
countries), and that bond returns exceed equity returns by 2.5 to 4% on FTS
days.
One of their techniques is to develop a continuous signal between interval [0, 1]
that signifies the probability or likelihood of FTS occurring on that day. This
measure identifies FTS as a day of occurrence of extremely negative stock return
and simultaneously an extremely positive bond return. Therefore, for country i
FTS is given by
FTSi,t = 1{rbi,t > zi,b} x 1{rsi,t > zi,s} (A.3)
where 1 is the indicator function, rbi,t, rsi,t are country specific return on bond and
stocks index, and zi,b, zi,s are time-varying country specific thresholds that are
directly related to time varying volatility of bond/equity returns. The key variable
in derivation of the FTS days then is the time-varying threshold parameters, zb,
zs that is k standard deviations from time-varying volatilites σb,t, σs,t.
zb = kσb,t and zs = kσs,t (A.4)
There are a couple of methods that can be used to generate this time-varying
volatility of stock and bond prices. A common approach is to fit a Garch (1,1)
on the daily return series. This approach is based on using the Gaussian kernel,
which treats both past and future observations as equally significant in generating
the volatility of any given date. This paper instead relies on Baele, Bekaert,
Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2019) approach that identifies the time-varying long and
short-run volatility by employing backwards-looking Gaussian kernel density esti-
mator1. For long-run volatility estimation, a normal density kernel is used over
past 255 (i.e. near 1 year of trading days), and the weights on the previous 5 days
are ignored. The short-run volatility is estimated by using the backwards-looking
kernel over the last 5 days (i.e. 1 week of trading days). The volatility is modelled
using a simple kernel method is discussed in the next subsection.
1Page 5 of Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht and Wei (2013)
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A.2.1 Kernel density based conditional volatility
Kernel methodology from Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2019) for finding
the short and long run variances and covariances is reproduced for the avid reader.
Given any date t0 in a sample t = 1, ..., T . The kernel method calculates the




Kh(t/T − τ)r2i,t i = s, b (A.5)
where the weightsKh(z) = K(z/h)/h are dependent on how close the observations
are to the point of interest τ , the size of chosen bandwidth h > 0, and the specific
functional form of kernel density estimator. Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and
Wei (2019) suggest the following backward looking Gaussian Kernel.





if z ≤ t− l
T
(A.6)
K(z) = 0 if z > t− l
T
(A.7)
The scaling factor ψ is used to make the weights sum to 100% and l is the
number of past days that are ignored in the variance calculation. For long-run
variances, a bandwidth h of 255 days is chosen, and the last 5 observations (l = 5)
are ignored. In short-run variances the size of h is 5 days and no observations
are ignored, (l = 0). The time-varying short and long-run covariance between
equity and bond return is calculated using the same Kernel density estimator
to the cross-product of bond and equity returns. The time-varying correlation
between these assets is then given by the ratio of the stock-bond covariance to
the product of stock and bond volatilities. Once the time-varying volatilities and
covariances are determined, we proceed in the next section to generate an FTS
incidence indicator by using either a Threshold-based or an Ordinal rank-based
approach. Figure 1.7 on page 19 highlights the results from short and long-run
variance and covariance produced from the backwards-looking Kernel methods.
A comparison between this nuanced backwards-looking Kernel-based method and
a trivial alternative Rolling days method is made in Figure A.1 on page 257. The
rolling days method chooses past 250 days of returns for calculating long run
time-varying volatility and chooses past 5 days of returns for calculating the short
run time-varying volatility. The rolling days method places equal weights to all
past observations and therefore has higher peaks and lower troughs.
A.2. HIGH-FREQUENCY APPROACH TO FTS 247
A.2.2 Threshold approach to FTS
The first approach to identify FTS days is based on the coexeedance approach
in Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013) that studies contagion across
emerging markets by counting joint occurrences of extreme (or beyond a certain
threshold) events. The significance of the events is compared to what would be
expected under certain normal distributions.
Denote rt = (re,t,−rb,t) as the series of observed equity returns and negative
of observed bond returns. The change of sign of the bond return observation
is crucial. Recall that the FTS event is marked by a joint observation of bond
returns being above a defined positive threshold and equity returns being below
a defined negative threshold. If such a cumulative density function under the
assumption of joint normality between stock and negative of bond returns were
to be plotted on a two-dimensional grid with equity returns on the horizontal
axis and the negative of bond returns on the vertical axis. It would showcase an
FTS event to be lying in the bottom left, or south-west corner also known as the
third quadrant of the two-axis coordinate system. Assuming that both equity
and bond returns are normally distributed, with mean zero, so ri,t ∼ N(0,Ωt). In
this joint normal distribution the cumulative probability of a threshold that is set
equal to negative (κ) times the standard deviation of the respective equity and






where the variance-covariance matrix Ωt consists of the variances of bond and eq-
uity return, σe,t and σb,t are respective time-varying volatilities, and the covariance







The threshold κ can be calibrated to deliver on a targeted number of events that
are considered extreme or demonstrate FTS. An observation is considered extreme
(or demonstrates FTS) when the Probobs,t is less than Probths,t, i.e. the observed
equity returns and negative of bond returns are below the threshold,
Probobs,t < Probths,t = Prob
 re,t < −κσe,t
−rb,t < −κσb,t
 (A.10)
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Therefore the probability of FTS in the threshold method can be calculated as
FTSt = 1{rb,t > 0} x 1{rs,t < 0} x 1{Probobs,t < Probths,t} x (1− Probobs,t)
(A.11)
where the first term checks if the bond returns are positive, the second term
checks if the stock return is negative and the third indicator function marks
extreme events, i.e. when the cumulative probability of the event is lower than
the cumulative probability of the threshold event. Once a day is deemed to have
exhibit FTS, the last term puts a higher probability to more extreme events. So
for a threshold probability of 0.04, only an observation that has strictly negative
stock return, strictly positive bond return and has a cumulative probability density
of Probobs < 0.04 can be counted as an FTS event. The FTS probability of that
date is then set to be 1− Probobs, which will be greater than 0.96.
Whether an event would be extreme enough to be characterised as an FTS
depends on the threshold κ, for instance, if we choose the threshold κ to be equal
to 1.25 (time-varying) standard deviation below the mean equity or negative bond
return, this would lead to a higher number of FTS days than we would get by
setting a threshold κ of 2.0. Figure A.2 on page 258 plots the FTS incidence,
calculated using the Threshold method, for different choices of the threshold
(κ). In fig. A.2, the threshold probability is time-varying as it depends on the
time-varying volatilities of stock and bond returns.
A.2.3 Ordinal index approach to FTS
Another way to identify FTS using kernel density based measure of time-varying
volatility of returns and a threshold criteria, is the Ordinal index approach. This
alternative method is based on Kremer, Lo Duca, and Holló (2012) composite
measure of determining stress in financial system. Their method generates the
composite index by aggregating the empirical (ranked) cumulative probability
distribution over several indicators. So far, we have used the definition of FTS as
the extreme chance of generating excess positive bond returns and excess negative
equity returns. To this, using Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2019), we
can add several other features of the market that accompany any FTS event, such
as:
Strong features:
a) the size of difference between bond and equity return,
b) the dip in the difference between long and short run stock-bond correlation,
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c) the spike in the difference between short term and long term equity return
volatility.
and Weak features:
d) strictly negative bond return and strictly positive equity return,
e) short-term bond equity return correlation is negative and strictly below the
long-term level,
f) ratio of short term to long term equity volatility is above a threshold k such
that k > 1.
Once we have the time-varying long and short term volatility, the value of
these six features for any day in the sample can be easily calculated using daily
stock and bond market returns. The three strong features are all continuous
data and are structured so that a high values occurs on days of FTS. The three
weak features are binary, indicating whether the feature is achieved or not on any
day in the sample, these are expected to take their ‘true’ value for FTS days. A
combination of these results can be used to develop a continuous series of FTS
likelihood for any day in the sample.
The procedure begins by generating ordinal ranks for each observation on each
of the three strong features in the entire sample. The ordinal rankings for each
feature are normalised to be ∈ [0, 1]. Thereafter a composite rank ∈ [0, 1] for
each day in the sample is obtained by averaging its ranking on the three strong
features. Therefore an ordinal incidence rank of 0.9 or of 90% for a day in our
sample signifies that only 10% of the total days in the sample have higher average
ordinal rank than that particular day. This ordinal number can be read as a
FTS likelihood series, where the closer the averaged rank gets to 1, the higher
is the likelihood of FTS event occurring on that day. This estimate of the FTS
likelihood can be futher improved by considering the weak features of FTS days.
Consider the Ordinal rank of all days that satisfy the weak symptoms of FTS,
and consider the lowest of these ranks as a threshold. All days in the sample with
ordinal rank below the rank of threshold are allocated an FTS probability of zero.
The FTS probability of the threshold is assigned as 1 minus the probability of its
‘false positives’. In order to obtain the ‘false positives’ for the threshold number,
first determine the number of days in the sample that have an ordinal rank larger
than the rank of the threshold, and then calculate the percentage of those days
that fail to satisfy all of the three weak symptoms of FTS. Similarly we could
rely on the weak features to obtain FTS probability measure for the observations
that have an ordinal rank above the ordinal rank of threshold. FTS Probability
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of those observations is also equal to one minus the probability of observing their
‘false positives’.
For instance, suppose that the ordinal rank on 3rd Aug 2018 is 0.7 which is
greater than the ordinal rank of threshold 0.62 for that day. And of the 300 days
in the sample that have an ordinal rank above 0.7, near 23% fail to satisfy all
three weak features of FTS, then the ‘false positive’ probability of 3rd Aug 2018
is 23% and its FTS probability is given by (1− 23%) = 67%.
The choice of threshold in this setup is determined by the lowest ordinal rank
that satisfies the 3 weak features, however the third of those weak features involves
subjectivity in the choice of k > 1, i.e. the ratio of short to long term equity
volatility should be above k on FTS days, where k could be any number greater
than 1 that could be chosen by the researcher. Based on different choices of k,
Figure A.3 on page 259 plots the FTS incidences and their probabilities.
A.2.4 FTS and FTR days
The results of the threshold approach are presented for various levels of threshold
κ in fig. A.2, and the results from the ordinal approach are presented in fig. A.3.
In both these approaches as we increase the threshold criteria (κ or Probths or
k), there is a decrease in FTS days. Therefore to obtain the desired level of FTS
likelihood, a relevant threshold can be calibrated.
The daily FTS series is aggregated to generate a monthly and quarterly series.
The charts in Figure A.5 describe this aggregation for the Ordinal index approach
for k = 1.25. While it is straightforward to interpret the frequency charts in
fig. A.5, as the total number of FTS events that occurred in a given time frame,
interpreting the quarterly aggregate of FTS probability as given in fig. A.5 can
be a bit confusing, but it is relevant to get the full incidence and impact of
FTS events that may be missing from an aggregated series that is only based
on frequency. In a frequency-based aggregation, a quarter with 4 FTS events is
weighted higher than a quarter with 3 FTS events. However, it is possible that
the 3 FTS events were all very extreme occurrences while the 4 FTS events were
mild. Therefore an aggregate measure that sums up the extremity of FTS events
is required. One approach to achieve this is by aggregating the sums of FTS
probability in each quarter and dividing it by 62.5, which is the number of trading
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days in a quarter. This gives us a measure of the likelihood or probability of FTS
days in that quarter.
Based on this aggregation we witness from both the heatmaps (in fig. 1.6
on page 17 and the bubbles chart in fig. A.5 on page 261) that there is a higher
likelihood of FTS cases in periods surrounding the events of global market distress,
such as the inflation of 70s, the Russia, Tequilla and Asian crisis, the Dot-com
bubble and the Great Recession. There is also an upsurge in FTS events and
probability in the last 5 years.
Similarly, we can run a complimentary exercise using the same methods,
i.e. the ordinal index and the threshold approach to generate a Flight to Risk
(FTR) variable. This can be achieved by considering periods when the return
on equity index is positive and return on the bond index is negative, and this
difference is above a threshold when using the threshold method, or if using
the Ordinal method, the ordinal ranking of such days lies is in tails of a fitted
cumulative probability distribution. A comparison of FTS and FTR days using
the ordinal index method with threshold k of 1, as shown in Figure A.4 on page
260, demonstrates that incidence of both FTS and FTR events has increased since
the late 1990s and that FTS events have bigger and more frequent spikes than
FTR.
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A.3 Tables
Table A.1: FEVD of Investment with Identification Strategy 1
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
12.97 17.51 13.08 7.67 9.26
(1.46, 44.78) (2.47, 49.93) (1.45, 45.92) (0.89, 32.67) (0.81, 40.68)
4
9.39 38.13 9.62 11.46 8.00
(1.77, 34.73) (8.38, 64.47) (1.89, 26.36) (1.73, 35.46) (2.00, 30.86)
8
7.54 37.35 8.69 13.96 8.92
(1.22, 30.02) (6.29, 64.09) (1.75, 22.89) (2.35, 38.12) (2.16, 30.59)
12
7.75 40.45 8.39 11.80 8.21
(1.69, 31.57) (8.90, 66.37) (1.61, 20.80) (2.15, 35.60) (2.02, 28.34)
16
8.64 42.46 7.76 11.15 7.93
(2.15, 32.39) (10.77, 66.06) (1.94, 20.29) (2.17, 34.50) (1.95, 26.81)
20
9.25 42.77 7.63 10.97 7.77
(2.69, 33.52) (11.45, 65.29) (2.16, 20.13) (2.44, 34.26) (2.27, 26.13)
24
9.82 42.53 7.71 11.00 7.91
(2.93, 33.87) (11.86, 64.32) (2.49, 20.16) (2.60, 33.54) (2.34, 25.81)
28
10.17 42.17 8.04 11.03 8.01
(3.17, 33.64) (12.16, 63.72) (2.75, 20.16) (2.80, 32.99) (2.47, 25.58)
30
10.22 41.99 8.16 11.05 8.11
(3.37, 33.64) (12.27, 63.50) (2.94, 20.21) (2.82, 32.74) (2.48, 25.50)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model identified
with Identification Strategy 1. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table A.2: FEVD of Investment in Great Moderation period
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
10.56 10.62 19.96 11.90 11.44
(0.72, 42.80) (1.24, 30.78) (3.09, 66.15) (0.65, 38.26) (0.70, 41.78)
4
9.18 20.23 14.90 13.40 12.41
(2.05, 34.70) (5.44, 48.47) (3.43, 41.11) (2.56, 44.71) (1.94, 34.98)
8
7.86 24.51 14.38 12.04 10.33
(1.29, 35.73) (5.46, 57.31) (3.15, 37.26) (1.92, 42.57) (1.23, 32.53)
12
7.84 24.18 14.51 11.84 10.62
(1.09, 35.76) (5.14, 56.29) (3.30, 38.31) (1.82, 42.67) (1.47, 32.39)
16
8.27 24.18 15.97 12.27 10.73
(1.51, 35.47) (4.78, 54.72) (3.85, 38.15) (2.13, 41.80) (1.86, 33.13)
20
8.62 23.51 16.84 12.14 10.67
(2.20, 36.61) (4.57, 53.21) (4.65, 39.58) (2.94, 40.57) (2.55, 31.64)
24
9.62 22.70 17.59 12.77 10.81
(3.08, 35.45) (4.60, 51.32) (5.60, 39.82) (3.57, 39.84) (3.34, 31.11)
28
10.63 21.70 17.62 12.52 11.84
(3.84, 34.26) (4.53, 49.54) (6.58, 39.68) (3.97, 39.09) (4.08, 31.35)
30
10.97 21.37 17.74 12.77 11.81
(4.11, 33.72) (4.53, 48.56) (6.84, 39.41) (4.18, 39.17) (4.44, 31.55)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model in Great
Moderation period data (1983-2007) identified with Identification Strategy 1. Median
level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table A.3: FEVD of Investment in Pre-Great Moderation period
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
8.78 7.45 14.98 23.12 16.82
(2.14, 23.52) (0.61, 25.97) (1.02, 48.08) (2.73, 57.36) (1.22, 47.26)
4
5.50 9.67 8.56 32.62 21.52
(3.11, 15.10) (1.82, 34.20) (1.47, 29.15) (5.28, 57.94) (4.79, 56.39)
8
18.76 6.32 5.86 29.73 25.60
(12.32, 27.66) (1.32, 21.99) (2.35, 23.02) (9.04, 50.18) (8.14, 49.35)
12
27.13 5.68 5.69 26.08 24.57
(15.84, 36.87) (1.21, 19.14) (2.44, 20.88) (8.40, 45.55) (8.57, 43.53)
16
27.22 5.80 6.21 25.54 25.10
(15.25, 37.94) (1.53, 18.98) (3.15, 20.05) (8.36, 45.12) (8.60, 43.74)
20
27.25 5.79 6.33 25.05 26.26
(14.67, 38.51) (1.67, 18.65) (3.46, 19.55) (8.39, 45.11) (8.89, 44.67)
24
27.96 5.69 6.21 24.54 26.61
(14.41, 39.69) (1.64, 18.12) (3.46, 18.76) (8.32, 44.81) (8.87, 46.03)
28
28.52 5.57 6.24 24.28 26.50
(14.32, 40.98) (1.59, 17.63) (3.50, 17.95) (8.35, 44.32) (9.14, 45.79)
30
28.65 5.56 6.32 24.16 26.57
(14.27, 41.36) (1.57, 17.42) (3.48, 17.63) (8.38, 44.55) (9.29, 46.45)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model in pre Great
Moderation period data (1954-1978) identified with Identification Strategy 1. Median
level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table A.4: FEVD of Investment with Identification Strategy 2
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
7.31 15.18 23.61 12.34 4.19
(0.34, 32.83) (2.36, 51.54) (2.62, 72.04) (0.93, 38.08) (0.52, 17.76)
4
23.55 16.18 19.95 11.15 5.66
(7.08, 47.50) (2.99, 43.74) (3.63, 50.98) (2.71, 33.19) (1.65, 21.85)
8
25.32 11.75 21.49 11.89 6.74
(5.24, 48.81) (1.70, 36.50) (3.10, 47.29) (1.99, 35.21) (1.19, 26.75)
12
27.06 12.95 18.40 11.63 7.25
(5.91, 51.14) (2.90, 37.11) (2.66, 43.81) (1.70, 34.47) (1.01, 26.05)
16
27.83 13.59 17.88 11.92 7.68
(6.77, 50.80) (3.99, 37.90) (2.81, 40.85) (1.75, 33.98) (1.02, 25.92)
20
28.17 14.21 18.46 11.81 7.71
(6.76, 49.62) (4.90, 37.91) (3.31, 39.49) (2.00, 33.51) (1.11, 25.81)
24
28.21 14.39 18.66 11.85 7.87
(7.02, 48.75) (5.64, 38.18) (3.72, 38.71) (2.33, 33.02) (1.23, 25.52)
28
27.92 14.60 18.54 11.85 8.00
(7.19, 48.00) (6.23, 38.15) (4.14, 38.14) (2.65, 32.56) (1.48, 25.38)
30
27.78 14.64 18.48 11.81 7.97
(7.21, 47.64) (6.48, 38.15) (4.25, 38.05) (2.68, 32.34) (1.59, 25.43)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model identified
with Identification Strategy 2. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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Table A.5: FEVD of Investment with Identification Strategy 3
Horizon TFP FTS MP SRatio Residual
1
4.05 14.09 39.70 6.25 2.61
(0.13, 19.80) (1.71, 58.41) (8.94, 78.99) (0.66, 32.25) (0.45, 11.70)
4
28.01 24.99 17.91 9.59 5.12
(7.74, 48.65) (4.50, 50.14) (4.23, 37.20) (2.67, 27.08) (1.11, 19.03)
8
33.34 24.37 17.36 10.51 5.62
(7.39, 51.82) (4.35, 43.88) (3.80, 31.07) (1.97, 29.27) (1.18, 23.71)
12
34.61 25.82 14.18 11.46 5.88
(8.40, 55.76) (5.25, 43.42) (3.37, 26.43) (2.10, 30.79) (1.22, 24.93)
16
34.97 26.54 12.75 11.99 5.89
(9.14, 56.37) (6.06, 43.17) (3.40, 23.90) (2.26, 31.37) (1.16, 25.32)
20
34.64 27.22 12.39 12.20 6.01
(9.26, 56.75) (6.59, 42.86) (3.40, 23.06) (2.23, 31.53) (1.33, 25.39)
24
34.05 27.37 12.26 12.23 6.15
(9.16, 56.36) (7.13, 42.74) (3.36, 22.74) (2.35, 31.60) (1.39, 24.91)
28
33.74 27.55 12.10 12.53 6.37
(9.30, 56.15) (7.62, 42.60) (3.33, 22.45) (2.67, 31.63) (1.66, 24.61)
30
33.70 27.35 12.01 12.58 6.45
(9.50, 55.90) (7.90, 42.57) (3.31, 22.28) (2.83, 31.61) (1.72, 24.47)
Notes: FEVD of Private Investment from all shocks in the benchmark model identified
with Identification Strategy 3. Median level and 68% confidence bands are reported.
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A.4 Figures
Figure A.1: Volatility from Kernel and Rolling days method
Notes: Long term (LT) and Short term (ST) conditional volatility, variance, correlation and
covariance for daily returns on S&P 500 and US 10 year Treasury bonds. The long run variances
are calculated by using a backward looking kernel of 250 days, whereas short run variances
are based on backward looking kernel of 5 days. The rolling days volatility calculation puts
equal weight on past 250 days for Long run and on past 5 days for Short run calculation. See



















Figure A.2: Threshold approach to FTS
Notes: Cumulative probability density of observation (in circles) and time-varying threshold (solid line) on days that are considered
as FTS (i.e. when Probs < Prths). The threshold is set below ‘kappa’ times the conditional volatility of asset returns rt = (re,t,−rb,t).
Parentheses in chart titles signify the percentage of total days from 1965 to 2019 that count as FTS for a particular choice of threshold








Figure A.3: Ordinal index approach to FTS
Notes: FTS probability of observations whose Ordinal rank is above the rank of chosen threshold k. Varying levels of threshold are
set by choosing different k, or the 3rd weak feature of FTS, which requires the short to long run ratio of stock return volatility on
FTS day to be greater than k, s.t k > 1. Y-axis: the probability of each FTS event, X-axis: date (in years).
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Figure A.4: FTS and FTR shocks from Ordinal index method
































Notes: Quarterly and monthly average of FTS and FTR probability calculated from
Ordinal index method discussed in Appendix A.2.3 with k equal to 1.
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Figure A.5: Frequency and Likelihood of Flight to Safety days II
Notes: Aggregated Likelihood (prob) & frequency (days) of Flight to Safety (FTS).
Aggregated by month (mth) & quarter (qtr) from 1963 to 2019. FTS days are calculated
by Ordinal index approach (see Appendix A.2.3), for k = 1.25. Aggregated likelihood,
or strength of FTS, for each month or quarter in the studied period is calculated by
adding the cdf probability value for each FTS day during that period.
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Figure A.6: Time-series plots of US macroeconomic variables
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Notes : Cons(NDur+Svc) is the Non-surables and Services consumption, Rel.Px Inv is
relative price of Investment in terms of the price of Consumption. Rel.Px Inv+Dur is
relative price of Investment and Durables consumption in terms of price of Services+Non
durables consumption. px stands for price, Cons for consumption, Inv for investment,
Res for residential, emp for employee, vac for vacancy, TR for total return, earn for
earnings, Cape for Cyclical adjusted price to earnings. Except for ratios and series
labelled in %, all other time series are in logs. X-axis: years in last 2 digits (YY) format.
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Figure A.7: First-differenced plots of US macroeconomic variables
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Notes : Cons(NDur+Svc) is the Non-surables and Services consumption, Rel.Px Inv is
relative price of Investment in terms of the price of Consumption. Rel.Px Inv+Dur is
relative price of Investment and Durables consumption in terms of price of Services+Non
durables consumption. px stands for price, Cons for consumption, Inv for investment,
Res for residential, emp for employee, vac for vacancy, TR for total return, earn for
earnings, Cape for Cyclical adjusted price to earnings. Except for ratios and series
labelled in %, all other time series are in logs. X-axis: years in last 2 digits (YY) format.
264 A. FTS IN BUSINESS CYCLES - APPENDIX
B. Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Equity Premium






ΩMR = λrt+1 (B.2)

























with risk-free returns: nominal Rnt,t+1 ≡ 1V nt and real R
r
t,t+1 ≡ 1V rt . the Return on
equity
Et[Reqt,t+1] ≡
Et[V eqt+1 + dt+1]
V eqt
(B.6)
Comparing the above equations for Rrt,t+1 and R
eq
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where Expectation of product on the RHS is
Et
[
ΩMR(V eqt+1 + dt+1)
]
= EtΩMREtV eqt+1 + EtΩMREtdt+1
+ cov(ΩMR, (V eqt+1 + dt+1)) (B.8)













so we can say
V eqt =
Et[V eqt+1 + dt+1]
Rrt,t+1
+ cov(Ω
MR, (V eqt+1 + dt+1))
Rrt,t+1Et[ΩMR]
(B.10)
similarly we calculate the expected return on equity
Et[Reqt,t+1] = Rrt,t+1 −
cov(ΩMR, (V eqt+1 + dt+1))
V eqt Et[ΩMR]
(B.11)
Equity Premium is the difference
ln(Et[Reqt,t+1])− ln(Rrt,t+1)
and dividends from (2.13) are
dt = Ct − wNt − τpYt (B.12)
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B.2 Efficient competitive equilibrium
In steady state the marginal cost ϕ is given by









(π − 1) π − ψ
σ
β (π − 1) π (B.14)
where π is the desired rate of inflation. Firm’s marginal cost is equal to the wage
rate which in the steady state using consumption-leisure MRS (2.25) and resource
constraint is given as
ϕ = w = Y ηCρ
(
1− h(1− φ)1− φ
)ρ (
1− h(1− φ)ω1− βφ
)−1
(B.15)
ϕ = Y η+ρ
[
1− ψ2 (π − 1)
2
]ρ (
1− h(1− φ)1− φ
)ρ (






1− ψ2 (π − 1)
2
]−ρ (
1− h(1− φ)1− φ
)−ρ (
1− h(1− φ)ω1− βφ
)
(B.17)



























whether the efficient output Y ∗ (2.70) is ≷ than steady state competitive equilib-
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B.3 Variance of SDF











































= −ρ (log(Ct+1)− log(Ct) + log(St+1)− log(St)) (B.25)
by using lowercase letters for log notation,
mt+1 = −ρ (ct+1 − ct + st+1 − st) (B.26)
and the variance becomes,
vart(mt+1) = ρ2Et [ct+1 − Etct+1 + st+1 − Etst+1]2 (B.27)
= ρ2 (vart(ct+1) + vart(st+1) + 2covt(ct+1, st+1)) (B.28)
where the conditional expectations of all time t variables are eliminated. Approx-
imating the surplus ratio to second order is sufficient to get a usable third order
term for the variance and co-variance terms in var(mt+1). The surplus ratio,
st+1 = log(Ct+1 − hXt+1)− log(Ct+1). (B.29)
Second order Taylor expansion around the steady state is,
st+1 = log(1− h) +
h
1− h
 ĉt+1 − x̂t+1 + (1− h)−1ĉt+1x̂t+1
−12(2− h)(1− h)
−1ĉ2t+1 − 12h(1− h)
−1x̂2t+1
(B.30)
where the superscriptˆover variables describes their deviation from steady state,
and in steady state x = c. We write, x̂t+1 = x̃t as habits in period t+1 depend on
variables known in period t. By defining the notation Ψ0 := h1−h , and by removing
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ˆsuperscript over variables for ease of notation, we can specify,
st+1 = log(1− h) + Ψ0
[



























































































it can be simplified as,
vart(mt+1) = Ψ1vart(ct+1) + Ψ2covt(ct+1, c2t+1) + Ψ3vart(c2t+1) (B.36)
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To compute the variance and covariances, let’s consider the flexible price allocation
of output, from the NKPC for internal habits,
0 = (1− σ)(1− τp,t) + σξ−1y,tY
η
t (Ct − hXt)ρ (B.40)
it can be simplified to get an expression for flexible price allocation c∗ = y∗,
c∗t = y∗t = Υ−1
[
ετ,t + ηεy,t + ρ(1− h)−1hx̃t−1
]
. (B.41)




, and avoiding the ∗ for ease of notation the variance,







covt(ct+1, c2t+1) = covt
 Υ−1 (γτετ,t + ετ,t+1 + ηγyεy,t + ηεy,t+1 + ρΨ0x̃t) ,
Υ−2 (γτετ,t + ετ,t+1 + ηγyεy,t + ηεy,t+1 + ρΨ0x̃t)2
 .(B.44)
As shocks are Gaussian and uncorrelated, we can write





Substituting equation (B.43), (B.45) into (B.36), and ignoring the var(c2t+1) terms,
vart(mt+1) = Υ−2
[
























(γτετ,t + ηγyεy,t + ρΨ0x̃t)
 (B.47)
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, Φ1 = η(1 − h) + ρ, and
making use of the notations,
κx =








η−1ρh(2− h)(1− φ) + Φ1γy(1− h) + Φ1(γy + φ− 1)
Φ21
(B.54)







1 + 2Ψ20 + 3Ψ20 (κxx∗t − κτετ,t − κyηεy,t)
]
. (B.55)
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B.4 Figures
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Figure B.1: Deviation caused by Productivity Shocks in various states
























































Notes: Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1%
quarterly productivity shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditioned by assuming no change in
tax rate for the entire horizon. The various states are defined as: Normal state - when
Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state (SSS) in the shock period, Contraction
state - when Habits are above +2s.d. of their SSS, and Expansion state - when Habits
are below -2.s.d. below their SSS. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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Figure B.2: Deviation caused by Cost Shocks in various states






















































Notes: Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1%
quarterly shock to the Tax rate. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditional on assuming no change
in productivity for the entire horizon. The various states are defined as: Normal
state - when Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state (SSS) in the shock period,
Contraction state - when Habits are above +2s.d. of their SSS, and Expansion state -
when Habits are below -2.s.d. below their SSS. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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Notes: Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a +1%
quarterly productivity shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditioned by assuming no change in
tax rate for the entire horizon. The various states are defined as: Normal state - when
Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state (SSS) in the shock period, Contraction
state - when Habits are above +2s.d. of their SSS, and Expansion state - when Habits
are below -2.s.d. below their SSS. The various models are defined as: Benchmark -
when Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal - when Habits
are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External - when Habits are 1% internal
(ω = 0.01) and 99% external. All charts in a row share a common Y-axis which is
labelled for charts in first column. All charts in a column share a common X-axis
which is labelled for charts in the last row. X-axis: time horizon (in quarters).
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Notes: Annualised deviation (%) from their pre shock levels, upon impact of a
+1% quarterly Tax rate shock. Policy functions depend on three states viz. Habits,
Productivity and Taxes. All the responses are conditional on assuming no change
in Productivity for the entire horizon. The various states are defined as: Normal
state - when Habits are at their Stochastic Steady state (SSS) in the shock period,
Contraction state - when Habits are above +2s.d. of their SSS, and Expansion state
- when Habits are below -2.s.d. below their SSS. The various models are defined as:
Benchmark - when Habits are 75% internal (ω = 0.75) and 25% external. Internal -
when Habits are 99% internal (ω = 0.99) and 1% external. External - when Habits
are 1% internal (ω = 0.01) and 99% external. All charts in a row share a common
Y-axis which is labelled for charts in first column. All charts in a column share a
common X-axis which is labelled for charts in the last row. X-axis: time horizon (in
quarters).
C. Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Cost minimisation of final goods firms


















































C.2 Profit maximisation of final goods firms
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All homogeneous final firms face a similar demand function, set the same prices
demand same amount of intermediate goods, and therefore have the same marginal
cost and the same markup. So we can derive the NKPC (3.35) in given in main
text.
C.2.1 Wage index
Substituting the supply function for both risky (3.49) and safe (3.41) intermedi-
ate firms in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for the final firm (3.29) and by using
















































Each household supplies equal units of labour (NRt ) to all (qt−1) risky intermediate
firms and equal units of labour (NSt ) to all (1− qt−1) safe intermediate firms. The
Labour market equilibrium (Nt = qt−1NRt + (1− qt−1)NSt ) is written1 in terms of
intermediate firm’s technology as
Nt = qt−1Y Rt ϑ−1t ξ
−1
1+η


























1Parameter η when equal to σ − 2 can eliminate the exponential terms on Qt and ξS,t.
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C.2.3 Labour income

























or we can substitute the Labour in consumer utility function with



















































 1η . (C.11)
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C.3 Partial derivatives of auxiliary functions
∂ΩP (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
∂Xt
=
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C.4 Derivation of Optimal policy
The FOC wrt to endogenous state variables.
Xt : 0 = −h (Ct − hXt)−ρ + β
∂Et
{









































∂Vd (εS,t, Xt−1, qt−1)
∂Xt−1
= −φΛ1,t (C.13)
and one-step forward iteration
∂Et
{
Vd (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
}
∂Xt
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and by the taking the derivative inside the integral, we can re-write the FOC for
Habit as,
Xt : 0 = −
h
(Ct − hXt)ρ




































FOC wrt proportion of risky firms is
qt : 0 = β
∂Et
{









































































































Thereafter taking the derivative inside the integral, FOC for risk allocation qt
becomes,






























































= −(σ + η)
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C.5 Solving for Optimal policy when q = 0
Value function for the discretionary problem as q ∈ [0, 1] reaches lower bound,













Vd− (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
}
 (C.23)
It is subject to the 4 constraints on Habit accumulation (3.69), Aggregate Resource
allocation(3.70), Inflation NKPC (3.71), and Consumption Euler equation CEE
(3.72). The optimal policy problem can then be formulated as the Lagrangian,
Ld− =
(









Vd− (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
}
+Λ1,t (Xt − (1− φ)Ct − φXt−1)
+Λ2,t
([





















where ΩP−(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) and ΩC
−(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) are the auxiliary functions that
depend on future policy decisions.
ΩP−(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) ≡ (πt+1 − 1) πt+1λrt+1Yt+1 (C.25)
ΩC−(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) ≡ (Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ − λrt+1. (C.26)
Defining the auxiliary function















ΩλY −(εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
]
− 12 . (C.28)
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The policy rate in constraint (3.75) is chosen to optimize other policy functions.
It is always binding and therefore not included in the Lagrangian specification.
First order conditions
The FOCs with respect to the decision variables.
Ct : 0 = (Ct − hXt)−ρ − Λ1,t(1− φ)− Λ2,t
+ Λ4,t [1− h(1− φ)ω] ρ (Ct − hXt)−ρ−1 (C.29)























πt : 0 = −Λ2,tYtψ (πt − 1)− Λ3,t [ψ (2πt − 1)] (C.31)
Xt : 0 = −
h
(Ct − hXt)ρ
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C.6 Solving for Optimal policy when q = 1
Value function for the discretionary problem as q ∈ [0, 1] reaches upper bound













Vd+ (εS,t+1, Xt, qt)
}
 (C.34)
It is subject to the 4 constraints on Habit accumulation (3.69), Aggregate Resource
allocation(3.70), Inflation NKPC (3.71), and Consumption Euler equation CEE
(3.72). The optimal policy problem can then be formulated as the Lagrangian,
Ld+ =
(













+Λ1,t (Xt − (1− φ)Ct − φXt−1)
+Λ2,t
([

































where ΩP+(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) and ΩC
+(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) are the auxiliary functions that
depend on future policy decisions.
ΩP+(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) ≡ (πt+1 − 1) πt+1λrt+1Yt+1, (C.35)
ΩC+(εS,t+1, Xt, qt) ≡ (Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ − λrt+1. (C.36)
Defining the auxiliary function



















− 12 . (C.38)
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The policy rate in constraint (3.75) is chosen to optimize other policy functions.
It is always binding and therefore not included in the Lagrangian specification.
First order conditions
The FOCs with respect to the decision variables.
Ct : 0 = (Ct − hXt)−ρ − Λ1,t(1− φ)− Λ2,t
+ Λ4,t [1− h(1− φ)ω] ρ (Ct − hXt)−ρ−1 (C.39)



























πt : 0 = −Λ2,tYtψ (πt − 1)− Λ3,t [ψ (2πt − 1)] (C.41)
Xt : 0 = −
h
(Ct − hXt)ρ
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